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The purpose of the present research is to investigate the empirical determinants of the non-
performing loans’ evolution in the European banking system.  
The main aim of this introduction is to justify the production of additional research on a topic 
that has been in the limelight since the end of the last century. The stock of non-performing 
loans is still considered as a pan-European problem and a matter of great concern for the solidity 
of the individual banks, hence justifying further research projects aimed at assessing their 
determinants. If on the one hand the proactive behaviour of the financial industry over the last 
years led the magnitude and severity of the problem to diminish significantly in the majority of 
the European countries, on the other hand, the European regulator still assigns to the NPLs issue 
a central relevance. As a matter of fact, the SSM Risk Map1 highlights NPLs, geopolitical 
uncertainties and cycbercrime as the top three risks considering both their probability and 
impact. 
Figure 0: Key risks for SSM banks for 2019. SSM Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) – Methodology Booklet. 
European Central Bank (2018) 
 
This concern is mostly explained by the acknowledgment that the aggregate level of NPLs 
within the European industry remains elevated by international standards. Moreover, ongoing 
search for yield, along with still subdued profitability, might result in an excessive risk taking 
and consequently in future non-performing loans.  
                                                          
1 SSM Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) – Methodology Booklet. European Central Bank 
(2018). 
The present work is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 provides a detailed description of the European perimeter of definitions concerning 
non-performing and forborne exposures. Innovations introduced by the new accounting 
standard (IFRS 9) are also taken into consideration. The descriptive part of the chapter is then 
enriched by the contextualization of the variable of interest within the European environment. 
The reader will be indeed provided with a trustworthy picture of the current situation in Europe 
in order to set a levelled playfield for the right comprehension of the size of the problem. 
Building on the information collected by the Risk Assessment Questionnaires (RAQs), we will 
finally identify the most relevant impediments to a complete resolution of the non-performing 
loans problem.  
Chapter 2 discusses the most common practices employed by financial institutions in the 
management of non-performing exposures both from a theoretical and practical point of view. 
The dissertation is also enriched with the updated EBA Guidelines (2019) in the field of NPL 
management and linked to Chapter 1 as the most relevant perspectives to solve the bad loans 
problem are presented. In particular, paragraph 2.4 focuses on the projects of a united European 
secondary market for NPLs and of a pan-European bad bank. 
Chapter 3 constitutes a broad literature review on the empirical determinants of non-performing 
loans. Macroeconomic, banking-specific and corporate governance determinants have been 
considered.  
Chapter 4 presents in detail the empirical analysis performed. Since its early stages, this 
research project has been conceived with the strong ambition to highlight common patterns at 
a European level, rather than at a country-specific level. It is opinion of the author that the 
increasing convergence of the European regulatory and supervisory framework evidenced by 
Chapter 1 opens significant research possibilities to investigate banking-related issues on a 
European level. We decided to investigate the empirical effects of a set of corporate governance 
variables on the magnitude of the non-performing loans held. The focus on the role of corporate 
governance on the ability to manage exposures is precisely the main contribution of our work 








1.1 Definitions and classifications 
In the aftermath of both 2007 financial crisis and the most recent sovereign debt crisis, banks 
have witnessed a dramatic reduction of their assets’ quality, caused by the increased share of 
debtors unable to meet their obligations when they came due.  
Building on the horizon of a banking union, the lack of comparable and sound data on both 
forbearance transactions and exposures qualified as non-performing could have been an 
obstacle to the objective assessment of banks assets’ quality. For this reason, and in the view of 
the Asset Quality Review2 (AQR) exercise, the European Banking Authority (EBA) released 
its final Implementing Technical Standards3 (ITS) on supervisory reporting of Non-Performing 
Exposures and Forbearance enclosing the harmonized definitions of forbearance (FBE) and 
non-performing exposures (NPEs). This normative intervention became necessary given the 
acknowledgment of two main problems: 
 the recurring use of forbearance measures with the purpose of postponing loss 
recognition, thus covering up assets’ quality deterioration;  
 the lack of consistency among the assets’ quality assessments across Europe, in 
particular with respect to the threshold employed by different jurisdictions in order to 
distinguish between performing and non-performing categories.  
The harmonization of the definitions scheme on a European level is, together with the Council 
Action Plan (2017), the cornerstone that allowed European countries to address the problem of 
assets’ quality deterioration in a decisive and effective way.  
The proposed definitions for forbearance and non-performing exposures rely on the existing 
concepts of impairment and default in accordance to both International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (CRR4). EBA decided to avoid a rough 
replacement of those concepts in the national jurisdictions, following instead a more 
accommodating path. The harmonized definitions have been drafted after considering the 
mappings across international accounting standards and national common practices. These 
                                                          
2 Together with the stress testing exercise, the asset quality review composes the second pillar of the assessment 
performed by the European Central Bank on the banks it supervises directly. These comprehensive assessments 
help to ensure that banks are adequately capitalised and can withstand macroeconomic and financial shocks.  
3 Published on 21st October 2013 




mappings aimed at assessing to what extent it could have been possible to rely on already 
existing or similar concepts for the definition of forbearance and non-performing exposures. At 
the same time, the consideration of the mappings ensured consistency with the definitions and 
common practices already employed in Europe. This exercise revealed a twofold truth: the 
heterogeneity among the national definitions of forbearance and non-performing exposures and 
the common practice of having these concepts strongly linked to the notion of impaired and/or 
defaulted exposures. The latter statement, well describes the reasons why it has been decided 
to use the notions of impairment and default as building blocks in the definition of forbearance 
and non-performing exposures at a European harmonized level. As a result, the aforementioned 
definitions constitute umbrella concepts, meaning that they cover some of the existing credit 
risk-related concepts, without replacing them, allowing for a broader scope. Consequently, all 
impaired and defaulted exposures in accordance to IFRS and CRR will be necessarily NPEs5, 
but NPEs can also encompass exposures that are not recognized as impaired or defaulted as 
defined by the aforementioned normative frameworks. A fitting example of this situation is the 
Italian environment, where categorizations of non-performing exposures inherited from the past 
are still used in parallel with the harmonized European categorizations.  
It has to be highlighted that, within the scope of the regulation, “exposures” includes all debt 
instruments (loans and advances and debt securities) and off-balance sheet exposures6 but held 
for trading exposures. The difference is relevant since in the continuation of the thesis we will 
refer mostly to non-performing loans, considering then only a subset, even though the most 
relevant one, of the broader concept of non-performing exposures.  
In the continuation of the paragraph, the reader will be provided with the technical definitions 
of both NPEs and forborne exposures. Particular attention will be devoted to present the 
discontinuation criteria for both concepts.  
EBA’s Technical Standard defines non-performing exposures as: “those that satisfy either or 
both the following criteria: 
a) material exposures which are more than 90 days past-due7; 
                                                          
5 Non-performing exposures 
6 Off-balance sheet exposures comprise the following revocable and irrevocable items: loan commitments given, 
financial guarantees given, and other commitments given. 




b) the debtor is assessed as unlikely to pay its credit obligations in full without realisation 
of collateral, regardless of the existence of any past-due amount or of the number of 
days past due.” 
As it is clear, the rationale of the definition is to determine the non-performance of an exposure 
in accordance with an objective days-past-due criterion, together with the assessment of the 
borrower’s debt servicing capacity. EBA’s ITS clarifies at paragraph 146 that the 
aforementioned definition shall apply despite the belonging of an exposure to the families of 
either defaulted exposures in accordance with Art. 178 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 or 
impaired for accounting purposes. In categorizing non-performing exposures, the Technical 
Standard specifies how the entire amount must be considered, without taking into account the 
existence of any collateral. Furthermore, any exposure can be assessed as non-performing on 
an individual basis (transaction approach) or by considering the overall exposure towards a 
given debtor (debtor approach). The choice on which approach to follow is left to the discretion 
of the individual entity. However, the Technical Standard identifies the scenario8 that requires 
a mandatory use of the debtor approach. EBA’s ITS specifies at paragraph 155 that the 
mentioned scenario entails the consideration of the entirety of that debtor’s on-balance sheet 
and off-balance sheet exposures as non-performing (pulling effect).   
EBA furnished the NPE definition with a clear statement of the conditions, the achievement of 
which constitutes recovery from the non-performing status. According to the Technical 
Standard (par. 156), an exposure shall remain classified as non-performing until all the 
following three requirements are met in full: 
a) the exposure meets the exit criteria applied by the reporting institution for the 
discontinuation of the impairment and default classification; 
b) the situation of the debtor has improved to the extent that full repayment, according to 
the original or when applicable the modified conditions, is likely to be made; 
c) the debtor does not have any amount past-due by more than 90 days. 
Paragraph 157 states instead the discontinuation criteria to be met in full in order to allow a 
non-performing exposure on which forbearance measures was granted, to cease being non-
performing: 
a) the extension of forbearance does not lead to the recognition of impairment or default; 
                                                          
8 In the case that the individual entity has on-balance sheet exposures toward a debtor that are past due by more 
than 90 days, the gross carrying amount of which is no less than 20% of the gross carrying amount of the entirety 




b) one year has passed since the forbearance measures were extended; 
c) there is not, following the forbearance measures, any past-due amount or concern 
regarding the full repayment of the exposure according to the post-forbearance 
conditions. The absence of concerns has to be determined after an analysis of the 
debtor’s financial situation. Concerns may be considered as no longer existing when the 
debtor has paid, via its regular payments in accordance with the post-forbearance 
conditions, a total equal to the amount that was previously past-due (if there were past-
due amounts) or that has been written-off (if there were no past-due amounts) under the 
forbearance measures or when the debtor has otherwise demonstrated its ability to 
comply with the post-forbearance conditions. 
In terms of forborne exposures, the harmonized definition identifies them as “debt contracts in 
respect of which forbearance measures have been extended”. Forbearance measures consist of 
concessions towards a debtor facing or about to face difficulties in meeting its financial 
commitments (“financial difficulties”). Concessions may entail a loss for the lender and in 
particular they refer to either of the following actions (par.164):  
a) a modification of the previous terms and conditions of a contract the debtor is considered 
unable to comply with due to its financial difficulties (“troubled debt”). Such 
modification is aimed at allowing a sufficient debt service ability and it has to be 
characterized by the fact that it would not have been granted had the debtor not been in 
financial difficulties; 
b) a total or partial refinancing of a troubled debt contract, that would not have been 
granted had the debtor not been in financial difficulties. 
At first glance, forbearance measures represent then changes to the terms of the original 
contract, granted by a bank to the customer, in order to address its objective condition of 
financial difficulty. In general terms, exposures are treated as forborne if a concession has been 
made, irrespective of whether any amount is past-due or of the classification of the exposures 
as impaired9 or as defaulted10. It follows that there is the simultaneous existence of forborne 
exposures categorized either as performing or as non-performing depending on the achievement 
or not of the non-performing criteria cited above.  
                                                          
9 In accordance with the applicable accounting standard (refer to IFRS) 




In parallel with the structure adopted in defining non-performing exposures, we now give 
evidence of the cases acknowledged by the Technical Standard to prove as events that cease the 
belonging to the forborne category (par. 176):  
a) the contract is considered as performing, including if it has been reclassified from the 
non-performing category after an analysis of the financial condition of the debtor 
showed it no longer met the conditions to be considered as nonperforming; 
b) a minimum 2 year probation period has passed from the date the forborne exposure was 
considered as performing; 
c) regular payments of more than an insignificant aggregate amount of principal or interest 
have been made during at least half of the probation period; 
d) none of the exposures to the debtor is more than 30 days past-due at the end of the 
probation period. 
The forbearance classification of the exposure is discontinued when all the aforementioned 
conditions are met. 
 
1.2 Current situation in Europe 
In the scope of our empirical analysis, we deem of relevant importance the contextualization of 
the variable of interest within the European environment. In particular, the dissertation 
concerning banks’ asset quality commenced in the previous paragraph, is now provided with 
concrete substance by the consideration of the utmost proxy for asset quality: NPL ratio. NPL 
ratio is hereinafter defined as the ratio between the stock of non-performing loans held by a 
bank and the total gross loan amount granted by the same bank in the same fiscal year. The ratio 
is usually expressed in percentage terms.  
The following paragraph, mostly drawing from EBA Report on NPLs (2019), will provide the 
reader with the most updated data on non-performing loans ratios, coverage ratios and 
forbearance ratios, proposed at different levels of aggregation.  
In the attempt of depicting a trustworthy image of the current situation in Europe and of its 
recent past, the present section displays data regarding the four years between June 2015 and 
June 2019. Such a time-window is of particular interest since it follows the introduction by 
EBA of a harmonised definition of NPLs across European countries in 2014. It also includes 
the publication by the European Council of the comprehensive action plan to tackle NPLs dating 




The figures included in the subsequent paragraphs are based on a balanced sample of 
approximately 150 banks, coherent with the EBA risk dashboard, covering no less than 80% of 
the EEA11 banking sector by total assets.  
General trend in non-performing loans: The asset quality of banks in the Euro-Area as 
defined by the NPL ratio has significantly improved over the time-period hereby considered. 
As a matter of fact, the industry’s NPL ratio weighted average currently lines up to 3,0%, down 
from the maximum of 6,5% in December 2014. The down-warding trend has been persistent 
through the years. Nevertheless, the pace of such a reduction has been slowing down in the 
recent years, signalling the difficulty of addressing those legacy-non-performing-assets that 
weight down banks’ balance sheets. From an analytical point of view, the trend is mostly driven 
by the reduction in NPL volumes rather than by an increase of total loans (denominator). Figure 
1.1 highlights how, on an aggregate basis, the numerator has halved over the four years 
considered: from EUR 1152 billion in June 2015 to EUR 636 billion in June 2019. On the other 
hand, loans volume increased by more or less 10% over the same time-period.  
Figure 1.1: Quarterly trend in NPL and NPE ratios (%) and NPL volumes (EUR billion) — December 2014 to June 2019. Final 
EBA Report on NPLs (2019). 
 
 
By investigating the ratios at a country-level we are able to spot those countries in which the 
developments have been more significant. Not surprisingly, banks in countries with high NPL 
ratios at the beginning of the period generally reported the biggest improvements. Those banks’ 
                                                          




results are then the main drivers of the decrease at the aggregate European level. In the 
following graph (Figure 1.2) are displayed the NPL ratios at June 2015 and June 2019 at a 
member state level, allowing us to draw the attention on those countries that succeeded the most 
in reducing domestic volumes of NPLs. In particular, among the large economies, Italian and 
Spanish banks achieved a reduction of  9% and 3,5%, respectively. Still considering relative 
terms, even more significant results have been achieved by smaller economies such as Cyprus 
and Slovenia: here banks reported a reduction in NPL ratio close to 30% and 20%, respectively. 
Data on Greek banks may look odd at first sight; nevertheless the explanation of such a low 
change has to be found in the fact that NPL ratio of Greece peaked in September 2016, thus 
almost a year after the other European economies. Taking into consideration the peak of 47,1% 
(Sept.2016), Greek banks achieved a decrease on NPL ratio of 7,7%, a result comparable to the 
Italian environment.  
Figure 1.2: NPL ratios by country in June 2015 and June 2019 (%) and p.p. change between June 2015 and June 2019. Final 
EBA Report on NPLs (2019).  
 
 
Data available at the most granular level are those at individual banks level. The evidences so 
far mentioned are confirmed also at this level of granularity. Specifically: a steady and 
generalized reduction of the ratios over the years, mostly driven by banks that reported NPL 
ratios higher than average in the years immediately following the Great Recession and the 




characterized by less-stressed balance sheets, achieving an average decrease of 8,7% versus the 
average 3,9% of the full sample.  
Figure 1.3: NPL ratio (%) by bank in June 2015 and the change between June 2015 and June 2019 (p.p.). Final EBA Report on 
NPLs (2019).  
 
 
Non-performing loans by past-due category: In order to enrich the description of the 
European environment, it can be useful to consider the segmentation of non-performing loans 
by past-due category. Such a perspective provides to be crucial since there is evidence that older 
NPLs may be harder to cure and suffer of a significant depreciation. Countries with high NPL 
ratios have generally higher shares in past-due buckets of 1 year and more. Consequently, such 
exposures are of particular concern both for banks and for the regulator, and are then the ones 
on which most attention has been given during recent years. Such concern and attention allowed 
the bucket of past-due of more than 1 year to reduce, in relative terms, from 52% in 2015 to 
29% in 2019. Such a reduction implicitly caused UTP12 bucket to increase in relative terms 
from 32% to 40% while reducing in absolute terms. 
                                                          




Figure 1.4: NPL volumes   (EUR billion) by past due category and yearly trend of EU NPL ratio (%) — June 2015 to June 2019. 
Final EBA Report on NPLs (2019).  
 
 
Non-performing loans by type of exposure: A further relevant point of view, useful to 
disentangle the evolution of NPLs in Europe, is to consider the types of exposure. As of June 
2019, NPLs to non financial corporations (NFCs) stood at EUR 364 billion, down from EUR 
705 billion in June 2015. A more flat reduction characterized the evolution of NPLs to 
households that indeed decreased from the EUR 396 billion of 2015 to the EUR 250 billion of 
2019. A more granular description of the two aggregates goes beyond the scope of this work, 
still we would like to underline how once again the steepest reduction (NFCs) has been driven 
by the most distressed sectors: in this case the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) of high 
NPL countries.  
The analysis of the data at the type of exposure level allows us to better understand the drivers 
of the coverage ratios of non-performing loans.  
Coverage of non-performing loans: The coverage ratio can be roughly defined as the ratio 
between the provisions for NPLs put aside by the bank and the NPLs themselves. The banking-
industry average coverage ratio of NPLs reported as of June 2019 was 44,9%, achieving an 




both components have been following a down-warding trend, but at different paces. The 
coverage ratio peaked in June 2018 at 46% and then inverted the trend due to a significant fall 
in provisions that overcame the aforementioned steady reduction in NPLs. A set of reasons can 
be called on in order to justify the evidenced decrease in provisioning: first of all, we may recall 
the lower cost of owning risk allowed by the dynamics of economic recovery, secondly the 
general phenomenon of de-risking banks’ balance sheets definitely played a role.  
Figure 1.5: Trends in EU coverage ratio (%), numerator and denominator (EUR billion) — June 2015 to June 2019. Final EBA 
Report on NPLs (2019). 
 
 
We shall now clarify that the coverage ratios data presented so far are intended to be averages 
on a European level. For sake of completeness, we shall mention that, beyond these averages, 
there is quite a significant dispersion on a country level, ranging from 26% for banks in Malta, 
Finland, Netherlands and Ireland, to 66% for banks in Hungary and Romania. The differences 
across countries in coverage ratios can be mainly explained by different exposures towards 
specific segments: for example, NPLs to large corporates attract a higher level of provisioning 
as compared to mortgages, since the latters have usually higher collateral. From here, we 
understand the usefulness of investigating non-performing loans also from an exposure-type 
point of view.  
The magnitude of provisioning has direct consequences on distressed loan portfolios: banks 




timing perspective are in a better position to manage NPLs. Given the centrality of this 
dimension in the management of asset portfolios, various European authorities, including the 
ECB and the Commission, have applied provisioning expectations and policies to enhance 
prudential treatment.  
Forbearance. A last mention has to be made regarding those exposures characterized by 
forbearance measures. In Europe, contrary to the Anglo-Saxon environment, there is evidence 
of a banks’ preference towards loan restructuring rather than towards loan refinancing. On 
aggregate EU level, 75% of the loans with forbearance measures used modification of terms 
and conditions, whereas only 25% were refinanced.  
Forbearance ratios of the EU banking sector have been decreasing constantly since June 2015. 
The average forbearance loan ratio13 (FBL) of the sector, as June 2019, stood at 1,9%, down 
from 3,7% in June 2015. The same trend also holds true for the forbearance exposure ratio14 
(FBE), which has reduced from 3,2% to 1,7% over the past four years. Besides the aggregated 
view, the aforementioned general trend is also confirmed on an individual-bank level: as a 
matter of fact, only 13 banks out of 150 have increased their FBL ratio within the time window 
considered. 
If we consider performing FBLs as more vulnerable assets than performing loans, we might 
build up a more conservative index for distressed loan portfolios combining performing FBLs 
and NPLs ratios. The resulting index over-estimates the riskiness of loan exposures, a feature 
that may be useful in those contexts where under-estimation of risks is common practice. The 
EBA Report claims that the magnitude of such index stood at 3,7% in June 2019 (compared to 
3% of  “plain NPL ratio”), down from the maximum of 8,1% in December 2014. 
 
1.3 Impact of IFRS 9  
Beyond normative definitions, a crucial role in the framework of non-performing and forborne 
exposures is performed by the accounting standard regulating the treatment of such captions in 
the banking books. The rationale of the present paragraph is to provide the reader with an 
updated review of the accounting standard the banks have to comply with since January 1st, 
2018: IFRS 9. The attention of the reader will be driven through the reasons that made a new 
                                                          
13 FBL ratio is calculated as loans with forbearance measures (including both non-performing and performing) 
for loans and advances, over total gross loans and advances. 




standard needed, the differences with respect to the past and the effects that such standard has 
on recognition and evaluation of impaired assets by European banks. 
During the financial crisis, the late recognition of credit losses related to loans and other 
financial instruments, together with the high degree of subjectivity allowed regarding the 
identification of financial instruments at fair value, was identified as one of the major 
weaknesses in the existing accounting standard (IAS 39). The timing of the loss recognition 
had become a significant issue because the model describing such procedure under IAS 39 was 
an incurred loss model, i.e., a model that do not recognizes credit losses until a credit loss event 
occurs.  
Building on the failure of IAS 39 in preventing the effects of the crisis to jeopardize banks’ 
solidity, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued the final version of  IFRS 
9. The biggest development brought by the new standard is the employment of an expected loss 
model: a model aimed at a timely recognition of expected losses on credits, associated with a 
more useful and transparent disclosure of them. In other words, the difference between IFRS 9 
and IAS 39 impairment requirements is the removal of the incurred loss event as threshold for 
the recognition of credit losses, i.e. it is no longer necessary for a credit event to have occurred 
before credit losses are recognised. On the contrary, banks shall account for expected credit 
losses on a financial asset since its initial recognition. Moreover, they retain the responsibility 
of adjusting, at each reporting date, the loss allowances amount in the event of changes in 
expected credit losses. These checks has to be made with the purpose of reflecting potential 
changes in credit risk, starting from the initial recognition of the asset. The standard envisages 
three different ways to quantify the amounts to set aside as a loss allowances or as provisions: 
the General Approach, the Simplified Approach15 and the credit-adjusted EIR approach16. 
The guiding principle of the expected credit loss model as cornerstone of IFRS 9 impairment 
model, is to follow the general pattern of deterioration (or improvement) in the credit quality of 
financial instruments. The expected credit loss (ECL) is formally defined as the weighted 
average of the credit losses that the bank recognizes on the financial asset following the default 
event17. Credit losses are consequently defined as the present value of expected cash shortfalls. 
In particular, from an analytical point of view, the present value of expected cash shortfalls is 
                                                          
15 Such an approach is either required or available as a policy choice for trade receivables, contract assets and 
lease receivables. 
16 Such an approach is used for purchased or originated credit-impaired financial assets. 
17 It has to be underlined how the Standard does not contain any definition of default, it simply specifies that the 
default definition has to be consistent with that used for internal credit risk management purposes. Nevertheless 




computed as the difference between the cash flows that are due in accordance with the contract, 
and the cash flows expected to be received, discounted at the original effective interest rate 
(EIR).  
The amount of ECLs recognised as a loss allowance or provision depends to the extent of credit 
deterioration since initial recognition. IFRS 9 impairment model provides indeed the 
categorization of the financial assets into 3 stages (staging allocation) on the basis of their credit 
quality deterioration. The impairment model, in its General Approach, requires financial 
entities to account for credit losses over a time horizon of 12 months for financial assets that 
have not increased significantly the credit risk since the initial recognition (Stage 1). On the 
other hand, the time horizon is extended to the maturity of the financial asset if it has 
experienced a significant increase in credit risk since initial recognition (Stage 2) or if it results 
impaired (Stage 3).  Stages 2 and 3 differ in how interest revenue is recognised. Indeed, after 
the staging allocation and the consideration of the appropriate time window in which to consider 
ECLs, the bank computes the interest revenues for each exposure. On the one hand, both Stage 
1 and Stage 2 exposures consider effective interest rate on the gross carrying amount of the 
asset (i.e. gross of impairment deductions). On the other hand, allocations to Stage 3 prescribe 
a more conservative computation of interest revenues, thus considering effective interest rate 
on the net carrying amount (i.e. net of impairment deductions, amortised cost) only. 
It falls within each entity’s individual responsibility the assessment, at each reporting date, of 
whether the credit risk on a financial instrument has increased significantly since initial 
recognition. The migration from Stage 1 to Stage 2 is generally triggered at the occurrence of 
an increase, assessed through a relative criterion, of the default probability (PD) in relation to 
the one assessed at initial recognition. The Regulator also identified 3 backstop indicators that 
automatically entail the occurred increase in default probability and thus the migration of the 
exposure from Stage 1 to Stage 2. Such backstop indicators are: payments 30 days past due, 
grant of forbearance measures, transferral of the exposure to a watchlist. With regards to the 
migration from Stage 2 to Stage 3, the exposure had to have suffered an objective evidence of 
impairment. Appendix A of IFRS 9 provides a complete list of those indicators the occurrence 
of which constitutes objective evidence of impairment. Among these indicators we report the 
most recurrent ones being: a significant financial difficulty of the issuer or of the borrower and 
a breach of the debt contract.  
The Standard also specifies that the measurement of expected credit losses must be the 




 an unbiased and probability-weighted amount that is determined considering at least 
two scenarios reflecting the possibility that a credit loss occurs (default) and that no 
credit loss occurs (no default); 
 the time value of money, identified by the Standard as the effective interest rate (EIR) 
determined at initial recognition; 
 reasonable and supportable information reflecting past events, current conditions and 
forecasts of future economic conditions.  
The ECL model, as conceived by IFRS 9, is thus based on 3 parameters of risk: marginal 
probability of default18 (MPD), loss given default19 (LGD) and exposure at default20 (EAD). 
Such parameters shall adjust to include forward looking information and macroeconomic 
scenarios as prescribed by the third point above.  
For those exposures for which a 12-months expected credit loss assessment is required, the 
model applied is the following: 
𝐸𝐶𝐿1 = 𝑀𝑃𝐷1 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷1 ∗
𝐸𝐴𝐷1
(1 + 𝐸𝐼𝑅)1
          (1) 
For those exposures for which a lifetime assessment of expected credit losses is required, the 
model applied is the following: 






         (2) 
The definition of Stage 3 exposure, while resembling the IAS 39 definition of impaired, still 
does not overlie with the EBA’s criterion of 90 days past due identifying a non-performing 
exposure. Within the purposes of the present work is thus important to underline how the 90 
days past due criterion that defines an exposure as non-performing prima facie, does not 
necessarily mean Stage 3 classification.    
Drawing again from final EBA Report on NPLs (2019) we are able to give evidence of the 
current European NPLs situation considering staging allocation. As of June 2019, European 
banks allocated on average 90,4% of the loans and advances recorded at amortised cost in Stage 
1, 7% in Stage 2 and 2,6% in Stage 321. These allocations compare favourably with the only 
                                                          
18 The marginal probability of default (MPD) is defined as the probability of the occurrence of a default event of 
the credit risk exposure at time t. 
19 The loss given default (LGD) is defined as the percentage of estimated loss at time t. 
20 The exposure at default (EAD) is defined as the measure of the exposure at the time of the default event of the 
credit exposure at time t. 




other observation available22: back in June 2018 the proportions were 88,2%, 7,7% and 4%, 
respectively, with a significant unload of both Stage 2 and Stage 3 exposures.  
We evidence the highest shares of loans and advances allocated to Stage 3 in Greece (41%) and 
Cyprus (31%). On the contrary, Czechia and Sweden were characterized by the highest share 
of exposures allocated to Stage 1 (more than 95%), followed by Norway and Germany. From a 
dynamic perspective, over the last 12 months, only 2 countries (Estonia and Luxemburg), 
reported an increase in the share of their Stage 3 loans and advances, thus confirming the 
consistent reduction of bad loans stock already evidenced in the previous paragraphs.  
Figure 1.6: Distribution (%) of loans and advances recognised at amortised cost among stages 1, 2 and 3, by country — June 
2019. Final EBA Report on NPLs (2019). 
 
 
Data at a bank level show that as of June 2019, roughly 50% of the banks allocated a share of 
at least 10% of their assets either in Stage 2 or Stage 3, signalling a more or less severity of 
deterioration. The 10% share hides possible vulnerabilities in the asset quality of some banks’ 
balance sheets.  
In terms of coverage ratios computed on IFRS 9 – like exposures, the EU banking industry 
average in June 2019 stood at 46,3% for Stage 3, 3,5% for Stage 2, 0,2% for Stage 1. Coverage 
ratios slightly decreased in the 12-month time window regarding Stage 1, while remaining 
constant for Stage 2 and for Stage 3. Similarly to what pointed out for the coverage of NPLs, 
the coverage of Stage 3 assets shows a wide dispersion both on a country and on a bank specific 
                                                          
22 Availability of data regarding “IFRS 9-like” exposures is very limited given its recent introduction (1st 




level, evidencing country-like and bank-like peculiarities in terms of foreclosures, 
collateralisation and provision policies, mostly.  
   
1.4 Impediments to the resolution of the problem 
The scenario outlined both in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 establishes a positive outlook for the 
future, achieved building mainly on the acknowledgment of the problem as a structural one and 
on the proactive behaviour of individual banks.  Nevertheless, as evidenced in the previous 
paragraphs, the pace of reduction of NPLs has been slowing down in the most recent years and 
this has become a matter of great concern for the European banking system as a whole.  
In order to address such a problem, the EBA included in its 2019 Report on NPLs, a dedicated 
section, reporting survey data gathered among European banks, collecting their views on the 
impediments to a further reduction of the problem. Data have been collected through the Risk 
Assessment Questionnaires23 (RAQs).  
Figure 1.7: Trend in impediments to resolving NPLs (%) — banks’  RAQs, autumn 2019. Final EBA Report on NPLs (2019). 
 
 
In autumn 2019, around 60% of the banks considered in the sample identified the lengthy and 
expensive judiciary process in cases of insolvency, together with collateral enforcement, as the 
                                                          
23 The EBA conducts semi-annual Risk Assessment Questionnaires (RAQs) among banks and market 
analysts. Please note that results referring to 2019 considers 65 banks and 13 market analysts, an enlarged 
sample as compared to the previous ones: 53 banks in Autumn 2018 and 38 banks in previous editions. The 2019 
sample is with no doubt better balanced among countries and it provides a more representative result across 




main impediment to resolve the NPLs issue on a deeper level. An important branch of literature 
studies such a relationship with Aiyar et al. (2015) being the seminal paper evidencing a strong 
negative relationship between NPLs and foreclosures. The lengthy of judiciary processes is, 
with no doubt, the biggest single obstacle, given the progressive resolution of the lack of a 
secondary market for NPLs. The perception of the latter as an issue has been decreasing 
significantly over the last 2 years. As a matter of fact, back in Autumn 2017, the lack of a 
secondary market for NPLs was addressed by banks to have the same relative incidence 
(approximately 55%) of an inefficient legal framework in slowing down the complete resolution 
of the NPLs problem. In Autumn 2019, only 34% of the banks reporting to RAQs address the 
lack of a secondary market as an impediment to a further development of the bad loans situation, 
such evidence witnesses the huge step forward that have been made in the development of 
markets for NPLs24. Of specific importance is the fact that banks from countries that have an 
NPL ratio below the EU average attach a higher relevance to the lack of a market for 
NPLs/collateral as compared to countries that have an NPL ratio above the EU average. This 
indicates that NPL investors focus on the regions with high NPL ratios rather than on “safer 
docks” in order to take advantage of lower valuations and increase returns. Corroborating the 
latter statement, the Italian market has been constantly the most active one over the last few 
years, as a report by Deloitte (2019)25 confirms. The activity around the aggregate European 
loan portfolio stood at around EUR 100 billion per year from 2014 to 2016. Volumes traded 
increased significantly both in 2017 and 2018 reaching local maximums at EUR 153,3 billion 
and EUR 202,8 billion, respectively. The significant increase in loan portfolio activity has been 
driven by the Italian market mostly. Institutional investors has found in the Italian loan market 
their favourite floor to trade. Since 2014, Italy has been moving EUR 238,8 billion in loan 
portfolios, approximately the half of which only in the two years between 2017 and 2018. The 
second and third most active markets of the Old Continent are Spain (EUR 168,6 billion) and 
UK (EUR 129,2 billion), respectively. Italian market is characterized by a huge pressure on the 
sell side of deteriorated loan portfolios, thus confirming the intuition of the interest of 
institutional investors on countries with higher-than-average NPL ratios. This idea is 
corroborated by the ranks of the top sellers and top buyers since 2014 drafted by Deloitte (2019). 
On the sell side we highlight the presence of three Italian banks within the first 6 sellers: 
Unicredit with EUR 37,8 billion dismissed, Banca MPS with EUR 35,1 billion and Intesa 
SanPaolo with EUR 28,2 billion. On the other hand, the Italian presence on the buy side is 
negligible: the most active Italian buyer has been Banca IFIS with EUR 15,3 billion acquired 
                                                          
24 Please refer to paragraph 2.4 for a thorough assessment of the topic. 




over 6 years. Such an amount is weakly relevant if compared to the EUR 102,9 billion acquired 































Deteriorated exposures, regardless of their formal and normative definition have to be managed. 
The latter is a decisive task to be performed by individual banks given the disruptive 
implications that distressed exposures have on banks’ stability and profitability. The aim of the 
current section is to give evidence of the most common practices employed by financial 
institutions in the management of non-performing exposures both from a theoretical (par. 2.1) 
and practical (par. 2.2) point of view. The dissertation will be also enriched with the updated 
guidelines by EBA (2019) in the field of NPLs management (par. 2.3) and concluded with the 
most relevant new perspectives in deteriorated exposures management: the creation of a united 
European secondary market and of a pan-European bad bank (par. 2 .4).  
 
2.1 Common practices to address the problem 
The first paramount concept to clarify is that it does not exist a unique best strategy to address 
the distressed portfolios problem. The set of tools available is huge and individual banks choose 
the combination that better allows them to pursue their objective, namely the maximisation of 
the recovery value. We are thus entering a framework with a well defined goal, but with 
countless paths to be taken in order to achieve it. It is then up to the single bank to take the 
correct one, building a coherent strategy considering the peculiarities of each portfolio as well 
as those of the bank as a whole. Within the assessment of its internal characteristics, the bank 
shall assign to the following a prime weight: size and organizational structure in general, 
availability of expertise to deal with distressed exposures, maturity of the internal control 
systems and of the IT infrastructure. On the single portfolio level instead, the concerns shall be 
directed to a truthful assessment of the different risk levels, perspectives of recovery and 
presence of guarantees.  The different features between private and corporate exposures shall 
also be always kept in mind.     
In addressing the set of tools available in order to manage distressed exposures, we follow the 
setting of Fell et al. (2016).  This paper identifies first a dichotomy between on-balance sheet 
and off-balance sheet approaches and then it enriches the set of options available adding more 




Figure 2.1 – A non exhaustive taxonomy of options for addressing NPLs. Source: Fell J., Grodzicki M., Martin R. and O’Brien E., 
Addressing market failures in the resolution of non-performing loans in the euro area, Financial Stability Review, November 
2016. 
 
The choice of either one of the two directions is not exhaustive: the best practices employed by 
the banks usually entail the use of a combination of the tools presented in figure 2.1 based on 
the characteristics of the single portfolio and of the bank itself. The complementarity of the 
options is the factor that gives strength to the presence of active management of NPLs portfolios 
within the banking industry: besides the more or less favourable macroeconomic environment, 
there is still space for the individual talent in managing such exposures.  
The description that will follow takes into consideration the most common strategies employed 
by banks in order to tackle the NPLs problem, detailing for each of them the most relevant 
characteristics and implications concerning costs, returns and risks.  
2.1.1. Internal management 
This option usually tends to be preferred by large banks since it entails a huge effort both in 
terms of costs and of organizational restructuring. The first step in fostering an internal 
management strategy for dealing with distressed exposures is to develop a specific NPL 
working unit that encompasses the presence of individuals with the right expertise supported 
by an appropriate IT system. Beyond pros and cons, the in-house management solution implies 
a significant investment in human resources, organizational processes and information 
technology systems. In terms of processes, screening and monitoring become a core task of the 
unit with the purpose of reducing the migration of performed exposures towards the non-
performing buckets. The screening process work in parallel with the lending office, assisting it 




the quality of loans after they have been granted. It is then clear how crucial it is, from the 
individual-banks’ perspective, the recognition of early signals that may foresee the deterioration 
of a particular exposure or portfolio. Early recognition allows the bank to act in advance, most 
likely avoiding the borrower from becoming non-performing. A clear task of the working unit 
is then the development and implementation of strategies and policies concerning the 
management of the exposures before their deterioration (i.e. ex-ante management).  
Among the benefits of the in-house solution, we recall the possibility of developing and 
pursuing an independent recovery plan, allowing the institution to track its own records, 
possibly developing a corporate best practice to address the problem. This may enable the bank 
to maximise gross recoveries of loans owing to a better understanding and a longer history of 
dealing with distressed exposures. At the same time, through an internal management solution, 
the bank may be able to retain its customers allowing them to return to a performing status 
instead of writing them off. 
On the other hand, the drawbacks of the in-house strategy are: the cost structure to sustain in 
order to develop the working unit and the deferred reduction in loan loss provisions.  
2.1.2 Outsourcing 
The outsourcing of the NPLs management to a specialized third-party is often the preferred 
path in the cases where a sufficient internal expertise is lacking. With the outsourcing solution, 
the third party becomes responsible for both NPLs management and related activities such as 
the relationship with the borrowers and credit recovery. This solution, if compared to the 
internal management, it can be intended as the symmetrical one on the spectrum of possible 
practices. 
The outsourcing solution entails a three-sided set of benefits. First, the transferral to a 
professional third party allows the bank to exploit the expertise of a structure that, owing to its 
experience and know-how, can provide a more effective and efficient service. Second, this 
solution entails a different cost structure as compared to the internal workout. The latter 
envisages a fixed cost structure made of significant investments in both human resources and 
IT systems; the outsourcing strategy instead allows for a very flexible cost structure that turns 
out in a considerable reduction of the operating costs for banks26. By outsourcing the 
management of NPLs, banks are implicitly pegging their costs to the results obtained by the 
third-party hired. Please note that in the context of NPLs management, results are usually 
measured in terms of recovery rates achieved. Third, with no concerns regarding NPLs 
                                                          




management, banks can redirect attention and resources towards their core business (i.e. lending 
activities). 
The main concern for banks that decide to undertake the outsourcing strategy is the lack of a 
fair competitive environment among the third-party professional operators, thus the risk of 
being charged with out-of-market contractual conditions.  
2.1.3. Asset Protection Schemes 
In between the on-balance sheet management of which at paragraph 2.1.1 and the off-balance 
sheet management of which at paragraph 2.1.2, we identify a hybrid strategy: asset protection 
schemes (APSs). They consists of an insurance-based government protection scheme with the 
purpose of sustaining individual banks with excessive NPL levels; it is a measure usually 
implemented during crises and in the aftermath of financial turmoil. The hybrid nature of the 
APS option can be easily understood from the fact that even though the assets formally remain 
on the banks’ balance sheet, they are actually included in an internal work-out unit and managed 
separately from the bulk of banks’ other assets.  
The advantage that justifies the pursuing of such option is that banks can benefit from the state 
guarantee while avoiding to report losses since the assets are kept on-balance sheet instead of 
being sold. Still, given the individual-based reach of such option, and given the systematic 
dimension of the problem in the Eurozone, this strategy is not greatly employed. 
2.1.4. Sale 
Probably the most straightforward way to reduce the stock of NPLs is to sell the distressed 
exposures in the secondary market. This simple and naïve statement conceal a great number of 
implications of which we will give notice in the present paragraph. 
As first intuition, we shall underline how the option presented in this section slightly differs 
from the outsourcing one (of which at paragraph 2.1.2) still acknowledging the multiple 
similarities. Within the scope of the outsourcing option, we refer to a contract that is expected 
to last over time, thus establishing an ongoing relationship between the bank and the third party 
professional NPL manager. When we talk of NPL sales, we are instead referring to a one time 
action, usually of significant magnitude, that still does not imply any further transaction.  
The sale of non-performing exposures leads the bank to the achievement of a twofold set of 
benefits. Besides the possibility to refocus its core-business, the bank is able to achieve an 
improvement in both liquidity and capital adequacy position. The liquidity obtained by the sale 




income. The possibility to increase the lending activity is also pursued through the capital 
adequacy channel: the write-off of deteriorated exposures from the books allows the bank to 
get rid of the heavy weights in the determination of minimum capital requirements, thus freeing 
capital to undertake new risky assets (e.g. new loans).  
In terms of disadvantages, the biggest drawback of the sale strategy deals with accounting issues 
and can be partially solved through the complete development of secondary markets for NPLs 
in Europe27. The sale of NPLs typically generates a loss for the bank due to the mismatch 
between the net value28 at which the loans are recorded on the banks’ balance sheet and its 
market value29. The abovementioned differenced is mainly justified by the different 
expectations on the recovery rates achievable from the management of the traded exposures. In 
compliance with the accounting rules, the loss caused by the sale transaction has to be recorded 
in the income statement of the year in which the transaction has been made. As a result, the 
pricing gap between the net value on the books and the market value has a direct and immediate 
negative effect on banks’ income statement and thus on its profitability.  
2.1.5. Securitization  
According to Pilati (2017), the securitization is a useful asset and liability management tool and 
an efficient way to transfer risk. A complete description of the securitization process goes 
beyond the purposes of our work, for this reason we will provide only a brief description in 
order to make the reader aware of its implications on NPLs management.  
As a first approximation, the securitization is a financial process aimed at allowing a given bank 
(the originator) to remove a set of distressed exposures from its financial reports. Such 
exposures will be grouped following a criteria of similarities, thus putting together exposures 
with comparable risk levels or time to maturity. The resulting portfolio is then sold to a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) that issues tradable securities backed by the abovementioned assets and 
sells them to third-party investors. This sale implicitly funds the purchase of the distressed 
assets in the first place. Prior to the introduction to investors, the issuance of the SPV is 
tranched, meaning it is divided into categories with different risk levels and repayment 
priorities. The SPV also appoints an independent third party (the servicer) that holds the duty 
of collecting the cash-inflows generated by NPLs. Such cash-flows will be then used as 
payments of principal and interests of the asset-backed notes issued by the SPV itself.  
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28 i.e. the nominal value of the debt minus the write-downs. 




The securitization option shares the benefits already seen in the sale paragraph, plus it enjoys 
the peculiar advantages linked to the tranching activity. By issuing different tranches of asset-
backed securities, the SPV (and implicitly the originator) is able to enlarge the audience of 
investors, enclosing investors with the most different risk attitudes. According to Bruno et al. 
(2017), the securitization option, thanks to its risk sharing nature, represents the most effective 
way for banks to dispose of their NPL stock. The risk sharing nature indeed naturally reduces 
the gap between bid and ask prices, facilitating trades and increasing recovery rates.  
Furthermore, the securitized assets are suitable to obtain a broad range of guarantees30 that 
enhance the attractiveness of the securities, consequently making them desirable by a larger 
sample of investors.  
Among the obstacles to securitization, besides the significant fixed costs to sustain in order to 
set-up the structure needed, we can surely point at the onset of opportunistic behaviour by the 
originators. As a matter of fact, during the years that led to the 2008 financial crises, the use of 
securitization as a tool to conceal junk assets spiked, and the investors were the ones that took 
the loss. In order to try to find a solution to this problem, the European legislator has recently 
endorsed the development of a securitization market that has to be simple, transparent and 
standardized (STS), hence increasing the degree of supervision on the quality of the assets 
securitized.  
2.1.6. Asset Management Companies 
A supplementary tool for managing non-performing exposures is the establishment of Asset 
Management Companies (AMCs) or bad banks. This solution consists in the creation of a 
separated company vehicle in which the toxic assets can flow-in. The company vehicle is 
created in the first place with the aim of purchasing, managing and disposing of distressed assets 
from banks, maximizing the recovery rates and spreading losses over time. The bad bank 
solution was born with the aim of solving the operational and management inefficiencies 
stemming from the contemporaneous presence of performing and non-performing exposures 
on banks’ balance sheets. The establishment of a bad bank thus allows the adoption of focused 
policies and adequate resources for a thorough management of non-performing exposures’ 
peculiarities. NPLs and their related risks are transferred to the brand new vehicle whose 
primary objective is to recover NPLs in a timely fashion, exploiting specialized human and 
organizational resources.  
                                                          




An AMC can take several forms. As first approximation, we shall distinct between centralised 
and decentralised AMCs. The former represents a systematic solution intended to attract 
wholesale investors mostly. A centralised AMC is aimed at receiving all the distressed assets 
of a given country or market, thus establishing relevant economies of scale in terms of financial 
resources, expertise and know-how. On the other hand, a decentralised AMC offers tailor-made 
solutions to individual banks. With respect to the ownership structure, bad banks may be 
established either by public or private capital. The dichotomy is in reality not that strict given 
the common presence of both AMCs partially publicly-owned and private AMCs that benefits 
from state-level guarantees.  
In terms of benefits, the separation between good and bad bank allows, especially when the 
latter achieves a systemic dimension, the exploitation of synergies and of professional 
management of NPLs. Furthermore, relieved from the burden of a high stock of NPLs, the 
banks are able to re-focus their processes towards their core business, accelerating the return to 
profitability. In conclusion, the centralization of assets from several banks to one AMC 
(centralised bad bank solution) may also attract a larger audience of potential investors, 
interested to larger quantities offered for sale. 
The biggest concerns associated to the Asset Management Companies deal with the difficulties 
in assessing the quality of the assets transferred to the bad bank together with the fact that 
typically banks has to record loss when transferring any distressed exposure to the AMC.  
 
2.2 Applications: evidences from Italy 
In this section we will be drawing from Martino P. (2019), and provide an on-hand approach 
discussing real NPLs management examples. The focus of this paragraph is on the Italian 
framework given its unique level of activity over the recent years. The analysis of Professor 
Martino is based on hand-collected information from banks’ annual reports covering the 2015-
2018 time window. In terms of figures, the NPL ratio for Italy stood at 16,8% at the end of 2015 
and it decreased to 9,7% as of June 2018. Such a significant, still not satisfactory, achievement 
is the result of an active management of the NPL stock, as it will be displayed for the cases of 
Unicredit and Intesa SanPaolo. The two major Italian banking groups are indeed the objects of 
analysis. 
Unicredit 
At the beginning of the time window considered, Unicredit’s NPL ratio was 15,42% while its 




performing porfolios, Unicredit employed the sale solution with consistency. In particular, the 
sale of NPEs was carried out using a competitive auction mechanism whose effectiveness was 
determined via a full costing analysis. Within the spectrum of the alternative solutions 
employed by the Group we recall the creation of a specialised Distressed Asset Management 
Structure aimed at assessing and initiating strategies directed towards the sale of portfolios and 
individual exposures through the secondary market.  
In June 2015, Unicredit signed a deal with Intesa SanPaolo and KKR Credit finalized at the 
creation of a platform for managing distressed loans. Such platform was intended as a foothold 
for the subsequent process of securitization of the assets collected. Unicredit exploited such 
agreement managing to securitize an overall nominal amount of EUR 288 million in the very 
first year.  
During 2016, two main restructuring operations were implemented. First, the execution of the 
so-called project FINO: a de-risking project of EUR 17,7 billion in gross bad loans to be 
achieved through the securitization of the namesake portfolio. Second, the execution of project 
PORTO regarding a significant increase in the provisioning levels on NPLs. Specifically, while 
FINO project detailed as a huge securitization process implemented over a couple of years, 
PORTO project addressed a series of management actions and measures aimed at improving 
the management of NPLs and finally the increase of recovery rates. Although the negative 
impact of PORTO project on net results for 2016, the partial disposal of FINO portfolio had a 
primary role in allowing a recognition of EUR 21,5 billion less in gross impaired loans, as 
compared to previous year. As a result, the NPL ratio at the end of 2016 stood at 11,78% on a 
consolidated down-trend.  
During 2017, Unicredit accomplished the first step of FINO project by selling the entirety of 
the receivables included in such portfolio and by the issuance of ABS securities by the 
appointed SPV. Phase 2 (the progressive sell down to third-party investors) has been 
implemented in 2017 and eased by the presence of the GACS guarantee31 on the senior tranche 
issued. Further actions in terms of organizational structure were undertaken. In order to strength 
the effectiveness of the risk controls, the corporate governance, in accordance with the Chief 
Risk Officer, established the Group NPE structure and the Group NPE Governance Committee. 
As a result of the initiatives mentioned, together with a generalized active management of 
distressed exposures, NPL ratio decreased in 2017 reaching in December the level of 10,15%.  
                                                          




The greatest highlight of 2018 is the conclusion of the FINO project with the accomplishment 
of its phase 2. As a consequence, the NPL ratio stood at 8,74% as of June 2018, down from the 
15,42% of 2015. The Group coverage ratio at 30 June 2018 confirmed the improvements made, 
reaching the level of 60,89% in comparison to the 51,20% of the 2015.  
Intesa San Paolo 
At the end of 2015, Intesa San Paolo reported an NPL ratio of 16,51% and a coverage ratio of 
47,6%. Intesa San Paolo is characterized for a strong corporate culture towards the active 
management of distressed exposures that express itself in the strong role acknowledged to 
corporate bodies on the matter, together with the organization of several projects aimed at a 
timely and proactive loan management.  
Starting from 2014, ISP activated a new Proactive Credit Management process aimed at 
structuring a new work method based on the need of identifying in a timely fashion performing 
positions with early signs of stress and thus implementing the most suitable recovery process 
for such exposures. In terms of monitoring, Intesa San Paolo employs a method of ratings that 
summarise the counterparties’ credit quality, implicitly reflecting their likelihood of defaulting 
on a one-year horizon.  
Since 2015, the Group has employed a new organisational model, according to which the new 
bad-loans flows are managed by the Loan Recovery Department. This corporate body relies on 
its own specialised units in order to manage recovery activities for loans entrusted directly to 
it. With the purpose of identifying the optimal strategies to be implemented for each position, 
the department examines costs and benefits of every solution, also considering recovery times’ 
estimated financial impacts.  
Starting from 2016, the credit quality ratios has begun to show clear signs of improvement, 
mainly due to high volumes of disposals and securitizations, while containing the upcoming of 
new bad loans. ISP proactive credit management reflected in actions such as: monitoring of 
customer positions, prompt identification of situations at risk, immediate activation of measures 
to keep or reposition customers in performing status, anticipating or immediately resolving the 
deterioration of credit quality. As a result, at the end of 2016 the NPL ratio stood at 14,72% 
with 23.817 businesses completely recovered from a distressed status over the year.  
In March 2017 a 3-year NPL Plan was approved with the aim of achieving an NPL ratio 
comparable to pre-crises level (approximately 10,50%) by the end of 2019. It is interesting how 
such a programme entails mainly recovery via internal management. Significantly, during 2017, 




use of the securitization tool, signalling the willingness to empower their internal management 
unit. Within the same year, the banking group also launched the Retail Early Warning System 
(REWS) in order to strengthen and develop the assessment processes for counterparty risk 
together with the consideration of a thorough set of impairment triggers adapted to retail 
exposures. At the end of 2017 ISP achieved the rehabilitation of 21.000 businesses from a 
distressed status and a remarkable decrease in NPL ratio (11,87%), mostly by containing the 
insurgence of new non-performing loans.  
In 2018, Intesa San Paolo disclosed its Business Plan for the subsequent three years. Such Plan 
identified a significant de-risking as key priority, setting the level of 6% as NPL gross ratio as 
the goal to achieve by 2021. The Plan envisages a strengthening of internal organization 
together with the sale of significant bad loans portfolios as main drivers to achieve the NPL 
ratio target. Nevertheless, the highlight of the year is the deal signed with the Swedish firm 
Intrum. The deal concerned the creation of a unique and leading NPL servicer that unites the 
capabilities of the two firms. The deal in particular involved two transactions. First, the creation 
of a leading servicer in the Italy’s NPL market thanks to the integration of Italy’s platforms of 
Intesa and Intrum. Second, the disposal and securitization of a sizeable non-performing 
portfolio of the Italian bank totalling EUR 10,8 billion of gross book value. The Group also 
undertook other de-risking initiatives during the year that, taken together, have contributed to 
the improvement of the bank’s asset quality. As a matter of fact, the NPL ratio achieved as of 
June 2018 was 9,33% with a coverage ratio of 53,4%. We recall that the 2015 figures of NPL 
ratio and coverage ratio were 16,51% and 47,6%, respectively.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, it is aim of the author to give evidence of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework that characterizes the NPL management in Europe. In particular, there 
will be analysed three decisive aspects of the abovementioned framework: the guidelines 
provided by the European Banking Authority, the project of a European Asset Management 
Company and the requirements for a productive establishment of cross-border secondary 
markets aimed at non-performing exposures trading.  
 
2.3 EBA: Guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures 
As mentioned in paragraph 1.1, in addition to the adoption of a harmonized set of definitions, 
the second building block in addressing the non-performing loans problem in Europe has been 




path to be taken in order to systematically address the problem was a comprehensive approach 
consisting of a mix of complementary policy actions, both at national and European level. In 
this regard, the European Banking Authority (EBA), among others, was invited by the Council 
to contribute to the Action Plan primarily by offering new guidelines concerning management 
strategies aimed at reducing NPEs on banks’ balance sheets. This paragraph is then aimed at 
giving evidence of the highlights of the EBA Guidelines as new European benchmark in the 
field of management of non-performing and forborne exposures, especially in relation to those 
credit institutions carrying a significant stock of distressed exposures. As it will be seen in the 
following, the development and operationalization of an NPE strategy is the core building block 
of the document drafted by EBA.  
The objective of the Guidelines is to encourage and drive the convergence of NPE and FBE 
management practices across EU Member States building on the evidences of the Asset Quality 
Reviews conducted prior to their publication. The Guidelines also provide the supervisors with 
guidance regarding the assessment of banks’ risk management practices, policies, processes 
and procedures for managing distressed exposures, as part of the Supervisory Review and 
Evaluation Process (SREP). 
Before addressing thoughtfully the contents of the Guidelines, we shall recall how these do not 
have any binding legal power stricto sensu: they are indeed a supervisory tool that clarifies the 
expectations of the supervisor in terms of NPL identification, management and measurement.  
Still, they have been applicable since 30th June 2019 to those credit institutions with a gross 
NPL ratio equal or greater than 5%32 using 31st December 2018 as reference date33. 
 NPE Strategy 
The development of the NPE strategy as conceived by the EBA Guidelines should be finalized 
at a reduction of NPEs over a realistic but sufficiently ambitious time horizon. The Strategy 
shall detail the approaches and objectives to be pursued in order to maximize recoveries and 
reduce NPE stock while being compliant with the provisions aimed at protecting consumers34.  
The development and implementation of the NPE strategy (par. 25) should lay its foundations 
on the following key steps: 
a) assessment of the operating environment and external conditions; 
                                                          
32 The 5% threshold is aimed at ensuring a minimum level of transparency, on the contrary it is not intended to 
indicate any optimal level of NPLs that credit institutions should aim for. It should not be considered an 
automatic quantitative target to be implemented in management strategies.  
33 Competent autorities may extend the application of the Guidelines to those credit institutions that, even if not 
reaching the 5% threshold, display signs of progressive deterioration of assets’ quality. 




b) development of the NPE strategy over short, medium and long term horizons; 
c) implementation of the operational plan; 
d) full embedment of the NPE strategy into the management processes of the credit 
institution, including regular review and independent monitoring. 
The assessment of the operating environment (point a) refers to the need for the credit institution 
to take into consideration the internal capabilities towards the management of NPEs, the 
external conditions and the capital implications of the NPE strategy during its early stages. In 
terms of internal capabilities, credit institutions should run a comprehensive self-assessment to 
evaluate the current internal situation and the consequent steps required to address the gaps 
potentially observed. The assessment has to have an annual frequency and shall investigates 
strengths and gaps in the understanding of: the magnitude and drivers of the credit institution’s 
NPEs, the outcomes of NPE actions taken by the credit institution in the past and the operational 
adequacy in relation to the various steps involved in the process. In the early stages of the 
planning, credit institutions shall also consider the current and future external operating 
conditions and environment. The specific areas of concern will be then: the macroeconomic 
conditions, the market expectations35 with regard to acceptable NPE levels and coverage, the 
demand for NPE-related investments, the maturity of the NPE servicing industry and the 
regulatory, legal and judicial framework. Once the reduction drivers have been established, the 
credit institution should draft a detailed assessment of the impact of such drivers on capital, risk 
exposure amount, profit or loss and impairments. The assessment should be performed in 
accordance with the RAF as well as with the ICAAP.  
The development of the NPE strategy over different time horizons (point b) has to be structured 
in a sequence of well defined moments: the choice of the options to implement the strategy, the 
setting of targets and the definition of an operational plan. Before addressing each of these 
moments, we shall underline how the NPE strategy in general, and the operational plan in 
particular, has to be defined and approved by the management body of the credit institution, 
who also holds responsible for its review on an annual basis. The Guidelines suggest a number 
of non-mutually exclusive implementation options36 to apply to different portfolios and under 
different conditions. In the cases where the options proposed are not considered to grant 
sufficient NPE reduction, the credit institution should envisage for that exposure or portfolio a 
timely impairment or write-off approach. The second phase in the development of the NPE 
                                                          
35 Including but non-limited to the views of rating agencies and market analysts. 
36 Hold/forbearance strategy, active portfolio reductions, change of type of exposure or collateral, including 
foreclosure, debt to equity swapping, debt to asset swapping, collateral substitution, legal option (insolvency 




strategy is the setting of adequate targets. Credit institutions should include, at minimum, 
clearly defined, realistic yet ambitious quantitative targets in their NPE strategy (par. 42). The 
targets should lead to a concrete reduction, both gross and net of impairments, in NPEs, at least 
in the medium term. Interestingly, the Guidelines specify that the credit institutions shall not 
rely on expectations about changes in macroeconomic conditions to be the sole driver of the 
NPE reduction targets established. Such a statement gains a primary importance in the scope of 
the present work since the core of the research is directed to the establishment of determinants 
of NPLs other than the macroeconomic ones. Credit institutions shall establish targets by time 
horizons, by main portfolios and by implementation options. Nevertheless, the targets shall be 
referred to an overall reduction of NPEs as much as to a reduction focused on individually 
relevant portfolios. The conclusive part of the development process of the NPE strategy is the 
rationalization of an operational plan defined, approved and periodically reviewed by the 
management body, aimed at supporting the strategy itself. The operational plan should clearly 
define how the credit institution will operationally implement its NPE strategy over a period of 
time of at least one to three years. Among others, the operational plan should have specific 
attention to internal factors that may jeopardize the successful realization of the NPE strategy.   
With regards to the implementation process (point c), the Guidelines claim how the operational 
plan should rely on suitable policies and procedures, clear ownership and appropriate 
governance structures, further incorporating tailor-made changes in management activities and 
organization in order to embed the NPE workout framework as a key element in the corporate 
culture.  
Point d of the abovementioned list refers to the need of integrating the NPE strategy at all levels 
of the organization since its success depends on many different areas within the credit 
institution. The Guidelines thus require a consistent integration of the NPE strategy as a whole 
over the entire corporate functions, addressing to this requirement as prerequisite for the 
achievement of the targets set. A decisive task to be performed is the definition of roles, 
responsibilities and formal reporting lines for the implementation of the strategy. Staff and 
management involved in NPE workout activities should be provided with clear individual or 
collective goals and incentives geared towards reaching the targets established by the NPE 
strategy and operational plan. The incentive scheme that follows has to take into consideration 
remuneration policies, career development objectives and a transparent monitoring framework. 




Finally, the NPE strategy should be coherently incorporated in the risk management framework, 
from here a special attention should be paid to the alignment with the following: ICAAP, RAF 
and Recovery plan.  
NPE governance and operations 
The definition and implementation of the NPE strategy and of the operational plan surely have 
implications on the governance and operations area. This section sets out the fundamental 
elements of governance and operations with respect to the NPE workout framework, covering 
in particular: 
a) steering and decision making; 
b) the NPE operating model; 
c) the internal control framework; 
d) the NPE monitoring processes.  
In terms of steering and decision-making procedures, the Guidelines identifies a set of 
responsibilities that fall under the management body scope, among others we may recall: the 
approval, implementation and regular review of both the NPE strategy and operational plan 
considering the corporate’s overall risk strategy. Furthermore, the management body is also 
accounted responsible for a quarterly monitoring of the progresses made compared to the targets 
established, as well as for ensuring sufficient internal controls over the NPE management 
processes.  
The structuring of an NPE operating model (point b) calls for the further definition of the NPE 
working units (NPE WUs) as crucial entities aimed at tackling the distressed exposures 
problems avoiding any possible conflicts of interest. Credit institutions are indeed required to 
assemble such working units ensuring their independence from the loan origination procedures. 
This separation of duties encompasses not only client relationship activities but also the 
decision making processes. Banks should set up different NPE working units coherently with 
the different phases37 of the NPE life-cycle in order to provide a tailor-made service. NPE WUs 
should address homogeneous portfolios, thus developing specialized processes for each 
category identified; the grouping of exposures is thus allowed and suggested.  
Particular concerns are then directed towards the human resources area, in consideration of the 
possibility to witness moral hazard behaviours that can jeopardize the fair management of loans 
exposures. In particular, the mixture of managerial and monetary resources with other parts of 
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the value chain such as loan origination, is highly discouraged in order to avoid the insurgence 
of conflicts of interests, as discussed above. Nevertheless, in accordance with the joint ESMA 
and EBA Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of the members of the management 
body, the staff allocated to decisive NPE workout tasks shall be experienced and hold a specific 
expertise. Finally, the human resource area should be regularly appraised with particular 
concern towards the achievement of the institution’s NPE targets but also towards qualitative 
indicators.   
 An internal control framework (point c) has to be implemented in order to guarantee full 
alignment between the NPE strategy and operational plan on the one hand and the credit 
institution’s overall business plan38 and risk appetite on the other hand. The management body 
is accounted responsible for establishing and monitoring its adequacy and effectiveness. 
Between the internal control functions and the management body there should exist a prompt 
exchange of information in the form of written reports, mainly regarding the identification of 
deficiencies on which the management body should require adequate and effective remedial 
actions. In accordance with the EBA Guidelines on internal governance39, the internal control 
framework should be characterized by three lines of defence: 
 first line of defence controls: it has to be embedded into the procedures and processes 
of the operational units (i.e. NPE WUs); 
 second line of defence controls: its primary purpose is to perform controls on a 
continuous basis on the adequacy of the first line of defence controls. It follows that 
the second line of defence controls has to be characterized by an high degree of 
independence from the functions performing business activities such as the NPE 
WUs; 
 third line of defence controls: it is performed by the independent internal audit office. 
It should have sufficient NPE workout expertise in order to perform periodic controls 
over the efficiency and effectiveness of both the NPE framework and the precedent 
lines of defence controls. The results of the period controls has to be transmitted to 
the management body together with the detail of recommendations proposed.  
As discussed in the previous paragraph, the monitoring systems of NPEs (point d) should be 
based on NPE targets approved within the NPE strategy, rationalized in the operational plan 
and cascaded down to the operational targets of the NPE WUs. Crucial to a meaningful 
                                                          
38 It is considered to include NPE strategy and operational plan. 




monitoring process is the selection of NPE-related key performance indicators (KPIs) to be 
used to set targets as much as to measure the progress made towards them. The Guidelines list 
a set of non-exhaustive indicators to be taken into consideration, providing further detail for 
each of them. A complete dissertation on each of them goes beyond the scope of the present 
research, then we will simply provide the reader with the macro-areas to which each indicator 
belongs: general NPE metrics, borrower engagement and cash collection, forbearance activities, 
liquidation activities, other (e.g. NPE-related profit and loss items, foreclosed assets, 
outsourcing activities). 
Forbearance 
Forbearance measures are intended as concessions that should allow the borrower to return to 
a sustainable performing repayment status40. In this section, we will outline the guidelines in 
terms of governance of forborne exposures provided by the European Banking Authority in 
order to create a harmonized set of practices among European credit institutions.       
The first step each credit institution should follow is the consideration of a broad set of 
forbearance measures, for any given time horizon and for any possible exposure peculiarity. 
The first assessment has to be made with respect to the viability or non-viability of the measures 
themselves. Such assessment requires the consideration of a detailed set of factors, for example 
the objective expectation of full repayment and of resolution of outstanding arrears. On the 
contrary, the presence of multiple consecutive forbearance measures do not run in favour of the 
assessment of the concession as viable.  
After having set the perimeter of viability, the Guidelines detail the features of the sound 
forbearance process. First of all, the forbearance activity has to be backed by a clear corporate 
policy which has to be regularly reviewed in order to acknowledge the outcomes of the 
monitoring processes. The latter is a process of the forbearance activity that has to be structured 
prior the acknowledgement of any concession and it is aimed at creating an assessment model 
that, by following the dynamics of a set indicators, is able to judge the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the forbearance activity itself. The metrics suggested to be considered by the 
Guidelines are portfolio and exposure specific and, in particular, they are: forbearance cure 
rate, cash collection rate and incidence of write-offs. Most importantly, credit institutions must 
ensure that the concessions linked to the forbearance activity are never employed as tool to 
                                                          





delay the recognition of an exposure as un-collectable. The latter has become a paramount 
provision to be fulfilled, especially in the aftermath of the Global Financial crisis. 
For the purposes of granting forbearance measures, credit institutions should invest resources 
in processes able to spot signs of possible future financial difficulties at an early stage. Then, 
the assessment of the financial situation of the borrower shall not be limited to exposures with 
apparent signs of financial difficulties41. On the contrary, such assessments should be 
conducted also with regard to borrowers who does not have apparent financial difficulties, but 
whose repayment ability may have worsened in relation to significant changes in market 
conditions. Moreover, the Guidelines recall how a fundamental feature of the assessment of the 
repayment capacity is that it has to be performed by disregarding any collateral or guarantee 
provided by third parties. The Guidelines prompt on the one hand the adoption of decision trees 
and thus of standardised forbearance measures for portfolios of homogeneous borrowers, while 
on the other they stress the importance of tailor-made solutions for more complex exposures.  
For transparency and consumer protection (if applicable) purposes, the forbearance contracts 
should include unquestionably defined targets and a schedule for their achievement. Such 
targets should be credible, appropriately conservative and they shall take account of possible 
deterioration of the borrower’s financial situation. The achievement of the targets detailed in 
the schedule, together with the general performance of the borrower, have to be monitored by 
the NPE WU responsible for granting the forbearance measure.  
 
2.4. Secondary markets and bad-banks as pan-European solutions 
As discussed in paragraph 1.4 on the impediments to achieve a complete solution to the NPL 
problem, credit institutions agreed to identify the lack of a strong and reliable secondary market 
to trade NPLs, as one of the greatest obstacles. Strictly related to the good functioning of 
secondary market is the proposal of creating a European bad-bank. In January 2017, Andrea 
Enria, the EBA’s Chair at the time, in the context of a broad analysis of risks and challenges 
faced by European banking sector, proposed the creation on a single European bad-bank that 
should, among other things, address and solve the market failures evidenced in the functioning 
of NPL national secondary markets. Indeed, secondary markets have been populating the 
European scenario since the rise of the NPL problem, still they have never reached the maturity 
required to completely solve the problem. For this reason, we decided to discuss two possible 
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parameters: more than 30 days past due during the 3 months prior forbearance, increase in probability of default 




solutions, in chronological order: the proposal of Andrea Enria (2017) of a single bad-bank to 
solve the problem of the currently existing platforms and of the European Commission (2018) 
to introduce a new paradigm for NPL trade platforms.  
This paragraph clearly lies in a limbo between the regulatory aspects (Chapter 1) and the 
management tools (Chapter 2) of distressed exposures. Nevertheless, we decided to embed the 
discussion of such a twofold perspective into this chapter in order to highlight its relevance as 
possible new standards of a better management of NPLs, in particular with regard of those 
legacy assets whose dismissal is still a matter of great concern.  
 
A European bad-bank: the EBA’s proposal        
As it will become clear in the next section, the platforms that have been employed in the recent 
years for NPL transactions suffer from a twofold market failure that, according to the EBA’s 
view, may be solved by the constitution of a European bad-bank. Such market failures regards 
the lack of incentives for banks to sell their NPLs at losses and the information asymmetry 
reducing the transparency on prices.  
The EBA’s proposal builds mainly on the consolidated presence and success of three national 
AMCs working in the Euro Area: the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) in Ireland, 
the FMS Wertmanagement in Germany and the Sociedad de Gestion de Activos procedentes de 
la Resstructuracion Bancaria (SAREB) in Spain. Over the last 10 years, these entities proved 
their effectiveness in stabilizing the financial sector reducing the losses on legacy assets.  
The proposal endorsed by Andrea Enria back in 2017 was aimed at removing billions in NPLs 
from the European banks’ balance sheets and moving them into the EU AMC. This new entity 
should seek to sell the assets within a determined time horizon (e.g. three years) at their 
economic value; if it failed to do so, the original bank would have to absorb the difference. In 
such circumstances, the presence of warrants exercisable by national governments poses the 
first difficulty in the realization of the project since it would be in contrast with BRRD and State 
aid rules. By managing large amounts of NPLs, the European bad-bank may develop enough 
expertise to improve evaluations of loans’ recoverability. At the same time, the critical 
dimension of the assets managed would ensure the achievement of a significant market power 
that strictly connects to the achievement of effective and fair transactions. As a matter of fact, 
according to Fell et al. (2017), the main purpose of a systemic bad-bank would be to provide a 
bridge for the pricing gaps that emerge when market prices for NPLs and the underlying 




set at long-term (real economic) value, this avoids the fire sales that would result from NPL 
disposals into illiquid markets where the risk-premium required by outside investors is 
significantly high. This mechanism is believed to implicitly solve the first market failure 
mentioned above.  
Besides the already mentioned possible problems related to the State aid discipline, according 
to BBVA Research Office, the most significant obstacle that prevented the creation of a single 
European bad bank is the heterogeneity of the continental scenario. Moreover, besides the 
different degrees of severity of the problem, some Member States have already employed 
national solutions such as the abovementioned NAMA and SAREB. Such national entities have 
proven to work very well, then it would be a no-sense replacing them and similarly it would be 
very difficult to imagine a side entity that works in parallel on the European playfield. Spain, 
Ireland and Germany set up state-backed bad banks after the 2008 financial crisis to deal with 
sudden increases in toxic bank debt.  But since then, the EU has introduced the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which restricts governments from setting up bad banks 
except as part of an official resolution process.  
The debate among the creation of a pan-European bad-bank has regained strength in March 
2020 over the concerns about the implications of the coronavirus crises on banks’ asset quality. 
In March, the EC adopted a temporary relaxation of the state-aid rules and it has thus waved-
through billions of euros in emergency government relief measures. Proponents of the bad bank 
idea hope to make it acceptable under state-aid rules by proposing that the toxic loans would 
have to be sold into the market after a fixed time period, with the power to recoup any losses 
from the lenders themselves.  
European platform for Non-Performing Loans42 
A European platform for non-performing loans would have to be structured as an electronic 
marketplace where banks and investors can trade distressed exposures creating an active, liquid 
and efficient secondary market. Currently, many private companies have organized similar 
structures. They offer though limited geographical scope and not standardized loan data, thus 
failing to achieve the greatest benefits of a pan-European platform. A platform structured in the 
ways that will become clear in this paragraph, would address the several market failures 
affecting the current (national) NPL markets. It would improve and harmonise information and 
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drafted in 2018 and it reflects the views of staff members from the European Commission, the European Central 




data availability by making use of standardized templates, it could reduce transaction costs by 
reducing research expenses, hence improving price formation. Finally, it could reduce market 
entry barriers by attracting a wider audience of both buyers and sellers thus increasing 
competition and bettering the price discovery process.  
The first concern of the present dissertation is to provide a clear definition of what has to be 
intended as European NPL Platform. In particular, an NPL platform would be an electronic 
marketplace where holders of NPLs (sell-side) and professional investors (buy-side) can meet 
to exchange information and to trade. The twofold purpose of this tool is then evident given its 
definition.  
The organization and the features of the platform ensure the achievement of a broad set of 
benefits for all the market participants, namely: investors, sellers and service providers.  
 investors (buy-side): they will mostly benefit from the loan data harmonization process 
based on EBA NPL templates. Building on standardized and validated data, investors 
may accurately perform portfolio valuations and significantly reducing costs by 
targeting specific market segments and allowing the implementation of more complex 
strategies; 
 sellers (sell-side): they will mostly benefit from the creation, within the NPL platform, 
of a database of investors interested in the purchase of various types of NPLs. Such data 
availability would allow the creation of a pool of investors the buy-side may be 
interested to refer to, instead of approaching investors one to one.  
 service providers: the ‘seal of approval’ granted by the platform, given its legitimacy 
power, constitutes a huge incentive for various ancillary service providers (e.g. loan 
servicers, data analytics providers, deal advisers and law firms) to supply their services 
within the perimeter of the platform itself.  
The ‘seal of approval’ recognizes a compliant platform as a European NPL platform. 
In order to maximise the abovementioned benefits, the platform should be set up as to provide 
each of the following functions: 
 data warehouse function: it has to be based on standardised data and backed by the 
provision of a seal of data quality to investors; 
 a creditor coordination function; 




Within the core organizational guidelines, the working staff document provides practical 
indication on the following aspects, considered to be the most relevant ones: ownership, asset 
perimeter, services to be provided, centrality of NPL data templates. 
As already mentioned, a platform covering multiple Member States (pan-European scope) 
would have an advantage over purely national platforms in terms of the magnitude of the 
benefits achievable. The cross-border scope however, if on the one hand increases efficiency, 
on the other poses doubts regards the best ownership and governance structure. Insiders have 
considered several organizational models among which we recall: public ownership, private 
ownership and private ownership combined with standard setting and oversight by a third 
standard setting body. There is no clear-cut case for public ownership, then it may be more 
appropriate to endorse the private initiative, also fostering those already launched. 
The success of any NPL transaction platform would largely depend on its capability to reach a 
sufficient critical size, thus achieving economies of scale and scope. For this purpose, besides 
aiming at a European scope geographically speaking, the NPL transaction platform should 
ideally host a broad range of asset classes: commercial real estate (CRE) assets, residential real 
estate (RRE) assets, SME or other corporate loans, unsecured retail loans, asset-backed finance, 
car loans, other/specialised NPLs. 
In order to achieve the objectives advanced in the staff working paper, the private platforms 
would seek a ‘seal of approval’ by the industry body identified for the development of the 
industry standards. In order to be eligible for a ‘seal of approval’, the platform should, among 
other things, directly offer a minimum perimeter of services: 
 data review and validation: the platform, at its end-stage, should provide data that are 
fully assured and subject to a three-fold set of validation checks. 
 data warehousing operating thanks to electronic databases recursively updated;  
 matching buyers and sellers on NPLs: allowing the convergence of bids and asks for 
selected NPLs or NPL portfolios is the key function of this kind of electronic transaction 
platform. Within this process, the platform would never provide settlement services, nor 
assume the ownership of the assets traded. In this way the platform can be considered 
not subject to counterparty risk; 
 ancillary services provided by third parties but offered through the platform (e.g. 
intermediation of credit servicing and valuation services). 
The last critical building block we will discuss is the use of NPL data templates. EBA NPL data 




specific and they have been thought to fully represent the loan (portfolio) and to be used to 
perform financial analysis on it. The broad and common usage of the standardised templates 
ensures comparability, thus facilitating the analysis of investors both on a single exposure and 
on a portfolio level. The usage of common data templates runs of course in favour of the 
establishment of a data warehouse as well as of the data validation process. It is important to 
underline that the templates are not a supervisory reporting requirement: they can be used by 
banks on a voluntary basis for NPL transactions and may form the foundation for NPL 
secondary markets initiatives. To conclude, we recall how the idea of the employment of 
standardised documents in dealing with complex transactions is not new at all. Indeed, the idea 
of EBA NPL data templates builds on the consolidated practice coming from the derivative 
world where the usage of the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) model 
have been used since the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are not European NPL Platform operating in the continent 
at current date. The process is likely to require a fair amount of time and it probably needs a 
higher degree of homogeneity among Member States from a normative point of view. 
Notwithstanding, an ambitious project has been launched in November 2019. NPLMarkets is a 
marketplace with data preparation, valuation and reporting. It is a cross-national platform for 
banks, investors and service providers to standardise data, analyse, value and trade non-


















The literature review that follows is built using the work of Manz (2019) as primary source. 
Manz (2019) provides a systematic review of 44 papers regarding the determinants of non-
performing loans published in the period 1987-2017 by the most influential journals. In 
particular, absolute precedence has been given to papers published by the Journal of Banking 
and Finance and the Journal of Financial Services Research.  Besides the time coverage and the 
trustworthiness of the sources, the paper of Manz (2019) entails a categorization of the sources 
within three broad aggregate dimensions (macroeconomic, bank specific, loan specific), further 
decomposed into first and second order codes. In other words, Manz (2019) identifies three 
bodies of literature that point at macroeconomic, bank specific and loan specific factors 
respectively, as having the most important explanatory power in driving the evolution of non-
performing loans. Certainly, it is not possible to imagine the three families of determinants as 
separated entities, rather, both in reality and in the econometric models, we witness a co-
participation of the different families of determinants. In particular, scholars has focused mainly 
on macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants, given the difficulty of tracing the granular 
data needed to establish loan specific correlations. The same data availability issue with regards 
to granularity holds when we deal with aggregate non-performing exposures instead of 
specifying the type of exposure. As a matter of fact, very few papers investigate the 
determinants of non-performing loans on a disaggregated basis, specifically because of the 
difficulty in tracing data at such level of granularity. Among these, we will mainly discuss Gosh 
(2017) and Louzis et al. (2012). Literature of late 90’s looked at aggregated time series data on 
bad loans, employing macroeconomic variables only to explain their dynamics. Technical 
progress and database enrichments allowed scholars to start considering data on a bank-level, 
thus pursuing a higher level of detail and granularity.  
In the following, contrary to Manz (2019), we discard the categorization among 
macroeconomic, bank specific and loan specific determinants. We select instead a sub sample 
of the papers analysed and we provide, for each of them, an overall summary furnished with 
the indication of which body of literature may be predominant.  
Published by the Journal of Banking and Finance in 1997, Berger and DeYoung (1997) is one 
of the most decisive and cited paper investigating the determinants of non-performing loans. 




intertemporal relationships between problem loans and cost efficiency43 rather than establishing 
a causal relationship that was already clear mainly thanks to Berg et al. (1992) and Hughes and 
Mester (1993). Berger and DeYoung (1997) assess the direction of the causality between cost 
efficiency and stock of problem loans by testing, via Granger-causality techniques, four now-
well-known hypotheses on a dataset composed of U.S. commercial banks in the period 1985-
1994. Given the relevance these hypotheses have gained in literature over the subsequent years, 
we decided to present them in their extended form.  
i. bad luck hypothesis: an increase in non-performing loans caused by external events such 
as a local plant closing, is expected to Granger-cause (i.e. temporally precede) decreases 
in measured cost efficiency; 
ii. bad management hypothesis: poor management practices (not adequate loan 
underwriting, monitoring and control) are associated with low cost efficiency. Under 
this hypothesis, low cost efficiency is expected to Granger-cause an higher stock of non-
performing loans44; 
iii. skimping hypothesis: under this hypothesis the direction of causation runs from 
measured efficiency to stock of problem loans as in the bad management hypothesis, 
nevertheless the sign of the association is the opposite (positive in this case) as there is 
thought to be a trade-off between short-term operating costs and future loan 
performance problems; 
iv. moral hazard hypothesis: deviating from the relationship between problem loans and 
cost efficiency, this hypothesis claims that low capital would Granger-cause high non-
performing loans given the incentives to raise the riskiness of the loan portfolio such a 
bank would be exposed to (moral hazard).  
As it is clear from their presentation, the aforementioned hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
In a corner solution, all four could affect the same bank at the same time.  
In terms of variables used, we recall that Berger and DeYoung (1997) employs the dollar value 
of loans that are either 90 days past-due or are no longer accruing interest, divided by the value 
of total loans (NPL ratio) to capture the level of problem loans. In order to give evidence of 
cost efficiency instead, the authors estimate a best-practice cost frontier for the year and 
measure the distance from it for each bank.  
                                                          
43 Cost efficiency is measured for the individual banks as deviation, on a yearly basis, from the estimated 
efficient operating cost frontier. The frontier is specified and estimated for each year considered in the analysis.  
44 It is then clear how the bad luck and the bad management hypothesis prescribe the same negative association 




Estimation results suggest that the intertemporal relationship discussed above runs in both 
directions. Data provide support both for the bad luck hypothesis and for the bad management 
hypothesis. On average, the latter is found to dominate the skimping hypothesis for the entire 
sample, meaning that a decline in cost efficiency precedes the non-performing loans increase, 
possibly because of poor loan portfolio management. Still, we must bear in mind that the 
prevalence of one hypothesis over another, on average for the entire sample, does not preclude 
the reversal of dominance in one or more individual banking institution. As a matter of fact, if 
the dataset is restricted to consistently efficient banks over time, the hypothesis found dominant 
is the skimping one. Last but not least, data also provide justification for the moral hazard 
hypothesis, signalling how decreases in banks’ capital ratio generally precede increases in non-
performing loans stock caused by moral hazard incentives.  
The hypotheses formulated by Berger and DeYoung (1997) have been expanded and tested 
again by a number of scholars. Among the others, we recall Louzis et al. (2012) that tested the 
hypotheses of Berger and DeYoung (1997) on a panel of Greek commercial banks, and Podpera 
and Weil (2008) that tested them on a panel of Czech banks.  
The paper by Podpiera and Weill (2008) extend the Granger-causality model developed in 
Berger and DeYoung (1997), by applying GMM dynamic estimator on a panel of 43 Czech 
banks over the period 1994 - 2005. The rationale of the analysis is once again the investigation 
of the causality between non-performing loans and cost efficiency finalized at a better 
understanding of the dynamics of bank failures. Podpiera and Weill (2008) accurately draw 
from the seminal paper of Berger and DeYoung (1997) in the definition of the hypotheses to 
test. As a matter of fact, the hypotheses tested by the paper under analysis are the well-known 
bad luck, bad management and skimping hypothesis. The authors decided not to speculate on 
the moral hazard hypothesis in order to avoid the consideration of the capital dimension in their 
model. A further difference with respect to Berger and DeYoung (1997) is the use of GMM 
dynamic panel data estimators, in the place of OLS estimators, in order not to suffer from 
omitted variable problems arising from the omission of capitalization. From a practical point of 
view, the variables addressed within this paper are the NPL ratio and the cost efficiency score. 
The former is defined as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans45 while the latter is 
defined as the relative cost efficiency score as compared to the best-practice-bank in each year, 
                                                          
45 It has to be stressed that within the context of Podpiera and Weill (2008) a loan is considered non-performing 
when it is 361 days past due. It is then clear how this definition is very far away from the one employed within 
the scope of this work (please refer to chapter 1 for a thorough discussion about the definitory perimeter of the 




and it captures management quality. The definition of the variable that describes the cost 
efficiency is a further difference with Berger and DeYoung (1997).  
Empirical results provide clear support for the bad management hypothesis while the bad luck 
hypothesis is rejected as the total effect of non-performing loans on cost efficiency is not 
significant, thus implying that changes in NPLs do not Granger-cause changes in cost 
efficiency.     
In general, literature consistently addressed the cost efficiency as one of the main determinants 
of non-performing loans. There is a deep dichotomy though among those scholars who 
measured cost efficiency via the estimation of a cost frontier as Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
and those who measured it as net income divided by total assets (ROA) as Gosh (2017) and 
Salas and Saurina (2002), among others. 
The paper by Gosh (2017) investigates the impact of both macroeconomic and bank specific 
determinants on the non-performing loans of the 100 largest U.S. commercial banks between 
1992 and 2016. Over the years, this paper has gained a prime relevance since it explores the 
evolution of non-performing loans of one of the biggest economies in the world at a 
disaggregated level, hence reporting the exposures of the loan portfolio at a sector-specific level 
of detail. In particular, NPLs are divided into four categories: real estate, commercial and 
industrial (C&I), individual and farm loans. The empirical determinants of NPLs are drawn 
from the financial accelerator theory (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) 
that associates NPLs with a nation’s macroeconomic environment. The model of Gosh (2017) 
also controls for bank specific determinants as capitalization, lending specialization, quality of 
credit, diversification, profitability and operational efficiency. We find then clear connections 
with the seminal work of Berger and DeYoung (1997) in dealing with moral hazard for 
capitalization and quality of credit, and bad management - skimping for profitability and 
operational efficiency.  
Gosh (2017), similarly to Espinoza and Prasad (2010) employs a log-transformation of NPLs 
as dependent variable to exploit the benefits in terms of range of variation and symmetry. From 
an econometric point of view, the model of Gosh (2017) does not bring any innovation to the 
NPL literature: both static and dynamic estimation techniques have been used. The static 
framework uses a fixed effect estimation model that controls for the effect of time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across banks, while in the dynamic framework, a two-step system-




The fineness of this paper’s results consists in finding the disaggregated drivers of NPLs. In 
terms of results, an higher capitalization is associated with a significant increase of total and 
C&I NPLs, thus implicitly claiming that a higher capitalization lead banks to resort to lax credit 
checking and, in general, to more liberal lending policies. Data support the moral hazard 
hypothesis since a deterioration of banks credit quality significantly increases NPLs for all the 
types of loans considered. Similarly to Louzis et al. (2012), bank diversification is not found to 
significantly impact the level of NPLs. Bank profitability, measured as return on assets, is once 
again addressed to cause a reduction in total, real estate and C&I non-performing loans. In terms 
of macroeconomic variables, inflation is negatively associated to NPL ratio in total, real estate 
and individual exposures, suggesting a beneficial effect for borrowers of higher inflation as it 
makes debt repayments cheaper. In line with the results of Louzis et al. (2012), real GDP growth 
significantly reduces total and real estate NPLs, while unemployment rates increase NPLs. 
Building on the evidence of the dynamic specification of the model, a common feature of 
aggregate and sector specific NPLs can be captured: the significance and the positivity of lagged 
coefficients witnesses the persistence of the determinants analysed. Overall, the results 
presented show that total, real estate and C&I NPLs are most sensitive to banking and 
macroeconomic conditions while farm loans are least sensitive.  
The conclusive section of the paper by Gosh (2017) employs panel VARs to explore the impact 
of disaggregated NPLs on key US macroeconomic fundamentals and to trace the duration of 
their impact.  
In accordance with the papers presented so far, Louzis et al. (2012) combine both 
macroeconomic and bank specific factors, to investigate the determinants of NPLs over a panel 
dataset comprising nine Greek commercial banks, spanning from first quarter of 2003 to third 
quarter of 2009. The aim of the paper is to identify the most significant bank-specific 
determinants, after controlling for the macroeconomic environment. Similarly to Gosh (2017), 
loan exposures are presented with an high level of granularity, since the loan portfolios are 
broken-down into mortgage, business loans and consumer loans.  Based on precedent literature, 
Louzis et al. (2012) employs GDP growth, unemployment rate and lending rates as primary 
macroeconomic determinants of NPLs and it estimates a baseline model using this set of macro-
fundamentals as regressors. The rational of the paper is then to examine whether the addition 
of bank specific variables contributes to the explanatory power of the model.  
The framework of hypotheses tested by Louzis et al. (2012) is significantly deep as it entails 
nine hypotheses; for sake of brevity, we give evidence of the most relevant ones. As Reinhart 




increase in NPLs is tested. In terms of bank specific factors, besides the traditional hypotheses 
à la Berger and DeYoung46, Louzis et al. (2012) consider, among others, three interesting 
original hypotheses. The first (diversification hypothesis) claims that the bank size and the 
weight of non-interest income on total income are negatively related to NPLs. The too big to 
fail hypothesis claims instead a positive effect of leverage on NPLs as large banks take 
excessive risks relying on the too big to fail presumption. The third (bad management II 
hypothesis) claims that performance, as measured by return on equity, is negatively associated 
with increases in future NPLs. Opposite sign of variation is instead supposed by the pro-cyclical 
credit policy’ hypothesis that presumes a positive association between performance and future 
increases in NPLs, reflecting a liberal credit policy. As Salas and Saurina (2002) and Gosh 
(2017), the paper under analysis employs a dynamic approach in order to give evidence of time 
persistence in NPL phenomenon. The model specified is consistently estimated using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), an estimation procedure that has been frequently 
used in NPL literature.  
The estimation of the baseline model evidences the statistical significance of the coefficient of 
the lagged NPL ratio in the case of business and consumer loans, and the statistical 
insignificance for mortgages. Contrary to Gosh (2017), the sign of the former association is 
negative, possibly signalling an extensive use of write-offs. Again from the baseline estimation 
is found that there are quantitative differences in the response of different NPL to 
macroeconomic variables. As a matter of fact, while both the real GDP growth rate and the 
unemployment rate have the strongest effects on business NPLs, lending rates have a significant 
effect on consumer NPLs. Among the others, mortgages are found to be the less sensitive to 
macro-fundamentals. Louzis et al. (2012) found strong evidence in favour of the sovereign debt 
hypothesis for all the types of NPLs considered. Empirical evidence considering also bank 
specific factors supports the bad management hypothesis as in Berger and DeYoung (1997) and 
Podipera and Weill (2008). On the other hand, both the moral hazard and the diversification 
hypothesis (at both its specifications) are clearly rejected by Greek data. Empirical results 
instead confirm the presence of a too big to fail effect on risk taking behaviours and confirms 
the bad management II hypothesis.       
Following the body of literature that considers both macroeconomic and bank specific 
determinants, Espinoza and Prasad (2010) estimate the effect of their model on NPL ratio 
according to a dynamic panel estimated over the period 1995-2008 on around 80 banks in the 
                                                          




GCC region47. Similarly to Gosh (2017), this paper also estimates a macroeconomic panel VAR 
in order to assess the effects of banks performance on key macroeconomic fundamentals. As 
mentioned before, Espinoza and Prasad (2010) specified the dependent variable as a log-
transformation of the NPL ratio itself.  
Building on the specificities of the GCC countries, this paper envisages a particular set of 
macroeconomic regressors: non-oil real GDP growth, stock market returns, interest rates, world 
trade growth, the VIX index and a time-dummy for the Asian crisis. In parallel, the regressions 
also control for bank specific variables as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), a set of different 
measures to capture efficiency (expenses/asset ratio, cost/income ratio, ROE), the banks’ size 
as measured by the logarithm of equity and the lagged values of both net interest margin (NIM) 
and credit growth deflated by the CPI. With the purpose of exploring the largest range of 
opportunities, the authors decided to estimate several econometric specifications of the dynamic 
panel data gathered: OLS, Fixed Effects, 2-step Arellano-Bond, difference GMM and system 
GMM. Empirical results show that both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables do have a 
role in the build-up of NPLs in GCC countries. In particular, the most relevant and significant 
effects are found to be caused by non-oil GDP growth rate and interest rates in the 
macroeconomic category and by size of capital, credit growth and efficiency as measured by 
non-interest expenses/assets, in the bank-specific category.  
The aim of Salas and Saurina (2002) is, by considering a model containing both 
macroeconomic and bank-specific determinants, to investigate the different behaviour of ex-
posts credit risk (proxied by NPL ratio48) in two different institutional regimes: commercial and 
savings banks in Spain49. Indeed, even if the choice of determinants does not provide any 
particular insights, the choice to focus on an individual country, instead of on larger entities, 
may provide new points of view on the matter. Moreover, the paper compares the credit policies 
of two types of financial institutions which have very different ownership structures. The 
relevance of such a perspective has to be found in the fact that both types of banks operate under 
the same regulatory framework and under the same macroeconomic conditions; it then follows 
                                                          
47 GCC region includes: United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain. 
48 To be precise, Salas and Saurina (2002) refer to a general problem loans over total loans as dependent 
variable. In particular, they define problem loans as the “doubtful” plus “nonperforming” loans according to the 
1/1982 Bank of Spain Rule (CBE). The “doubtful” category contains loans, overdue or not, with very low 
recovery probability. The “nonperforming” category contains instead loans and other balance sheet items that are 
3 months overdue, and that are not accruing interest or principal payments (rational close to the most common 90 
days past due). 
49 In Spain, commercial banks are for-profit organizations under shareholders control while savings banks, 
focusing primarily on retail clients, are close to a status of commercial nonprofit organization since their profits 




the interest in assessing whether and how the credit risk measured by the NPL ratio behaves in 
the two different banking paradigms. 
The relation between banks problem loans and the business cycle is confirmed by empirical 
evidence; in this paper, Salas and Saurina (2002) measure the aggregated economic activity by 
the GDP growth rate given its high informative power also with respect to unemployment, real 
wages and real interest rates. In terms of bank specific determinants, the focus is here directed 
towards the rate of credit growth, the composition of the loan portfolio and the incentives to 
take riskier credit policies. Bearing in mind the purpose of the paper, it is then clear that if any 
difference in the risk taking behaviour between commercial and saving banks would be found, 
it would have to be assigned to the different form of ownership and governance. A significant 
credit growth rate is deemed to be one of the most significant determinants of problem loans as 
banks interested in enlarging their market share are likely to trade it off with a reduced 
borrowers’ quality level. A thorough monitoring of borrowers is another key element of a good 
credit policy: recall Berger and DeYoung (1997) findings on the negative relation between cost 
efficiency and problem loans. Similarly to Louzis et al. (2012) and Gosh (2017), this paper 
recognises that different types of loans have different degrees of credit risk. Then the 
composition of the loan portfolio reflects the risk that the managers are taking, being loans to 
the real estate and construction sectors the riskiest ones. The last set of bank specific 
determinants finds in the incentives of bank managers another cause of problem loans. The 
well-known example is the case of the bank with solvency issues that gambles to survive by 
betting on a rapid credit expansion in sectors with high expected returns, but also high risks. As 
Espinoza and Prasad (2010) and Gosh (2017), the paper under analysis applies a logarithmic 
transformation to the ratio of problem loans in order to exploit the abovementioned benefits and 
to better suit the GMM procedure50. Beyond the model’s specification, the estimation method 
employed is the Arellano-Bond estimator (linear GMM estimator) that fits dynamic panel data 
models. In terms of results, the null hypothesis that data referring to commercial and savings 
banks belong to the same empirical model is rejected, signalling that the two institutional 
models do respond to different drivers. Bank specific variables have higher explanatory power 
for savings banks than for commercial banks. Furthermore, problem loans are more sensitive 
to the business cycle in commercial banks than in savings banks and, among savings banks, 
growth policies, management incentives, managerial inefficiency, loan portfolio composition 
and market power have a highly significant effect on problem loans. Among commercial banks 
                                                          
50 GMM procedure is indeed not deemed suitable when the dependent variable is a truncated one as the NPL 




instead, the statistically significant macroeconomic variables are only branch growth, capital 
ratio and size. In the end, ownership and governance affects problem loans through differences 
in the coefficient of the explanatory variables, which implies differences in the internal 
evaluation and management of loan decisions by the banks.         
Among the macroeconomic literature on NPL determinants, a theme that gained particular 
relevance after the global financial crisis is the relationship between sovereign debt and banking 
distress. The seminal paper is in this case Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). The two authors 
identified in the narrowness of the time periods usually considered, one of the most unfortunate 
tendencies of the economic research in general. For this reason, they analyse a panel data 
composed of 70 advanced and emerging economies and they span their analysis over two 
centuries, going back to the date of independence or well into the colonial period for some 
countries. During this time window, they take into consideration 290 banking crises and 209 
sovereign default episodes. The hypothesis framework is extremely complex but it can be 
summarized as follows: first, external debt waves are a recurring antecedent to banking crises. 
Second, since banking crises precede or accompany sovereign debt crises, they may have a 
predictive role. Third, public debt increases ahead of an external sovereign debt crisis as 
governments often hide those debts that far exceed the disclosed levels of external debts. In 
terms of results, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) claim that “banking crises most often either 
precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises” (p.1689). Similarly, Louzis et al. (2012) asserts 
that “the mechanisms at work include either the taking over of massive debt on the part of the 
government which undermines its solvency or the collapse of the currency which inflates 
foreign currency debt” (p. 1014). Nevertheless, according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), the 
opposite causal chain from sovereign debt crisis to banking crisis is not dismissed. This paper, 
besides its results and conclusions, had the role to prompt the inclusion by the academic 
community, of sovereign debt variables in the specification of their models as it is witnessed 
by the postulation of the sovereign debt hypothesis by Louzis et al. (2012).  
Boudriga (2009) investigates the impact of bank industry factors on the aggregate NPL ratio 
analysing data for a panel of 59 countries over the period 2002-2006. The study also examines 
on the one hand the effect of the regulatory framework on the stock of problem loans, on the 
other hand the impact of legal and political environment on the compliance with supervisory 
regulations. The hypothesis framework indeed follow this double purpose. Among the bank 
specific determinants of NPLs, Boudriga (2009) expects a positive association to NPLs of loan 
loss provisions and state ownership, a negative effect of capital adequacy ratio, bank 




expected to have an ambiguous effect on NPLs. With respect to the effects of bank supervision 
on NPLs, this paper foresees a negative impact of the following variables: stringency of capital 
requirements, official supervisory power, private monitoring and supervisory authorities’ 
independence. It may be noticed that the latter variables, excluding the degree of independence 
of supervisory authority, reflect the three pillars of Basel II. From a methodological point of 
view, Boudriga (2009) employs a two-fold specification of the model in order to investigate 
both the banking industry determinants of NPLs and the impact of supervisory environment. 
The baseline model regresses the banking industry variables on NPLs while the second 
specification investigates the impact of bank supervision factors by re-estimating the baseline 
model, this time including each of the four regulatory variables mentioned above. For 
estimation purposes, given the features of the panel data under analysis, the author used the 
PCSE method51. The estimated coefficients signal a negative relationship between NPLs and 
lagged loan loss provision rate, then countries with higher rates of problem loans exhibit lower 
level of provision rates and countries with low rates of NPLs are characterized by a better 
provisioning policy. This contradicts the idea of loan loss provisions as risk control tool and 
then positively related to problem loans. No evidence of association is found between NPLs 
and lagged ROA, probably because the relation between such variables holds at a bank firm 
level but not in aggregate. The estimated coefficients on state ownership are found to be positive 
and significant while foreign participation is found to have a positive effect on reducing the 
degree of bank problem loans. Finally, bank concentration is found to exert a negative effect 
on NPLs. Contrary to Salas and Saurina (2002), the coefficient for the lagged growth rate is not 
significant, signalling that economic conditions are not connected to problem loans. As 
mentioned above, the second part of the paper investigates the impact of the regulatory 
environment on problem loans. The entire set of regulatory variables introduced is not 
significant, suggesting that the regulatory channel is not suitable to reduce risk taking 
behaviour, hence problem loans. This result corroborates the growing literature that claims the 
ineffectiveness of supervisory regulation on banking outcomes. However, this result suffers 
from the fact that the measures used only relate to statutory powers and do not take into 
consideration their effective implementation. For this reason, Boudriga (2009) introduced three 
interactions using the level of corruption, the degree of political openness and the rule of law. 
Nevertheless, even using various specifications, the coefficients never entered significantly.        
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Besides Boudriga (2009), Osei-Assibey and Asenso (2015) and a number of other studies, 
attempt to test and verify the impact of bank capitalization, as measured by the capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) on NPLs. To current date, there is no general consensus among scholars on the 
sign and the magnitude of the relationship between CAR and NPLs. The intuition behind this 
relation is that CAR may serve as a tool to control excessive risk taking behaviour, thus 
preventing NPL build-ups. Building on the moral hazard hypothesis, both Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) and Salas and Saurina (2002) approve the idea that banks with low CAR carry higher 
risk, ultimately causing higher NPLs.   
Osei-Assibey and Asenso (2015) aim at investigating the influence of the central bank’s 
regulatory capital on commercial banks specific outcomes: credit supply, interest rate spread 
and, most importantly for our purposes, non-performing loans. The empirical reference is a 
panel data of commercial banks from Ghana covering the period 2002-2012. This study models 
three separate equations using the system generalised method of moments52 (GMM), one for 
each bank specific outcome on which the impact of regulatory capital requirements is assessed. 
In particular, the dependent variables considered are: net interest margin to capture the interest 
rate spread, credit growth rate as a proxy for credit supply and finally the NPL ratio. For sake 
of coherence, we will discuss only the model referring to the bad-loans problem. Osei-Assibey 
and Asenso (2015) envisage a positive relationship between the net minimum capital 
requirement53and the NPL ratio. The intuition behind such a prediction is that a low excess of 
capital, as compared to the level required, would prevent banks from making excessive risky 
loans. On the other hand, excessive capital holdings could tempt the bank to make riskier loans 
with the purpose to guarantee adequate returns for capital providers. As in the majority of 
precedent literature, the model also controls for other bank-specific characteristics, industry and 
macroeconomic indicators. In terms of results, we remark the positive relation between net 
minimum capital requirement and NPLs, thus confirming the prevision under which banks 
create more (bad) loans when they have excess capital over the required target. Among the 
control variables, we signal the negative effect of GDP growth rate on NPLs, thus corroborating 
the majority of literature that recognizes that higher income levels enable borrowers to better 
meet their loan commitments.  
                                                          
52 The estimation approach choosen (GMM) ensures unbiased and consistent estimates of regression parameters 
in presence of endogeneity and dynamic panel bias.  
53 It should be noted that in this study the capital requirements are expressed as net minimum capital 
requirement. Meaning that such variable is defined as the ratio of the difference between the minimum capital 




Within the body of literature that identify the bank capitalization as the most relevant 
determinant of NPLs, the most-known study is with no doubt Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997). 
This paper investigates the relationship between banks’ leverage and the incentives for 
managers to take inefficient behaviours. There are empirical evidences that agency costs and 
information asymmetries may exert a significant effect on risk, leverage and efficiency, thus 
explaining why some institutions react to increased cost of capital by taking-on more risk. 
Closely related to this paper is the study by Berger and DeYoung (1997). As mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter, such study examines the relationship between bad loans, asset risk 
and cost efficiency using the Granger causality test. The main difference with the paper under 
analysis -Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997)- is indeed the structural relationship assumed to hold 
between risk-taking and efficiency. Results from Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) provide evidence 
on the link between bank capitalization, risk and operating efficiency based on a simultaneous 
equation framework. A positive effect on the level of capital attributable to regulatory pressure 
on underperforming institutions is determined (p.117). On the other hand, the authors claim that 
properly capitalized banks are found to operate more efficiently than less capitalized 
organizations, also, the relationship between inefficiency and credit growth is found to be U-
shaped, indicating that operating efficiency improves at a decreasing rate as loan growth rate 
rises (p.117). 
The last branch of literature we are discussing is the one referring to corporate governance as 
determinant of non-performing loans. The range of variables that can be brought together under 
the corporate governance hat is huge. For this reason, we will not discuss papers related to the 
role of corruption and political imperfections as Barth et al. (2004) and Hu et al. (2004), rather 
we will focus on how the internal structure of government of credit institutions may have a role 
in reducing the NPL build-ups. The seminal paper will be then Tarchouna et al. (2017). This 
paper gains even further relevance since it will provide the grounds for the development of the 
empirical analysis of our study (Chapter 4). 
Tarchouna et al. (2017) aim at estimating the effect of corporate governance on non-
performing loans. In the aftermath of the global financial crises, the weak corporate governance 
principles and the excessive risk taking behaviours that have led to it, shed light on the 
importance of an active role of variables such as board features, CEO pay and ownership in the 
control of dimensions like NPLs. Nevertheless, the simultaneous introduction of a consistent 
number of corporate governance variables in the model if on the one hand increases its 
explanatory power, on the other it may cause problems in terms of over-parameterization. Over 




index that includes many different dimensions of banks’ corporate governance (Grove et al. 
(2011), Love and Rachinsky (2015), Zagorchev and Gao (2015)). The research question 
developed by Tarchouna et al. (2017) can be then summarized as follows: how to evaluate the 
effect of many governance variables on banks NPLs simultaneously? The authors developed 
their study following two steps: first, following prior literature54, build up a corporate 
governance index exploiting the Principal Component Analysis (PCA); second, similarly to 
Salas and Saurina (2002) and Louzis et al. (2012), use the GMM method to investigate the 
determinants of NPLs. The model includes both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables in 
excess of the abovementioned corporate governance index. The model finds empirical 
confirmation in a sample of 184 US commercial banks over the period 2000-2013.  
The dependent variable identified in Tarchouna et al. (2017) is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans, where non-performing loans are defined as the sum of non-accrual loans55 
and 90-days past due loans. The independent variables include, on aggregate, the corporate 
governance index, bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. Given the relevance 
this paper fulfils in the context of our dissertation, we provide the reader with the complete set 
of hypothesis formulated by Tarchouna et al. (2017): 
 The corporate governance index (CGI) is expected to have either a positive or negative 
relation with NPLs. The following variables are considered in the composition of the 
index: board size, CEO duality, board independence, majority ownership and directors’ 
ownership. 
 The bank size, as measured by the logarithm of bank total assets, is expected to have 
either a positive or negative relation with NPLs. Corroborating the positive sign view, 
we recall the too big to fail assumption by Louzis et al. (2012). On the other hand, the 
paper by Salas and Saurina (2002) supports the evidence of a negative relation between 
banks’ size and NPLs level. 
 The proportion of loan loss provisions on bank total loans is expected to have a positive 
relationship with NPLs. Nevertheless, we recall how Boudriga et al. (2009) report a 
negative relation between these variables since the provisioning rate can signal banks 
attitude towards risk. 
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(2011); Veprauskaite & Adams (2013). 
55 Non-accrual loans are defined as loans not earning the predermined rate either because the complete 





 A negative relation is expected between diversification opportunities and NPLs. 
Following Louzis et al. (2012), diversification opportunities are captured by the ratio of 
non-interest income to total income. Corroborating the view of this hypothesis, we recall 
the empirical results of Salas and Saurina (2002). 
 Interest rate is expected to have a positive association to NPLs. Please note how this 
study refers to interest rate as the real interest rate calculated as the difference between 
long-term interest rate and inflation rate.   
 Unemployment is expected to have a positive association to NPLs. This hypothesis 
follows the empirical results of Louzis et al. (2012) that claims how higher 
unemployment rate deteriorates the ability of borrowers to reimburse their credits. 
 A positive relationship is expected between the global financial crisis (captured by a 
time dummy variable) and the NPLs.  
Finally, the financial market risk as captured by the annual downside volatility is employed 
within the model as control variable.  
Principal Component Analysis reduces the five aforementioned corporate governance measures 
into a single index to be used as regressor in the dynamic panel data estimation. Still, it is of 
major interest to consider the contributions, in terms of sign, of each variable to the GCI as a 
whole. Board size has a negative contribution to the index throughout the entire sample except 
for the global financial crisis period (2006-2008) when the weight associated to board size has 
been positive, signalling how large boards may be beneficial during stress periods. Directors 
independence contributes negatively to the index, reflecting the passive role played by 
independent directors within the corporate governance environment. Majority ownership and 
directors’ ownership positively contributes to the CGI, signalling the relevance of the 
ownership structure in the corporate governance system.  
Empirical results show that the coefficient of the CGI is negative and statistically significant at 
a 1% level for small banks while it is significant but positive for medium, large and for the full 
sample of US commercial banks. Building on their corporate governance mechanisms, small 
banks are able to perform a better selection of borrowers thus avoiding too risky prospects that 
may jeopardize the stability and the performance of the bank. Small banks then focus on 
creating value via investments having more controllable risk, this would in turn keep the NPL 
ratio under control. This evidence corroborates the finding of Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) that, 
based on the construction of a Risk Management Index (RMI), claim that those banks having 




performance during the stress-period. On the other hand, NPL ratio of medium and large banks 
in the sample is found to be positively related to the index capturing the quality of corporate 
governance. The authors identify two reasons that may explain this finding: first, having an 
higher degree of liquidity, medium and large banks are more prone to accept riskier investment 
projects as compared to small institutions. Second, the multinational scope of medium and large 
banks is generally associated to the transferral of the parent’s risk level to the subsidiaries. Then, 
a strengthen of corporate governance systems would lose power in a multinational context, not 
allowing a more sound loan-granting policy. 
Besides the CGI, the remaining hypotheses whose expected sign was unidirectional are 
confirmed by models’ estimation: proportion of loan loss provision (+), income diversification 
opportunities (-), real interest rate (+), unemployment (+), time dummy related to global 
financial crisis (+). All the coefficients are found to be significant at least at a 10% level. With 
respect to bank size, empirical results of this study corroborate the too big to fail assumption 























The last chapter of this study will be devoted to present to the reader the empirical analysis 
carried out in order to disentangle the determinants of NPLs’ evolution in the European banking 
system. To perform the analysis a set of econometric and statistical tool will be employed; the 
paper will also provide the reader with some hints for each of them so to allow a sufficient 
understanding to everyone.  
We also stress the importance of including in our research a descriptive phase aimed at a 
complete understanding of the dataset used as input for the analysis. In our case, such stage 
take-on even a deeper relevance given the complexity and the width of the dataset, in particular 
considering the number of variables appraised.   
As it will become clear in the following pages, the goal of our research is to build a consistent 
baseline model able to capture and describe the relations between the ratio on non-performing 
loans held by each bank and a set of both macroeconomic and banking-specific determinants. 
The literature investigating this matter is huge, with an increase of production in the aftermath 
of the global financial crisis56. Building on this idea, we decided to follow a less-explored path 
investigating the empirical effects of a set of corporate governance variables on the magnitude 
of the non-performing loans held by each bank within the European framework. As in 
Tarchouna et al. (2017), the focus on the role of corporate governance on the ability to manage 
exposures is precisely the main contribution of our work to the academic community. 
Differently from Tarchouna et al. (2017), the geographical scope of our work is the European 
banking system and not the American one.        
This chapter will be organized as follows: the first section will introduce the dataset employed, 
explaining the rationale underneath its composition and offering a descriptive analysis 
highlighting the core variables considered. The second section of the chapter will propose the 
specification of the econometric models and hypotheses tested by their means. In particular, 
this section will be furnished with useful references to past literature findings. The third section 
will provide the reader with an essential understanding of the econometric tools employed in 
                                                          




the analysis from a theoretical point of view. The results of the empirical analysis will be 
presented in section four, section five concludes.  
 
4.1.1. Introduction to the dataset 
Since its early stages, this research project has been conceived with the strong ambition to 
highlight common patterns at a European level rather than at a country-specific level. It is 
opinion of the author that the increasing convergence of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework happening within the Euro-Area in the last decade will open significant research 
possibilities to investigate banking-related issues on a European level, in the wake of the 
significant number of papers already performing analysis with such a scope in relation to the 
US market.  
The first step we took with the purpose of composing the dataset has been to decide a rule to 
follow in order to select the banks upon which to perform our empirical analysis. Following a 
common scheme in literature, we decided to pick the top 50 banks in Europe according to their 
total assets amount57. The ranking refers to 2019 and has been published by Business Insider 
on their website58. On the abovementioned 50 banks, we performed a further selection, 
restricting the sample on the base of both data availability and on the banks’ status of being 
listed to regulated exchanges, thus coming up with the final sample of 20 banks that has been 
actually the subject of our research. Data availability has been a relevant and decisive issue 
throughout the process, thus it will be further discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Table 1 - Top 50 European banks by total assets (2019). Source:  Business Insider 
Ranking Bank Identifier Tot. Assets € (bn) Country 
1 HSBC Holdings plc HSBC 2100,13  GBR 
2 BNP Paribas SA BNP 1963,43  FRA 
4 Deutsche Bank AG DBK 1470,38  DEU 
5 Banco Santander SA SAN 1446,15  ESP 
6 Barclays plc BARC 1275,62  GBR 
11 UniCredit SpA UCG 936,79 ITA 
12 Royal Bank of Scotland Group 
plc 
RBS 930,78 GBR 
13 Intesa Sanpaolo SpA ISP 800,01 ITA 
15 UBS Group AG UBS 782,45 CHE 
16 Credit Suisse Group AG CSGN 680,46 CHE 
17 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
SA 
BBVA 671,02 ESP 
19 Nordea Bank AB NDA 581,61 SWE 
                                                          





20 Standard Chartered plc STAN 552,56 GBR 
28 KBC Group NV KBC 292,34 BEL 
29 Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A  281,51 SWE 
32 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
AB 
SEB A 260,41 SWE 
35 Swedbank AB SWED 225,11 SWE 
36 Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 221,35 ESP 
38 Erste Group Bank AG EBS 220,66 AUT 
40 Raiffeisen Gruppe Switzerland RBI AG 194,60 CHE 
 
 
Before entering into the details of the descriptive analysis of the dataset, I would like to spend 
a couple of words regarding the data collection process. The latter is indeed a crucial moment 
of every empirical analysis since solid econometric models can be built only through solid and 
accurate datasets. As it will become clear soon, our empirical analysis relies on variables 
coming from three macro-areas: macroeconomic, banking-specific and corporate governance. 
For each of them, different data sources have been questioned. Concerning the macroeconomic 
area, both the AMECO and the WorldBank (WB) datasets have been used. Time series about 
bank-specific variables have been extracted instead from Thomson Reuters Eikon, while 
corporate governance variables have been hand collected analysing banks’ annual reports, from 
here the importance of including in our sample only listed companies. The main issue that 
caused the reduction of the sample from 50 to 20 banks has been with no doubt the availability 
of data concerning bank-specific variables in general and about non-performing loans ratio in 
particular. As a matter of fact, Eikon dataset includes only partially complete time series of such 
ratio. For this reason, one of the most challenging tasks performed has been to identify the most 
complete time series available on Eikon and then ‘fill the blanks’ by manually building the 
ratios using the annual reports as inputs while simultaneously complying with the Eikon 
definition of the ratio for consistency reasons. Similarly, the construction of the time series 
regarding the corporate governance dimension has been time consuming since each variable 
appraised has been hand collected from the corporate governance section of the annual report 
of the 20 banks of the sample. The choice regarding which dimensions of the corporate 
governance structure to take into consideration has been inspired by Tarchouna et al. (2017) 
and further enriched as original research.  





Table 2 – Summary of the variables collected and analysed. Source: own elaboration 
Variable Definition Source 
Real interest rate Real short-term interest rates, deflator 
GDP (ISRV) 
AMECO 
Unemployment rate Unemployment, total (% of total labor 
force) 
WB 
NPL ratio Nonperforming loans as a percentage of 
total loans and other real estate owned. It 
is calculated as non-performing loans at 
the end of the fiscal year divided by total 
gross loans for the same period and is 
expressed as percentage. 
Eikon 
Total assets Total assets Eikon 
Loan loss provision Ratio of provision for loan losses for the 
fiscal year as a proportion of total loans 
for the same period, expressed as 
percentage. 
Eikon 
Tier 1 ratio Ratio of Tier 1 Capital59 (eoy) to total 
risk-weighted assets for the same period, 
expressed as percentage. 
Eikon 
Non-interest income/Op. income Non-interest income divided by the sum 
of income before tax and total interest 
expense for the same period. This ratio 
represents the portion of operating 
income that comes from non-lending 
sources. 
Eikon 
Efficiency ratio Ratio of non-interest expense for the 
fiscal year to total revenue less interest 
expense for the same period, expressed 
as percentage. It measures the cost to the 
bank of each unit of revenue. 
Eikon 
                                                          
59 Tier 1 Capital, also known as Core Capital, is defined as the sum of common stockholder’s equity, certain 
qualifying issues of preferred stock and minority interest, less goodwill, intangible assets, investments in certain 




Loans growth rate Percent change in the annual period: net 
loans as compared to the same period 
one year ago. It is calculated as net loans 
for the fiscal year minus net loans for the 
same period one year ago divided by the 
annual net loans one year ago, multiplied 
by 100. 
Eikon 
Pretax ROE It represents the return on equity before 
taxes. It is calculated as income before 
tax for the fiscal year divided by the total 






Size either of the Board of Directors or 
of the Supervisory board, depending on 
the type of governance adopted by the 
bank 
AR60 
Board size adjusted Board size relativized to the bank’s 
dimension as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets.  
AR 
Directors and Executives 
ownership 
Percentage of total share capital held by 
directors and executives in the form of 
Ordinary shares. 
AR 
Independence rate Number of independent directors 
divided by the Board Size 
AR 
Executives rate Number of Executives belonging to the 
Board of Directors divided by the Board 
Size 
AR 
Gender diversity rate Number of women belonging to the 




The information collected has been then organized within a panel structure in order to give 
evidence of both the cross-sectional and time series nature of the data. The time window 
considered covers a horizon of 10 years, from 2008 to 2017. The choice of this particular time 
                                                          




window allowed us to dodge the complications arising from the change of accounting standard 
from IAS 39 to IFRS 961. In conclusion, our panel dataset considers 20 European banking 
institutions over a period of 10 years resulting in 200 observations for each variable62.     
 
4.1.2. Descriptive analysis of the dataset 
Before entering into the details of the econometric models specification and estimation, this 
paragraph provides a useful description of the dynamics of the NPLratio across our dataset. 
To better understand the magnitude of the phenomenon associated to our target variable, we 
built a set of categorical variables to help us in our comparative analysis: NPLratio dynamics 
has been then addressed sorting by bank, by region and by dimension. In particular: region is a 
variable that assign to each bank a label in relation of their geographical area (south, continental 
and north). Dimension is instead used to sort banks by their size, as measured by total assets, 
in: small (less than €500bn), medium (between €500bn and €1500bn) and big (more than 
€1500bn).  
The first set of graphs considers the average (full-sample) NPLratio across each bank 
considered in the sample (Figure 4.1) as well as in each size class (Figure 4.2) and in each 
macro-region (Figure 4.3).  The results are not surprising, confirming a strong variability 
between southern and northern credit institutions, with banks belonging to the south-area being 
weighted down by a significant amount of non-performing loans (8,68% versus 2,60%). 
Differences in size on the other hand may not be so relevant to the purposes of non-performing 
loans management. As a matter of fact, we were not able to highlight a significant difference 
between the average NPL ratio values sorted by dimension: banks belonging to the medium-
size class display an average NPL ratio of 5,2% across the sample, while banks belonging to 
both small and big credit institutions are characterized by an average NPL ratio of 4,4%. In 
general, the average NPL ratio spans from a minimum of 0,45% (Swenska Handelsbanken) to 
a maximum of 12,75% (Unicredit).   
                                                          
61 IFRS 9 is the new accounting standard in place since 1st January 2018. It contains provisions on the accounting 
treatment of financial instruments, introducing disruptive changes in the classification and measurement of 
financial instruments, impairment of financial assets and hedge accounting. 
62 The final dataset has been reduced to 186 observations as it has not been possible to fill the missing values for 








Figure 4.2 – Average NPL ratios across the different banks’ size categories considered. Source: own elaboration on 





Figure 4.3 - Average NPL ratios across the different geographical regions considered. Source: own elaboration on Thompson 
Reuters Eikon data. 
 
 
Further analysis can be performed in relation to the distribution of the target variable across the 
sample chosen. The following graph (Figure 4.4) shows precisely the distribution of the 
observations, where each bars’ height signals the percentage of observations recorded in the 
generic range of values. In particular, we highlight how NPL ratios between 0% and 5% 
constitutes approximately 60% of the total observations (200) and how values below 10% 
characterizes approximately 85,5% of the total observations.  








The analysis regarding the distribution of the target variable can be expanded considering once 
again the different regions: the following graphs (Figure 4.5) give evidence of the distribution 
of the variable NPLratio across the three regions considered for our descriptive analysis. Please 
note how, differently from the previous graph, the frequencies over the 200 observations are 
reported (instead of percentages). Nevertheless, this graph is crucial since it corroborates the 
evidence of geographical differences in the magnitude of the phenomenon, with the NPLratio 
distribution being significantly different between southern and northern credit institutions and 
with the continental area that appears to be somewhere in the middle.  
 
Figure 4.5 - Global distribution of NPL ratio by geographical region, frequencies. Source: own elaboration on Thompson 




4.2. Into the empirical analysis 
The conclusion of the descriptive analysis of the target variable allows us to restore the dual 
feature of the project by considering both the cross-sectional and the time series nature of the 
phenomenon. In this paragraph, we will clarify the structure of the project, explaining its 
rationale and its inspiration. Subsequently, we will specify the models and state the hypotheses 




4.2.1. The research project 
The analysis that follows will be structured into two moments: the creation of a Corporate 
Governance Index (CGI) via the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the estimation of 
the econometric models.  
The need of the creation of a Corporate Governance Index to add as regressor in our model is 
borrowed from Tarchouna et al. (2017) and it answers to the willingness of including a set of 
different corporate governance variables in the model without causing statistical problems. In 
fact, these problems would have been linked to the existing interrelation, as substitutability or 
complementarity relations, between the different corporate governance mechanisms (Weir et 
al. 2002; Peasnell et al. 2003; Florackis 2005; Lasfer 2006). Moreover, the introduction of many 
variables can lead to an over-parameterization of the model that can, consequently, influence 
its reliability and make the conclusions biased. To overcome all these statistical problems, 
Tarchouna et al. (2017), as well as prior studies, suggested the necessity of using a single 
corporate governance measure able to evaluate the whole corporate governance system since 
the variables taken in isolation would offer only a limited picture of the bank’s overall corporate 
governance. Building on this evidence, we decided to build our own version of the Corporate 
Governance Index taking advantage of the PCA method63 while enriching the specification of 
Tarchouna et al. (2017) by considering a broader set of variables64.  As mentioned above, the 
outcome of this procedure will be a time series, covering 10 years, of a bank-specific 
governance index that will be included in the model’s specification as independent variable.  
The second step of the research project consists of the estimation of the models and of the 
interpretation of their results. The estimation process is entirely coded and performed using 
Stata16 as computational device. The rationale behind the specification of the models is the 
following: the first model, answering to a consistency request, strictly follows the specification 
employed by Tarchouna et al. (2017). The second model considers four further bank-specific 
variables, as compared to the baseline model. The additional variables are introduced with the 
purpose of capturing a higher part of the individual effect for each bank. Under such occurrence, 
it would be more likely the possibility of a consistent use of the Random Effect estimator (RE) 
that, combining both between and within variation, would result in more interesting estimates 
of the coefficients from an economic point of view. Models 3 and 4 respectively retrace the first 
two models with the only difference that the macroeconomic variables have been replaced by 
                                                          
63 Please refer to paragraph 4.3.2 for further details. 




year dummies. The introduction of year dummies provides an alternative way of accounting for 
the time effect and it also captures potential aggregate macro shocks.  
4.2.2. Specification of the corporate governance variables considered 
We will now briefly account for the formal definitions and assumptions employed in the 
construction of the seven variables considered within the scope of the corporate governance 
index (CGI). The reader may refer to the Appendix for a complete disclosure of the corporate 
governance data hand-collected from each banks’ Annual Reports.  
One-tier system (ots): it is specified as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the corporate 
governance system is monistic, 0 otherwise. It has to be reported that, in the definition of this 
variable, a quite demanding simplification has been applied. As a matter of fact, especially 
within the Italian context, a third corporate governance structure could be considered. This third 
way is usually referred to as “modello tradizionale” and it is mainly characterized by a clear 
separation between administrative and control activities. The former is performed by the Board 
of Directors, appointed by the Shareholders’ meeting while the latter is performed by a 
completely separated entity, called Board of Statutory Auditors, also appointed by the 
Shareholders’ meeting. Within our sample, the only occurrence of “modello tradizionale” is 
associated to Unicredit. Then, with the aim of simplifying the set of variables considered, we 
decided not to create a further dummy variable to capture the presence of this governance 
model, but rather to make it flow into the non-monistic category (ots=0). This decision can be 
justified by the need of accounting for the fact that, contrary to the monistic governance model, 
both in the dualistic and in the “modello tradizionale” environment, the entity designated to 
perform the control tasks does not belong to the Board of Directors. 
Size of the Board of Directors (bsize): it is a variable that captures the numerousness of the 
Board of Directors (or of the Supervisory Board if ots=0). 
Size of the Board of Directors, adjusted (bsize_adj): it is a variable that considers the 
numerousness of the Board of Directors (or of the Supervisory Board) relativized to the 
dimension of the bank, as measured by the natural logarithm of the total assets. This variable 
has been introduced with the purpose of accounting for the heterogeneity in dimension that 
characterizes the banks of the sample.  
Directors’ ownership rate (Dir_Own): it is a variable that measures the number of ordinary 





Rate of independent directors (Indep_r): it is a variable that returns the share of Directors 
appointed with the status of ‘independent’ (from the bank). 
Rate of Executives (Ex_r): it is a variable that counts the number of Executives seated in the 
Board of Directors and compares it with the numerousness of the BoD itself.  
Gender diversity ratio (Gen_Div): it is a variable that counts the number of women belonging 
to the Board of Directors and compares it with the numerousness of the BoD itself. 
Last but not least, we specify that, for consistency purposes, all the information collected 
concerning the different corporate governance dimensions refers to the situation as of the date 
of approval of the Annual Report.  
4.2.3. Specification of the model and hypothesis tested 
In this paragraph, the formal specification of the models estimated will be presented. In 
particular, the hypotheses underlying the first model are heavily inspired by Tarchouna et al. 
(2017), while the second model’s specification answers to the need of finding a way to 
consistently capture an higher part of the bank individual effect. For this reason, a set of four 
additional banking-specific variables has been introduced. Models 3 and 4 do not entail the 
specification of additional hypotheses but they rather consider an alternative way to account for 
the time effect and the potential aggregate macro shocks. The macroeconomic variables used 
as explanatory variables in the first two models have been here replaced by year dummies. In 
terms of hypotheses tested, models 3 and 4 retrace model 1 and 2, respectively.  
4.2.3.1. Model 1 
The first model studied is specified as follows: 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
Where the subscripts 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 denotes the cross sections; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 denotes the number of 
periods of the panel data; 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 denotes the ratio of NPL over total gross loans; 𝛼 is the 
constant term; 𝑀𝐸𝑡 is the 𝑘𝑥1 vector of macroeconomic explanatory variables, 𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 𝑘𝑥1 
vector of bank-specific explanatory variables, 𝛽 is a 𝑘𝑥1 vector of coefficients; 𝑓𝑖 is the 
unobserved bank individual effects and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
The dependent variable of the model is the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. 
For consistency reasons, we adopted the definition of the ratio available on Eikon dataset 




In accordance with prior literature, the explanatory variables include, besides the corporate 
governance index, banking-specific determinants as well as macroeconomic determinants. In 
the following, the set of hypotheses tested is presented. 
 Unemployment. The unemployment rate captures the ability of individuals and 
companies to comply with their debt commitments. Louzis et al. (2012) report a positive 
impact of the unemployment rate on NPLs, justified with the intuition that an increase 
of unemployment deteriorates the ability of the borrowers to reimburse their credits. 
H1: We expect a positive relation between unemployment rate and NPL ratio. 
 Real Interest Rate. Literature widely agrees on the idea that rising interest rates are 
passed though to the lending rate of banks, hence changing the debt-servicing abilities 
of borrowers. 
H2: We expect a positive relation between real interest rate and NPL ratios. 
 Bank size. The bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets. 
According to the “too big to fail” assumption proposed by Louzis et al. (2012) among 
others, the size of any credit institution affects NPL ratios positively. On the other hand, 
relying on the idea of the diversification by bank size, Salas and Saurina (2002) and Hu 
et al. (2004) find that the size of the bank affects its NPL ratio negatively.  
H3: We expect that the relation between bank size and NPL ratio can be either positive 
or negative. 
 Loan Loss Provision. The bank provisions for loan losses are measured by the 
percentage of loan loss provisions over banks’ total loans. A strand of literature 
evidences that the provisions for loan losses are positively related to NPL ratio as the 
retrospective behaviour of provisioning which supposes that the default in loans 
repayment causes the creation of provisions. Nevertheless, Boudriga et al. (2009) find 
a negative relation between loan loss provisions and NPL ratios building on the idea 
that the provisioning rate can signal the banks attitude towards risk.  
H4: We expect a positive relationship between loan loss provision and NPL ratio. 
 Diversification opportunities. The diversification opportunities are here captured and 
measured by the ratio of non-interest income to operating income. Both Louzis et. al 
(2012) and Tarchouna et al. (2017) consider the ratio of non-interest income to total 
income in order to give evidence of the diversification opportunities of the bank. This 
apparent inconsistency is resolved by recalling that the ratio hereby considered reflects 
the portion of operating income (in place of total income) that comes from non-lending 




other than lending in the individual bank, thus diversification. According to Salas and 
Saurina (2002) and Hu et al. (2004), the diversification opportunities are negatively 
related to the NPL ratios.  
H5: We expect a negative relation between diversification opportunities and NPL 
ratios. 
 Corporate Governance Index. We consider seven relevant corporate governance 
variables in the construction of the CGI. The set of variables chosen enriches the set 
employed in Tarchouna et al. (2017)  and it is composed of the following: one-tier 
system, board size, board size adjusted, directors and executive officers’ ownership, rate 
of independent directors, rate of executive officers’ seated in the board of directors, 
gender diversity rate.  
H6: We expect that the relation between the corporate governance index and NPLs can 
be either positive or negative. 
4.2.3.2. Model 2 
The second model studied is specified as follows: 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
Where the subscripts 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 denotes the cross sections; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 denotes the number of 
periods of the panel data; 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 denotes the ratio of NPL over total gross loans; 𝛼 is the 
constant term; 𝑀𝐸𝑡 is the 𝑘𝑥1 vector of macroeconomic explanatory variables, 𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the 𝑘𝑥1 
vector of bank-specific explanatory variables, 𝛽 is a 𝑘𝑥1 vector of coefficients; 𝑓𝑖 is the 
unobserved bank individual effects and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
As is it immediately clear, the econometric specification of the two models is the same; 
nevertheless, the second model is enriched with a broader set of banking variables. The 
hypotheses underlying the introduction of these additional variables are presented below. Please 
note that the entire set of hypotheses tested by model 1 is kept, thus the hypotheses that will 
follow have to be considered as additional, and the ones already specified will not be reported 
again not to incur in redundant information. 
 Tier 1 Ratio. It is computed as the percentage of Tier 1 Capital to the Total Risk-
Weighted Assets for the same period. Numerous studies attempt to verify the impact of 
bank capitalization on NPL ratio. The dimension usually considered to study such 
behaviour is the CAR (capital adequacy ratio), in our research project we consider 
instead the Tier 1 Ratio due to data availability issues. The only difference between the 




in a less conservative measures as compared to the one considered in our study. Based 
on the moral hazard argument, various authors, such as Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
Salas and Saurina (2002) or Us (2017) support the idea that banks with low CAR carry 
greater risk, ultimately causing higher NPL. Boudriga et al. (2009), addressing the 
regulatory situation in Europe, point out how banks with capital that is less than the 
regulatory minimum are forced to adjust their balance sheet to comply with the 
regulatory requirements either by raising more capital or reducing risk-weighted assets 
(Boudriga et al. 2009, p. 288 f.). The study of Barth et al. (2004) suggest that stricter 
CAR (higher) might encourage banks to enter into riskier lending activities to increase 
profitability, thus resulting in higher NPL ratios eventually.  
H7: We expect that the relation between banks’ capitalization, measured by the Tier 1 
ratio, and NPL ratio can be either positive or negative. 
 Cost Efficiency. In our study, the cost efficiency is measured through the ratio of non-
interest expense to total revenue less interest expense. Such a ratio measures the cost to 
the bank of each unit of revenue. Cost efficiency has been one of the most studied and 
revised NPLs’ determinants with a huge strand of literature addressing the direction of 
causality between the increase of NPLs and the cost efficiency of the bank. The timing 
and directional issues regarding cost efficiency go beyond the scope of this project, thus 
the set of relevant hypotheses to report reduces to two.  Beyond the order of causality, 
both under the bad management and the bad luck hypothesis (Berger and DeYoung, 
1997) cost efficiency is negatively related to NPL ratio. On the other hand, under the 
skimping hypothesis, high efficiency is positively correlated with increasing number of 
NPLs, reflecting the idea that banks that poorly allocate resources to underwriting and 
monitoring loan quality are more cost-efficient in the short-term, but suffer of higher 
NPL ratios in the long-term (Berger and DeYoung, 1997, Louzis et. al, 2012).  
H8: We expect that the relation between banks’ cost efficiency measured and NPL ratio 
can be either positive or negative. 
 Lending policy. Banks’ lending policies are captured by the loan growth rate. Kwan and 
Eisenbeis (1997) highlight how rapid credit growth is linked with a risky lending policy 
and thus with higher NPL ratios, on average. Salas and Saurina (2002) address this issue 
from a European perspective, recognizing rapid credit expansion as one of the most 
significant determinants of NPLs. 




 Return on Equity65. Both Klein (2013) and Makri et al. (2014) use return on equity as 
banking-specific explanatory variable and find a significant influence on the NPL rate 
for Eurozone countries. 
H10: We expect that the relation between banks’ return on equity and NPL ratio can be 
either positive or negative. 
4.2.3.3. Models 3 and 4 
Models 3 and 4 do not entail the specification of additional hypotheses. The macroeconomic 
variables used as explanatory variables in the first two models have been here substituted by 
the use of year dummies, thus leading to a different specification of the models. In any case, 
the hypotheses tested by models 3 and 4 retrace those of the models 1 and 2, respectively. 
𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
The introduction of year dummies in the place of the macroeconomic variables is justified by 
the willingness of finding an alternative way to consider both the time effect and possible 
aggregate macro shocks. 
 
The estimation results of the models specified as presented in this paragraph are provided at 
paragraph 4.4.2. 
 
4.3. Econometric introduction on panel data and PCA 
4.3.1. Panel data 
Panel data (or longitudinal data) are time-series of cross-sections where the same individuals 
are followed over time. According to Baltagi (2013), panel data can be defined as the pooling 
of observations on a cross-section of households, firms, countries, etc. over several time-
periods. A generic example: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖          (3) 
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 denotes individual 𝑖 and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 denotes period t, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a 1𝑥𝑘 vector of 
regressors and 𝑓𝑖 is an individual unobserved effect
66 which does not vary over time.  
                                                          
65 Pretax. 
66 In a post-estimates phase, it is also possible to recover the individual specific effects:  





Panel data provide information on individual behaviour, both across individuals and over time, 
meaning they have both a cross-sectional and time-series nature. Analytically, panel datasets 
include N individuals observed at T regular time-periods. They are said to be balanced when 
all individuals are observed in all time-periods (𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇 ∀𝑖) and unbalanced when individuals 
are not observed in all time periods (𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑇). In terms of dimensions, they are usually classified 
either as short panel if there are many individuals and few time periods or as long panel if there 
are many time periods and few individuals. Among the variables that can compose a 
longitudinal dataset we recall: varying regressors (𝑥𝑖𝑡), time-invariant regressors (𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖  ∀𝑡), 
individual-invariant regressors (𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡 ∀𝑖). 
The dual nature of panel data is also reflected in the concept of variance: as a matter of fact, in 
the context of panel data analysis the overall variation can be decomposed in two drivers that 
highlight the cross-sectional and time-series nature of the dataset, respectively. In particular, 
we refer to between variation to describe the variability between individuals (cross-sectional), 
while we refer to within variation to describe the variation existing within individuals (over 
time). It follows that time-invariant regressors have zero within variation, individual-invariant 
regressors have zero between variation and we may want to analyse which component is 
predominant in our dataset in order to make assumptions concerning the right model and 
estimator. 
Recalling (3), the objective of a panel data analysis is to consistently estimate 𝛽. The paramount 
issue is now to determine under what assumptions on the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (exogeneity 
assumptions) and on the unobserved effect 𝑓𝑖, 𝛽 can be consistently estimated. The fulfilment 
of one or more of the following assumptions justifies or rejects the employment of the 
estimators available. The following table summarizes the set of assumptions in turn required by 
the estimators. In particular we have two families of assumptions: 
Exogeneity assumptions 
Weak exogeneity 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑓𝑖) = 0  ⇒   𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑖) = 0                  (𝐴) 
Strict exogeneity 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖1, … . , 𝑥𝑖𝑇 , 𝑓𝑖) = 0 ⇒ 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑠
′ 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠, 𝑡
= 1, … , 𝑇  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑖) = 0                                          (𝐵) 
                                                          
Said otherwise, the intuition about the individual-specific effects is that they can be intended as representing the 





Assumptions on  𝒇𝒊67 
No correlation 𝐸(𝑓𝑖|𝑥𝑖1, … . , 𝑥𝑖𝑇) = 𝐸(𝑓𝑖) = 0                                                                     (𝐶) 
No restrictions  No restrictions on the correlation between 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇             (D) 
 
The estimator we choose to consistently estimate the vector of coefficients 𝛽 depends on the 
exogeneity assumption and on the assumption on the relationship between  𝑓𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡. The 
following table proves to be useful in directing the choice of the estimator to be employed 
towards a consistent estimate of 𝛽. 
 
Pooled OLS estimator 
Weak exogeneity Assumption A 
No correlation between 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 Assumption C 
Random Effects estimator (RE) 
Strict exogeneity  Assumption B 
No correlation between 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 Assumption C 
Fixed Effects estimator (FE) and First difference estimator 
Strict exogeneity  Assumption B 
No restrictions on the correlation between 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 Assumption D 
 
Pooled OLS estimator. It employs both the between and within variation to estimate the 
parameters. From a practical point of view, the pooled OLS estimator is obtained by stacking 
the data over 𝑖 and 𝑡 into a single regression with 𝑁𝑇 observations and estimating it by OLS. 
With no doubt the pooled OLS estimator is the simplest method of estimation, on the other hand 
though, it comes with a set of assumptions that rarely holds. The model we implicitly estimate 
is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                   (4) 
For the coefficients estimated to be consistent we need 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0  68 and 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑓𝑖) = 0. The 
latter is a very restrictive assumption, and it is also the reason why this estimator is not used 
much in literature, even if it is usually at least reported. The set of assumptions required by the 
                                                          
67 Each exogeneity assumption implies that the unobserved (fixed) effect 𝑓𝑖 is uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖𝑡 but it does 
not tell anything about the relationship between 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡  for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. 
68 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝑣𝑖𝑡) = 0 ⇒  𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡




Pooled OLS estimator says nothing about the relationship between 𝑥𝑖𝑠 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 for 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡. Last 
but not least, because of the unobserved heterogeneity captured by 𝑓𝑖, the error term is usually 
serially correlated and thus the use of a cluster-robust variance matrix estimator is required.  
Random Effects estimator (RE). In general terms, inference using Pooling OLS estimator will 
result, most of the times, biased due to the presence of serial correlation of the error terms. 
Estimation through random effects method requires strict exogeneity of the dependent variables 
with respect to the error term (Assumption B) and zero correlation between 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
(𝐸(𝑓𝑖|𝑥𝑖1, … . , 𝑥𝑖𝑇) = 0, Assumption C). Said otherwise, the RE model assumes the individual-
specific effects 𝑓𝑖 to be distributed independently of the regressors. The RE estimator exploits 
the serial correlation characterizing the composite error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 within a 
Generalized Least Squared (GLS) framework. It follows that the Random Effects model is 
written, similarly to the Pooled OLS one, as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒   𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡      (5) 
One of the paramount concepts to understand in the process of the RE estimation is the 
specification of the variance-covariance matrix (V) associated to the composite error term. Each 
diagonal element can be defined as 𝐸(𝑣𝑖𝑡
2 ) = 𝐸(𝑓𝑖
2) + 2𝐸(𝑓𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡) + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡
2 ) = 𝜎𝑓
2 + 𝜎𝑢
2 ∀𝑡 as 
the strict exogeneity assumption implies 2𝐸(𝑓𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0. On the other hand, off-diagonal 
elements can be defined as: 𝐸(𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑖𝑠) = 𝐸[(𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)(𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡)] = 𝜎𝑓
2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠. It strictly 
follows than that the GLS estimator exploits the serial correlation in the error terms as: 





                 (6) 
Where rho is the interclass correlation of the error. Rho is the fraction of the variance in the 
error due to the individual-specific effects. It approaches 1 if the individual effects dominate 
the idiosyncratic error.  
Up to this point, the GLS estimator cannot be implemented since the variance-covariance matrix 
is unknown. The latter depends on two unknown parameters (𝜎𝑓
2, 𝜎𝑢
2) that we need to estimate. 
Such a task can be performed by estimating (5) with OLS and using the estimated residuals 
(𝑣𝑖𝑡) to obtain a consistent estimate of  𝜎𝑓
2 and 𝜎𝑢
2. Omitting the analytical specification of the 
estimator, we can claim that the estimated coefficients (?̂?𝑅𝐸) are consistent and asymptotically 
normal. Under particular circumstances (the composite error variance has the random effect 




Between estimator. it only uses the between variation. It is an OLS estimation of the time-
averaged dependent variable on the time-averaged regressors for each individual. The biggest 
drawback of the between estimator is then clear: it disregards the entire temporal dimension of 
the panel dataset given that data are collapsed through the averaging process into a single 
observation per individual.  
Fixed Effects estimator (FE). It employs the within variation. FE estimation of 𝛽 builds on 
the idea of eliminating the unobserved effect 𝑓𝑖. Such a necessity is justified by the idea that the 
individual-specific effects 𝑓𝑖 contain non-observable errors that may correlate with the 
explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡, thus returning biased estimates. The fixed effects estimator is based 
on the use of time-demeaned variables, namely the individual-specific deviations of variables 
from their time-averaged values. The FE estimator ?̂?𝐹𝐸 is then obtained as an OLS estimation 
of the time-demeaned dependent variable on the time-demeaned regressors (“the transformed 
equation”): 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢?̅?)     𝑜𝑟     ?̃?𝑖𝑡 = ?̃?𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ?̃?𝑖𝑡                (7) 
Please notice how the number of observations on which the estimation is performed is once 
again 𝑁𝑇 and how the individual-specific effects 𝑓𝑖 cancels out.  
In terms of assumptions required, the Fixed Effects estimator requires on the one hand strict 
exogeneity of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 with respect to 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (Assumption B), but on the other hand it allows for 
correlation between 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and the unobserved effect 𝑓𝑖, for 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 (Assumption D). The strict 
exogeneity assumption on the transformed model (in deviation from the mean) is required in 
order to ensure the consistency of the OLS estimation instrumental to obtain ?̂?𝐹𝐸. Under the 
aforementioned set of assumptions, ?̂?𝐹𝐸  is consistent and asymptotically normal. The FE 
estimator is then consistent under weaker conditions than the RE estimator. However, this 
comes at a cost: some of the parameters of the model may be no longer identifiable. As a matter 
of fact, the FE estimator uses the time variation within each cross section, thus the effect of 
regressors that do not vary over time (time-invariant variables) cannot be identified. This 
constitutes the biggest limitation in the use of the FE estimator. The FE estimator is the most 
efficient estimator under the assumption of strict exogeneity and when the assumptions of no 
serial correlation and homoskedasticity of 𝑢𝑖 hold (𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑖
′|𝑥𝑖, 𝑓𝑖) = 𝜎𝑢
2𝐼𝑇).  
When both FE and RE estimators are consistent, the RE estimator is more efficient than the FE 




groups variability with within-group variability, while the FE estimator only uses within-group 
variability. 
First-differences estimator it uses the one-period changes on an individual basis, namely it 
employs the first-differenced variables that can be defined as the individual-specific one-period 
changes for each individual. This is an OLS estimation of the one-period changes of the 
dependent variable on the one-period changes in the regressors. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1)𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1)     𝑜𝑟     ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡        (8) 
Where 𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 . The number of obervations is thus 𝑁(𝑇 − 1) since we lose 
the first observation for each individual because of differencing. Once again, the individual-
specific effects 𝑓𝑖 cancels out and the greatest drawback of this estimator is that time-invariant 
variables are dropped from the model and their coefficients cannot be identified. 
In the following, we will provide a brief introduction regarding the statistical tests commonly 
used in literature in order to choose between the different estimators presented above. 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (LM). This is a test for the random effects model 
based on the OLS residual. It tests whether 𝜎𝑢
2 or, equivalently, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑠) is significantly 
different from zero. In particular, the LM test's null is that the variance of the random effect is 
zero: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖) = 0. Effectively, this would mean that there is no significant variability across 
individuals. Under this scenario, there is no panel effect, the intercepts are the same on an 
individual basis and the estimation of a pooled regression would be meaningful. If the LM test 
is significant, we can reject the abovementioned null hypothesis and the use of either the random 
effects estimator (RE) or of the fixed effects estimator (FE) is justified in order not to ignore 
the panel effect evidenced by the LM test. Nevertheless, we need to provide statistical support 
to the choice between fixed and random effects; in this sense, the Hausman test will do the job. 
Hausman test. The Hausman test (1978) represents the most powerful tool available to scholars 
in order to spot the true model, and consequently the consistent estimator, according to the 
dataset in use. As we have already mentioned, in general terms, the random effects estimator 
would be more efficient, still we need to have the supportive action of the Hausman test in order 
to justify its employment. On the contrary, if the test does not support its use, we shall use the 
fixed effects model.  
The Hausman test is based on the null hypothesis (𝐻0) that the individual-specific effects 𝑓𝑖 are 




𝐻0: 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅𝐸 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝐻1: 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐹𝐸 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 
From the hypothesis specification presented and from the dissertation held within this 
paragraph, it follows that under the null hypothesis, both the Fixed Effects and the Random 
Effects models are consistent. Nevertheless, if the null hypothesis is accepted, the Random 
Effect will result as the true model. On the contrary, if the null hypothesis is rejected, we shall 
conclude that the individual-specific effects 𝑓𝑖 are significantly correlated with at least one of 
the explanatory variable of the model. The latter implies that the Random Effect model cannot 
be considered as the true one and the use of the Fixed Effects model should be preferred in 
order to avoid the inconsistencies that the use of the random effect estimator on the (true) fixed 
effects model would generate on our estimates.    
In other words, Hausman (1978) suggests to compare ?̂?𝑅𝐸, the estimation obtained from the 
Random Effect model, and the ?̂?𝐹𝐸, the estimated coefficients obtained from the Fixed Effect 
model. Said otherwise, Hausman test tests, for time-varying regressors, whether there is a 
significant difference between the fixed and random effects estimators. 




] (?̂?𝑅𝐸 − ?̂?𝐹𝐸)           (9) 
?̂?𝑅𝐸 will be consistent and the best linear unbiased estimator only under the null hypothesis. It 
would be inconsistent when 𝐻0 is rejected. The Hausman test statistic is a chi-squared 
distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters for the time-varying 
regressors. The test statistic is based on the difference between the estimated coefficients in the 
two models considered. When such a difference is significant, the null hypothesis is rejected 
and the Fixed Effects model shall be considered.  
4.3.2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a data reduction method used to re-express multivariate 
data with fewer dimensions. The goal of such methodology is to re-orient the data so that a 
multitude of original variables can be summarized with relatively few components that capture 
the maximum possible information (variation) from the original variables.  
The ultimate purpose of PCA is to find components 𝑧 = [𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑝], which are a linear 
combination 𝑢 = [𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑝]′, of the original variables 𝑥 = [𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑝], that achieve 
maximum variance. The first component 𝑧1 is given by the linear combination of the original 




information not captured by the first component and is also uncorrelated with the first 
component. PCA maximizes the variance of the elements of 𝑧 = 𝑥𝑢, such that 𝑢′𝑢 = 1.  
The solution is obtained by performing an eigenvalue decomposition of the correlation matrix, 
by finding the principal axes of the shape formed by the scatterplot of the data. The eigenvectors 
represent the direction of one of these principal axes. Solving the equation (𝑅 − 𝜆𝐼)𝑢 = 0, 
where R is the sample correlation matrix of the original variables 𝑥, 𝜆 is the eigenvalue, 𝑢 is 
the eigenvector and I is the identity matrix. The eigenvalues 𝜆 are the variances of the associated 
components 𝑧. The diagonal covariance matrix of the components is denoted as 𝐷 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝜆).  
The proportion of the variance in each original variable 𝑥𝑖, accounted for by the first 𝑐 factors, 
is given by the sum of the squared factor loadings; that is: ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 . When 𝑐 = 𝑝 it means that 
all components are retained, thus all variation in the data is explained: ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 = 1.  
Factor loadings are the correlations between the original variables 𝑥 and the components 𝑧, 
from an analytical point of view, it is denoted as: 𝐹 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟(𝑥, 𝑧) = 𝑢𝐷
1
2. 
Next, the topic of component retention is crucial. Since principal component analysis is a data 
reduction method, there is the need to retain an appropriate number of factors based on the 
trade-off between simplicity (retaining as few possible factors) and completeness (explaining 
the most of the variation in the data).  
To conclude we now follow Tarchouna et al. (2017) to draft a list of the main reasons that 
justify the employment of PCA as data reduction method in the context of our research project. 
 it helps to aggregate the existing information of the individual bank corporate 
governance characteristics into a unique index; 
 it controls for multicollinearity that may be caused by the introduction of multiple 
corporate governance variables in the same regression; 
 it produces the weights for each corporate governance variable automatically. This 
makes the CGI able to explain as much of the variance in the set of the corporate 
governance variables selected. 
According to Maddala (2001), the use of the PCA requires the use of two statistical tests to 
validate the methodology, namely the Bartlett’s sphericity test and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) test. The former, by comparing the correlation matrix with the identity matrix, has a 




value of the Bartlett’s test should not be higher than 5%. The KMO measure, commonly used 
for sampling adequacy, ranges between 0 and 1 with 0,5 as lower threshold for acceptance.  
 
4.4. Results  
4.4.1. PCA 
As mentioned above, this project employs the PCA to build a corporate governance index (CGI) 
that evaluates the overall functionalities and characteristics of the governance systems of 
European banks. Within the scope of this study, the PCA summarizes seven variables, 
describing general features of corporate governance, into a single measure called CGI. In 
performing PCA, following Tarchouna et al. (2017), Florackis and Ozkan (2009) and Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013), we take only the first component since it captures the largest percentage of 
variation in the original dataset. This component linearly combines the seven variables chosen 
to represent and describe the corporate governance system of each bank: one-tier system (ots), 
size of the Board of Directors (bsize), size of the Board of Directors corrected by the dimension 
of the bank (bsize_adj), Directors and Executives ownership (Dir_Own), rate of independent 
Directors (Indep_r), rate of Executives within the Board of Directors (Ex_r), gender diversity 
rate (Gen_Div).  
Contrary to Tarchouna et al. (2017), we decided not to propose the same analysis performed on 
subsamples defined by size of the bank, given the scarce number of banks included in our 
original sample: 20 versus 184.  
The PCA method assigns weights for each corporate governance attribute rather than using 
arbitrary or equal weights. Such weights are then employed within the creation process of the 
governance index. Table 3 displays the weights of each individual corporate governance 
variable used to build the CGI for the full sample of European banks over the 2008-2017 period. 
Table 3 – PCA, loadings results. Own elaboration on hand-collected data from banks’ Annual Reports over the 2008-2017 
period. For consistency with the original paper, the loadings have not been subject to any rotation. 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
ots 0,1288 -0,2246 -0,3555 -0,3485 -0,4094 -0,4811 -0,5118 -0,5053 -0,4838 -0,4975
bsize 0,5101 0,6059 0,5935 0,6020 0,6236 0,6003 0,5021 0,4906 0,5130 0,5089
bsize_adj 0,5068 0,6064 0,5870 0,5973 0,6286 0,6111 0,5104 0,5005 0,5283 0,5166
Dir_Own 0,2470 -0,1767 0,1377 0,0257 -0,0463 -0,0831 -0,3029 -0,2939 -0,3228 -0,2763
Indep_r -0,4882 -0,3971 -0,3199 -0,3791 -0,0167 -0,0426 0,2514 0,2983 0,2203 0,2696
Ex_r 0,3351 0,1476 0,0011 0,0003 -0,0601 -0,1138 -0,2617 -0,2686 -0,2410 -0,2775
Gen_Div -0,2339 -0,0630 -0,2357 -0,1220 -0,2061 -0,1144 -0,0449 -0,0771 -0,1135 -0,0247
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0,446 0,533 0,566 0,570 0,571 0,524 0,570 0,571 0,473 0,532




The weights produced as output of the PCA are the loadings that express the direction and 
magnitude of the correlation between the single variable in a specific year and the principal 
component in the same year. The sign of the weights then signals either positive or negative 
correlation with the principal component. It is at this point important to underline that we are 
not yet addressing the issue of the determinants of NPLs. The sign and the magnitude of the 
weights presented in Table 3 are linked to the construction of the corporate governance index 
and not in any way to the dynamics of NPL ratios. 
Based on the results of Table 3, we can claim that the rate of independent directors has a 
negative contribution to the corporate governance index up to 2013 and a positive one from 
then onwards. This result is partially in line with the finding of Tarchouna et al. (2017) on US 
commercial banks evidencing a consistent negative sign for the rate of independence of the 
directors. This empirical result is thought to reflect the passive role played by independent 
directors in the corporate governance and may shed light on the alternative control assisted by 
insider directors who can facilitate the transmission of information between board and 
management. As a matter of fact, the weight associated to the rate of Executives seated in the 
Board is positive up to 2011 and negative from then onwards, perhaps signalling a 
complementarity of the two measures. In terms of size of the Board, it has to be noted how, 
both for bsize and bsize_adj, the weights are positive and consistent throughout the entire time-
window considered. This is partially in contrast with the findings of Tarchouna et al. (2017) 
that evidence positive weights only during distressed periods. The numerousness of the boards 
appears then to play a different role in affecting the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
depending on the geographical area considered (Europe vs USA). 
Interestingly, the weights associated to the gender diversity rate are consistently negative for 
the entire time-period, signalling a negative correlation between the percentage of women 
belonging to the boards and the principal component. Such result is definitely odd but it may 
be explained in the same way as for the independent Directors rate. The negative weights 
associated to the gender diversity rate may signal the passive role of female Directors within 
the Board. Furthermore, the female presence in the Boards started to became significant only 
around 2012-201369, meaning that for more than a half of the time-window considered the 
awareness towards the gender diversity in board was extremely low.  
Table 3 also reports the two diagnostic measures commonly used in order to assess the 
significance of the PCA method as compared to the informative contribution of the original 
                                                          




dataset. The null hypothesis of the Bartlett’s test of sphericity, suggesting that the correlation 
matrix equals to the identity matrix, is rejected for all the years considered. This evidence 
confirms the existence of a linear relationship between variables. On the other hand, the critical 
threshold value of 0,5 of the KMO measure is reached eight times out of ten. Hence, the results 
of these two tests generally support the validity of the use of PCA in our study. 
As last reminder, we recall that the results of the application of the PCA (the first component 
in our case-study) are then organized in the context of the panel data structure, thus resulting in 
a 10-years time series on an individual bank base. Such outcome will be then introduced as 
independent variable in the models’ specification, and its contribution will be assessed though 
the commonly used econometric tools.  
4.4.2. Panel data estimation 
This paragraph will be structured as follows: first, we will report the standardized table 
describing the different components of variability (overall, between, within) for every variable 
included in the models estimated; second, we will present the estimation results for each model 
specified considering four different panel data estimators: pooled OLS estimator, fixed effects 
estimator (within estimator) and random effects estimator. In particular, two variations of the 
random effect estimator (RE) have been employed: generalized least squares (GLS) and  
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Recalling that neither AIC (Akaike Information 
Criterion) nor BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) can be computed for the Random Effects 
GLS estimation, the estimation via Random Effects MLE allowed us to assign an index of 
goodness of fit to the Random Effect model, hence making a comparative analysis among the 
different models possible. Building on the evidences of a set of statistical tests, we will finally 
choose the most consistent estimator for each model and provide a thorough discussion 
regarding the sign, the magnitude and the significance of each coefficient in relation to the 
hypotheses previously formulated. 
4.4.2.1. Descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables 
The following table constitutes a decisive moment of panel data analysis as it is able to give 
evidence of the weight of the different components that drive the overall variability of each 
variable employed in the research.  
Table 4 – Descriptive analysis. Source: own elaborations. 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
NPL ratio Overall .0441678 .0403349 .001 .1961 N =     186 
Between  .036441 .0044595 .1197185 n =      20 




unemployment rate Overall .1017245 .0125453 .0748463 .1192839 N =     186 
Between  .0014716 .0987942 .1061629 n =      20 
Within  .0124775 .0744328 .1197733 T-bar =     9.3 
real interest rate Overall -.0025065 .0114469 -.0136896 .0258473 N =     186 
Between  .0015329 -.0071463 .0010055 n =      20 
Within  .0113667 -.0164917 .0261115 bar =     9.3 
ln(assets) Overall 20.17055 .925739 18.14986 21.64474 N =     186 
Between  .9175618 18.57531 21.42165 n =      20 
Within  .1628221 19.56208 20.66828 T-bar =     9.3 
loan loss provision Overall .0074548 .0067503 -.0037 .0335 N =     186 
Between  .0049324 .0004 .01696 n =      20 
Within  .0046535 -.0054327 .0253548 T-bar =     9.3 
Non-interest 
income/Op. income 
Overall 1.168387 1.257424 -.06 13.01 N =     186 
Between  .8435692 .298 4.265 n =      20 
Within  .9866762 -2.026613 9.913387 T-bar =     9.3 
Tier1 ratio Overall .1328167 .0413909 .068 .287 N =     186 
between  .0254071 .1042714 .2053875 n =      20 
Within  .0336996 .0372167 .2462167 T-bar =     9.3 
efficiency ratio Overall .7543065 .5232353 .461 7.196 N =     186 
between  .2438397 .4872 1.59 n =      20 
Within  .4664323 -.0676935 6.360306 T-bar =     9.3 
loans growth rate Overall .0402903 .2321911 -.269 2.807 N =     186 
between  .0580181 -.0177143 .24775 n =      20 
Within  .2258295 -.4764597 2.59954 T-bar =     9.3 
pre-tax ROE Overall .0876183 .1274413 -.814 .769 N =     186 
between  .0667923 -.08075 .171375 n =      20 
Within  .1104618 -.6923817 .7250183 T-bar =     9.3 
CGI Overall -.0226517 1.598384 -3.43535 3.855551 N =     186 
Between  1.30993 -2.161802 2.544437 n =      20 
Within  .9798573 -3.791932 3.035398 T-bar =     9.3 
 
As first consideration, we shall underline how the sample has been reduced to 186 observation 
as the issue of missing values over banking-specific variables has been accounted for. Such a 
reduction allowed the estimation of the different models specified on a common sample of data.  
In terms of drivers of variability, we evidence a general equilibrium, with the exception of a 
small number of explanatory variables characterized by the prevalence of one component. In 
particular, the variability of both loans growth rate and pre-tax ROE, is mostly driven by the 
within component signalling perhaps the presence of a sort of industry-best-practice among 
banks on a year-by-year basis that would indeed explain the prevalence of the variability over 
time on top of that among individuals. Considering the Corporate Governance Index, we 
highlight a slightly higher importance of the variability among individuals (between variation) 
as compared to the within variation. This is completely rational as corporate governance models 
may differ substantially among the individual banks but are likely not to change much over 




regarding the bank size as measured by the natural logarithm of the total assets: the overall 
variability is almost completely driven by the between variability as the differences in assets 
over time (time series perspective) are negligible compared to the magnitude of the total assets 
amount.  
Lastly, we report that the between component of the macroeconomic determinants should be 
zero as we used time-series referring to the Euro-area, hence from a purely theoretical point of 
view, both the unemployment rate and the real interest rate are non-varying determinants on the 
individual banks basis. Still, the table above reports a between component slightly positive as 
a consequence of the distortions caused by the sample reduction process aimed at obtaining a 
common sample for our estimates. 
4.4.2.2. Model 1 – Results  
The following table presents the estimation results of Model 1 considering different panel data 
estimators. 
Table 5 – M1, Estimation results. Source: own elaboration. 
 (PooledOLS) (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects GLS) (Random Effects MLE) 
 NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio 
Main     
unemployment rate 0.395 0.626*** 0.586*** 0.610*** 
 (0.263) (0.163) (0.174) (0.161) 
     
real interest rate -0.512*** -0.387** -0.459** -0.431** 
 (0.156) (0.190) (0.201) (0.187) 
     
ln(assets) -0.00747 0.0164* 0.000678 0.00484 
 (0.00450) (0.00872) (0.00479) (0.00610) 
     
loan loss provision 3.125*** 1.549*** 1.938*** 1.744*** 
 (0.526) (0.325) (0.330) (0.319) 
     
non-interest 
income/Op. income 
0.00470* -0.000712 -0.000153 -0.000538 
 (0.00248) (0.00150) (0.00156) (0.00147) 
     
CGI 0.00595* 0.000889 0.00252* 0.00171 
 (0.00306) (0.00145) (0.00144) (0.00141) 
     
_cons 0.125 -0.362** -0.0424 -0.127 
 (0.0806) (0.176) (0.0978) (0.124) 
N 186 186 186 186 
R2 0.445 0.361   
AIC -763.1 -959.4 . -867.0 
BIC -740.6 -936.9 . -838.0 
Standard errors in parentheses 






The first step in the analysis of the estimation results is to take into consideration a set of 
statistical tests commonly used in literature in order to guide the choice of the researcher 
towards the best regression estimates, given the dataset available. The Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier test (LM) assesses the presence of a panel-effect within the dataset in use. 
If the LM test is significant, the use of the random effects model in place of the OLS model is 
justified, precisely in order to give empirical substance to the panel-effect evidenced by the LM 
test itself. In our particular case the LM test resulted significant, hence the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the presence of the panel-effect justifies and requires the employment of estimators 
different from the Pooled OLS one. 
 𝐻0: 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢) = 0 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑟2(01)  =    114.40 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 >  𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑟2 =    0.0000 
Nevertheless, we still need to provide statistical support to the choice between fixed and 
random effects; in this sense, the Hausman test will do the job.  
𝐻0: 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 




] (?̂?𝑅𝐸 − ?̂?𝐹𝐸) 
 =        47.2 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 =       0.0000 
The p-value of 0,0000 leads us to reject the null hypothesis and to adopt the Fixed Effects model 
as the true model for our research. We recall that the use of the Random Effect estimator would 
result in inconsistent estimates if the true model is the Fixed Effects one, thus in this case we 
shall prefer consistency over efficiency and use the Fixed Effects estimator. The statistically 
relevant results of the estimation are then those reported in the second column of the Table 
above.  
The unemployment rate is found to have a positive and strongly significant (1%) effect on the 
NPL ratio, precisely as evidenced by Louzis et al. (2012). Contrary to the statement of 
hypothesis nr.2, the real interest rate is found to be negatively correlated to the dependent 
variable of the study. As one may expect, this evidence strongly deviates from the literature. 




by a particular and unique management of the interest rates. As confirmed by Table 4, the full-
sample average of the real interest rate for the Euro-Area has been negative for the time-period 
considered. We can argue then that this is the reason that generated estimation results not 
comparable with those evidenced by former literature. In accordance with the “too big to fail” 
assumption formulated by Louzis et al. (2012), the size of the bank, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the total assets amount, is found to have a positive and significant at a 10% level 
relation with the stock of NPLs. With regard to the loan loss provisions, we can now confirm 
the hypothesis stated on the pre-estimation stage of a positive and strongly significant 
relationship between loan loss provisions and NPL ratio. Such a dynamic has been justified in 
literature by the idea of the retrospective behaviour of provisioning that supposes that the 
default in loans repayment causes the creation of provisions. In accordance with Salas and 
Saurina (2002) and Hu et al. (2004), our results evidence a negative effect, yet not significant, 
of the diversification opportunities on NPL ratios. Results on diversification effect are further 
weakened by the magnitude of the coefficient estimated. Consistently with the full-sample, 
medium banks and large banks results of Tarchouna et al. (2017), the corporate governance 
index is found to positively affect the NPL ratio, even though in the context of this first model 
(FE) we have not managed to reject the null hypothesis claiming the CGI coefficient being 
equal to zero.  
4.4.2.3. Model 2 – Results  
With respect to model 1, a set of additional four banking-specific variables is introduced. The 
employment of FE estimator in the context of Model 1 implicitly caused to the elimination of 
the unobserved individual effects 𝑓𝑖. The broader specification of Model 2 is then not arbitrary 
but rather it is aimed at capturing a higher part of the bank individual effect so to avoid their 
elimination for estimation purposes. In this way we are implicitely steering the Hausman Test 
towards the acceptance of the Random Effect model as true model. The latter would be the 
desirable conclusion as it would justify the employment of the RE estimator in place of the FE 
estimator. As we know, the FE estimator considers only within variation while the RE estimator 
considers both within and between variation so its estimates may provide us with different 
results. 
Table 6 – M2, estimation results. Source: own elaboration. 
 (PooledOLS) (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects GLS) (Random Effects MLE) 
 NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio 
Main     
unemployment rate 0.185 0.628*** 0.542*** 0.598*** 
 (0.225) (0.178) (0.187) (0.172) 




real interest rate -1.098*** -0.364 -0.606** -0.491* 
 (0.298) (0.262) (0.272) (0.254) 
     
ln(assets) -0.00823** 0.0171* -0.000281 0.00403 
 (0.00382) (0.00967) (0.00486) (0.00631) 
     
loan loss provision 2.583*** 1.515*** 1.891*** 1.705*** 
 (0.542) (0.342) (0.346) (0.331) 
     
non-interest 
income/Op. income 
0.00372 -0.000259 -0.000122 -0.000397 
 (0.00244) (0.00161) (0.00166) (0.00154) 
     
Tier1 ratio -0.237** -0.00157 -0.0512 -0.0218 
 (0.0897) (0.0597) (0.0617) (0.0579) 
     
efficiency ratio -0.00420 0.00380 0.00357 0.00406 
 (0.00631) (0.00472) (0.00500) (0.00458) 
     
loans growth rate -0.00846 -0.00809 -0.00441 -0.00504 
 (0.0121) (0.00737) (0.00754) (0.00695) 
     
pre-tax ROE -0.0473 0.0000798 -0.00710 -0.00355 
 (0.0386) (0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0197) 
     
CGI 0.00467 0.000897 0.00241* 0.00165 
 (0.00300) (0.00146) (0.00146) (0.00140) 
     
_cons 0.204*** -0.379* -0.0138 -0.109 
 (0.0666) (0.193) (0.0999) (0.128) 
N 186 186 186 186 
R2 0.487 0.373   
AIC -769.6 -954.9 . -862.1 
BIC -734.1 -919.5 . -820.2 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
 
Retracing the analysis performed regarding model 1, we compute once again the Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (LM) in order to verify the presence of a panel-effect within 
the dataset in use. The LM test resulted significant, thus the null hypothesis is rejected and the 
presence of the panel-effect justifies and requires the employment of estimators different from 
the Pooled OLS one. Consequently, the coefficients reported in the first column of Table 6 shall 
not be deemed consistent for the purposes of our research. 
 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡:   𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢)  =  0 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑟2(01)  =     82.30 




Having established the presence of a panel-effect, it is now crucial to implement the Hausman 
test in order determine the true model between the fixed and random effect one, and 
consequently choosing the most efficient and consistent estimator among those available. The 
results of the Hausman test are the following: 
 𝐻𝑜:  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 




] (?̂?𝑅𝐸 − ?̂?𝐹𝐸) 
=        34.40 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 =       0.0002 
The significance of the test leads us to reject the use of the Random Effects model as the true 
model for our research. Building on this evidence, we employ once again the Fixed Effects 
estimator as it is consistent and most efficient within the scope of Model 2 specification. The 
statistically relevant results of the estimation are then those reported in the second column of 
Table 6. 
The addition of the banking-specific variables does not change the results obtained within the 
estimation of Model 1. In particular, Model 2 estimates corroborate the results in terms of sign, 
significance and magnitude of all the coefficients estimated by Model 1, with the exception of 
the loss of significance of the coefficient associated to the real interest rate. In terms of 
capitalization, in accordance with Berger and DeYoung (1997), Salas and Saurina (2002) and 
Us (2017), the Tier1 ratio is proved to beneficially affect the NPL ratio by lowering its amount. 
The statistically significance of the coefficient is instead not ensured, so as for the coefficients 
capturing the effect of the other banking specific variables. In our research project, we used the 
efficiency ratio as defined by Eikon dataset in order to study the cost efficiency of the bank. 
Results lack of significance but the negative coefficient would have led us to reject the skimping 
hypothesis (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Lousiz et al., 2012). Results regarding the loan growth 
rate are not satisfying as we would expect it to have a positive effect on NPL ratio, while 
empirical evidence suggests insignificance of the coefficient, thus not providing any support to 
the findings of both Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Salas and Saurina (2002). Not-significant 
and extremely small in absolute value is the coefficient associated to the pretax-ROE. This 
variable is then deemed not to have an influence on the NPLs accumulation in the context of 
our study; the latter result contradicts the empirical evidence of both Klein (2013) and Makri et 




CGI explanatory variable. Once again though, in the context of the Fixed Effects, we are not 
able to reject the null hypothesis claiming the CGI coefficient being equal to zero.  
4.4.2.4. Model 3 – Results   
Model 3 specification retraces that of Model 1 and it answers to the willingness of finding an 
alternative way of capturing both the time effect and the potential aggregate macro shocks. The 
set of macroeconomic variables employed as regressors in Model 1 is then replaced by the 
introduction of year dummies, while keeping the banking-specific and the CGI explanatory 
variables fixed.   
Table 7 – M3, estimation results. Source: own elaboration. 
 (PooledOLS) (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects GLS) (Random Effects MLE) 
 NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio 
Main     
2008 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
2009 0.00117 0.00994 0.00574 0.00815 
 (0.00427) (0.00646) (0.00727) (0.00618) 
     
2010 0.0209*** 0.0223*** 0.0220*** 0.0223*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00611) (0.00702) (0.00590) 
     
2011 0.0218*** 0.0247*** 0.0246*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.00640) (0.00625) (0.00712) (0.00600) 
     
2012 0.0288*** 0.0344*** 0.0335*** 0.0346*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00630) (0.00716) (0.00604) 
     
2013 0.0251** 0.0363*** 0.0340*** 0.0360*** 
 (0.0120) (0.00659) (0.00753) (0.00634) 
     
2014 0.0411*** 0.0429*** 0.0433*** 0.0435*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00624) (0.00711) (0.00599) 
     
2015 0.0274*** 0.0351*** 0.0344*** 0.0355*** 
 (0.00789) (0.00683) (0.00772) (0.00654) 
     
2016 0.0326*** 0.0343*** 0.0359*** 0.0356*** 
 (0.00768) (0.00675) (0.00756) (0.00643) 
     
2017 0.0256*** 0.0244*** 0.0263*** 0.0254*** 
 (0.00597) (0.00651) (0.00738) (0.00625) 
     
ln(assets) -0.00782* 0.00897 -0.00345 0.000806 
 (0.00447) (0.00926) (0.00397) (0.00581) 
     
loan loss 
provision 
3.356*** 1.894*** 2.555*** 2.126*** 
 (0.537) (0.358) (0.360) (0.337) 







0.00467* -0.00105 0.000303 -0.000811 
 (0.00227) (0.00158) (0.00170) (0.00150) 
     
CGI 0.00578* 0.00105 0.00350** 0.00186 
 (0.00300) (0.00145) (0.00145) (0.00137) 
     
_cons 0.149 -0.176 0.0706 -0.0111 
 (0.0878) (0.186) (0.0800) (0.117) 
N 186 186 186 186 
R2 0.475 0.391   
AIC -759.2 -954.4 . -864.1 
BIC -714.0 -909.3 . -812.5 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (LM): 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡:   𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢)  =  0 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑟2(01)  =     119.60 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 >  𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑟2 =    0.0000 
Having established the presence of a panel-effect, the implementation of the Hausman test 
allows us to determine the true model among the Fixed and Random Effects ones, and 
consequently to choose the most efficient and consistent estimator among those available. The 
results of the Hausman test are the following: 
 𝐻𝑜:  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 




] (?̂?𝑅𝐸 − ?̂?𝐹𝐸) 
=        65.89 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 =       0.0000 
The significance of the test makes us reject the use of the Random Effects model as the true 
model for our research. Consequently, we employ once again the Fixed Effects estimator since 
it is consistent and most efficient within the scope of Model 3 specification. The statistically 
relevant results of the estimation are then those reported in the second column of Table 7. 
Year dummies control for time variation of the dependent variable across the panel.  Estimation 
results signal the presence of a positive, yet not linear, time effect given by the presence of 
positive but not constant coefficients associated to each year dummy70. In this scenario, the 
                                                          




coefficients signal the effect, on the dependent variable (NPL ratio), of being in one year as 
compared to the base year (2008 in our case). Furthermore, the positive signs of the coefficients 
corroborate the evidence of a general build-up of the NPL ratio, as compared to the “2008-
level”, in the years following both the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe. 
Model 3 verifies the result of Model 1 in terms of loan loss provision, hence confirming the 
idea that the retrospective behaviour of provisioning supposes that the default in loans 
repayment causes the creation of provisions. Model 3 also confirms the sign associated by 
previous models to the effects of both corporate governance and diversification opportunities. 
With regards of the bank size, if on the one hand the positive correlation with NPL ratio is 
confirmed, the 10% significance of the coefficient evidenced by the first model is now lost.  
4.4.2.5. Model 4 – Results  
Model 4 specification retraces that of Model 2. This being said, the set of macroeconomic 
variables employed as regressors in Model 2 are replaced by the introduction of year dummies, 
while the banking specific and the CGI explanatory variables are kept fixed. As in Model 3, the 
year dummies are introduced to control for time variations of NPLratio across the panel.   
Table 8 – M4, estimation results. Source: own elaboration. 
 (PooledOLS) (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects GLS) (Random Effects MLE) 
 NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio NPLratio 
Main     
2008 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
2009 0.00861 0.0105 0.00882 0.0100 
 (0.00680) (0.00714) (0.00911) (0.00681) 
     
     
2010 0.0309*** 0.0231*** 0.0281*** 0.0247*** 
 (0.00836) (0.00690) (0.00872) (0.00653) 
     
2011 0.0276*** 0.0250*** 0.0280*** 0.0270*** 
 (0.00825) (0.00713) (0.00881) (0.00666) 
     
2012 0.0362** 0.0350*** 0.0374*** 0.0370*** 
 (0.0140) (0.00736) (0.00906) (0.00686) 
     
2013 0.0364** 0.0374*** 0.0393*** 0.0393*** 
 (0.0171) (0.00792) (0.00979) (0.00745) 
     
2014 0.0531*** 0.0442*** 0.0515*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.0149) (0.00777) (0.00947) (0.00727) 
     
2015 0.0440*** 0.0364*** 0.0440*** 0.0398*** 




     
2016 0.0507*** 0.0363*** 0.0485*** 0.0408*** 
 (0.0135) (0.00916) (0.0107) (0.00852) 
     
2017 0.0445*** 0.0271*** 0.0404*** 0.0311*** 
 (0.0123) (0.00891) (0.0105) (0.00837) 
     
ln(assets) -0.00851** 0.0110 -0.00587* 0.000791 
 (0.00372) (0.0101) (0.00320) (0.00594) 
     
loan loss 
provision 
2.788*** 1.911*** 2.693*** 2.147*** 
 (0.546) (0.382) (0.382) (0.353) 




0.00381* -0.000538 0.00159 -0.000551 
 (0.00205) (0.00169) (0.00192) (0.00156) 
     
Tier1 ratio -0.259*** -0.0410 -0.183*** -0.0680 
 (0.0890) (0.0633) (0.0705) (0.0596) 
     
efficiency ratio -0.00523 0.00404 -0.000240 0.00399 
 (0.00610) (0.00479) (0.00589) (0.00453) 
     
loans growth 
rate 
-0.0122 -0.00766 -0.00826 -0.00569 
 (0.0116) (0.00751) (0.00902) (0.00688) 
     
pre-tax ROE -0.0485 0.00654 -0.0195 0.00360 
 (0.0372) (0.0212) (0.0257) (0.0201) 
     
CGI 0.00434 0.000940 0.00389*** 0.00167 
 (0.00283) (0.00146) (0.00149) (0.00136) 
     
_cons 0.201** -0.217 0.136** -0.00835 
 (0.0739) (0.203) (0.0650) (0.119) 
N 186 186 186 186 
R2 0.522 0.403   
AIC -768.6 -950.0 . -859.8 
BIC -710.6 -892.0 . -795.3 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (LM): 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡:   𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢)  =  0 
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑟2(01)  =     84.81 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 >  𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑟2 =    0.0000 
The result of the Breusch-Pagan LM test establishes the presence of a panel-effect, hence 
proving inconsistency of PooledOLS estimator. Now it is crucial to implement the Hausman 




consequently choosing the most efficient and consistent estimator among those available. The 
results of the Hausman test are the following: 
 𝐻𝑜:  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 




] (?̂?𝑅𝐸 − ?̂?𝐹𝐸) 
=        9.73 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑐ℎ𝑖2 =       0.9145 
The non-significance of the test leads us adopt the Random Effects model as the true model for 
our research. Building on this evidence, we employ the Random Effect estimator as it is 
consistent and most efficient for the scope of Model 4 specification. The statistically relevant 
results of the estimation are then those reported in the third and fourth column of Table 8 above. 
The interpretation of the coefficients associated to the year dummies is precisely the same 
presented with regards to Model 3, hence it will not be proposed again in order to avoid 
redundancy. Nevertheless, the time effect appears to be reinforced in magnitude by the 
introduction of further explanatory variables able to capture unobserved individual specific 
heterogeneity.  
Model 4 confirms the sign and the significance of the estimates obtained by model 2 concerning 
loan loss provision and loans growth rate. Bank size is now found to beneficially affect the 
level of NPL ratio by lowering its amount. This effect, even though small in magnitude, is 
confirmed in literature by the papers of Salas and Saurina (2002) and Hu et al. (2004) that 
identified the banks’ size as a form of diversification, namely diversification by asset size.  
The relevance of including this fourth model within the scope of our research project is justified 
by the paramount results obtained with respect to both the Tier1 ratio and the Corporate 
Governance Index. Tier 1 ratio is found to significantly (1%) and negatively affect the NPL 
ratio. Such a result corroborates those of Berger and DeYoung (1997), Salas and Saurina (2002) 
and Us (2017) that proved how the Tier1 ratio beneficially affect the NPL ratio by lowering its 
amount. On the other way around, building on the moral hazard argument, this evidence may 
be rationalized by claiming that banks with low levels of capital carry greater risk, ultimately 
causing higher levels of NPLs.  
In terms of Corporate Governance Index, Model 4 evidences a positive and strongly significant 
effect (1%) on the dependent variable. On the other hand, the effect estimated is small in 
absolute value. Our result is in line with that of Tarchouna et al. (2017) referred to full-sample 




(2017) evidence a coefficient of (0,006620), (0,031307) and of (0,021957) for the full-sample, 
large and medium banks, respectively. The banks of the sample considered appear then to be 
poorly-governed given that their corporate governance index is positively related to NPLs. In 
order to explain the positive coefficient of CGI, two explanations could be advanced. First, 
given the fact that our sample is made mostly of large credit institutions, their intrinsic high 
level of liquidity leads them to accept the investment even in risky projects (Tarchouna et al. 
(2017)). The excessive risk-taking occurs when they accept projects without sufficiently 
making the trade-off between the returns, the risk of projects and the possibility of losses 
(Zagorchev & Gao (2015)). In such a scenario, the corporate governance seems unable to 
prevent the management from taking bad lending decisions. Second, we recall the domino effect 
studied by Upper and Worms (2004) linking credit risk and interbank lending. Reminding that 
the banks belonging to our sample are generally multinational institutions, we argue that the 
level of risk in a multinational bank can be transferred between subsidiaries and the parent bank. 
Putting together the ideas and in accordance with the domino effect, we can claim that the failure 
of a subsidiary can lead to the failure of many banks in different countries without being directly 
influenced by the original shock. In such a scenario, even though credit institutions try to 
strengthen their corporate governance system, this latter loses its power in multinationals and 
loses the ability to ameliorate loan quality.  
 
4.5. Conclusions and limitations 
In this research, we provide an empirical study of the relation between bank corporate  
governance and non-performing loans using a sample of 20 European banks over the 2008-
2017 period.  
Based on seven variables related to governance structure, we use the principal component 
analysis (PCA) in order to build a corporate governance index (CGI) for the full sample of 
banks considered. The main advantage of using the PCA resides in the fact that this method 
produces a single measure of corporate governance which evaluates the overall bank corporate 
governance system without the need of any subjective judgment concerning the production of 
weights related to the different individual corporate governance variables.  
The central finding of this study is that the corporate governance fails to protect European banks 
from the excessive risk-taking that damages their performance and loan quality thereafter. This 
finding can be explained by arguing that the high level of liquidity that characterizes large 
multinational credit institutions pushes their Directors to increase their investment and ignore 
the undue risks and potential losses. Additionally, the corporate governance can be thought to 




implies the domino effect linking credit risk, interbank lending and risk transmission between 
parent and subsidiaries.  
Our study contributes to the literature dealing with the association between corporate 
governance and bank risk-taking. This strand of literature encompasses many studies: Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012), Erkens et al. (2012), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Minton et al. (2014) 
among others and argues that boards push their banks to maximize the shareholders’ wealth by 
taking excessive risks.  
The heterogeneity that characterizes the dataset employed can be seen as a weakness at first 
sight. On the other hand, one of the purposes of the present work was to evidence common 
patterns at a European level, thus broadening the scope of the analysis and overcoming the 
traditional setting of country-specific analyses. The consideration of a broad and heterogeneous 
dataset was thus inevitable and, on the contrary, it may lay the foundation for future studies and 
analyses performed when the European landscape will be even more uniform.  
Our study can be extended firstly by considering other corporate governance variables in the 
construction of the CGI, that is to consider different dimensions in studying the relationship 
between banks’ CGI and loan quality, and secondly, by increasing the dimension of the panel. 
As a matter of fact, the size of the panel hereby considered is excessively limited: if the length 
of the time-window considered is similar to the one employed by Tarchouna et al. (2017)71, the 
cross-sectional dimension of our study deviates considerably from the reference. A sample of 
184 commercial banks as in the reference paper was indeed out of our reach from a 
computational and data-collection point of view. A broadening of the sample shall with no 
doubt lead to more significant results, and it would also allow for a partitioning of the sample 
according to the size of each credit institution. The latter analysis has not been feasible in the 
context of the present work given the scarce number of banks considered. In terms of further 
limitations, our research suffers mainly from the loss of the dynamic perspective. The paper by 
Tarchouna et al. (2017) performs indeed a dynamic GMM panel data estimation while we 
decided to capture only the static side of the panel data thus dropping the lagged dependent 
variable. This decision is justified by the lack of a long dataset as well as by the search for 
simplicity.  
Another weakness of our research resides in the fact that the model that evidences a strong 
significance of the corporate governance index is also the model with the worst goodness of fit 
to the data. Running a comparative analysis employing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
                                                          




and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) among the models estimated, we obtain the 
following results. 
Table 9 – Goodness of fit, comparative analysis. Source: own elaboration. 
 M1-FE M2-FE M3-FE M4-RE(MLE) 
AIC -959,4 -954,9 -954,4 -859,8 
BIC -936,9 -919,5 -909,3 -795,3 
 
We recall that the model with the lowest values of either AIC or BIC is the one with the highest 
goodness of fit. In our particular case, Model 4 is characterized by the highest values both of 
AIC and BIC, thus resulting the model with the worst goodness of fit. Nevertheless, we shall 
underline in conclusion that the Random Effects model was able to capture, for all the models 
specified, a significance of at least 10% for the coefficient of interest (CGI). This evidence, 
together with the consistency of the sign (+) and with the results of Model 4, reassures us 
































Top 50 European banks by total assets – Business Insider.  
 Bank Tot. Assets € (bn) Country 
1 HSBC Holdings plc 2100,13  GBR 
2 BNP Paribas SA 1963,43  FRA 
3 Crédit Agricole Group 1763,17  FRA 
4 Deutsche Bank AG 1470,38  DEU 
5 Banco Santander SA 1446,15  ESP 
6 Barclays plc 1275,62  GBR 
7 Société Générale SA 1275,13  FRA 
8 Groupe BPCE 1259,42  FRA 
9 LLoyds Banking Group plc 914,14  GBR 
10 ING Groep NV 846,22  NLD 
11 UniCredit SpA 936,79 ITA 
12 Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc 930,78 GBR 
13 Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 800,01 ITA 
14 Crédit Mutuel Group 793,52 FRA 
15 UBS Group AG 782,45 CHE 
16 Credit Suisse Group AG 680,46 CHE 
17 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 671,02 ESP 
18 Rabobank 602,99  NLD 
19 Nordea Bank AB 581,61 SWE 
20 Standard Chartered plc 552,56 GBR 
21 DZ Bank AG 505,60 DEU 
22 Danske Bank A/S 475,39 DNK 
23 Commerzbank AG 452,49 DEU 
24 Cassa depositi e prestiti SpA 419,53 ITA 
25 PAO Sberbank of Russia 392,55 RUS 
26 ABN AMRO Group NV 390,08 NLD 
27 CaixaBank SA 383,19 ESP 
28 KBC Group NV 292,34 BEL 
29 Svenska Handelsbanken AB 281,51 SWE 
30 DNB ASA 274,52 NOR 
31 Nationwide Building Society 262,05 GBR 
32 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 260,41 SWE 
33 Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 238,00 DEU 
34 La Banque Postale SA 231,48 FRA 
35 Swedbank AB 225,11 SWE 
36 Banco de Sabadell SA 221,35 ESP 
37 BFA Sociedad Tenedora de Acciones SAU 221,12 ESP 
38 Erste Group Bank AG 220,66 AUT 
39 Bayerische Landesbank 214,52 DEU 
40 Raiffeisen Gruppe Switzerland 194,60 CHE 
41 Nykredit A/S 191,62 DNK 
42 JSCVTB Bank 188,36 RUS 
43 Dexia SA 178,85 BEL 
44 Belfius Banque SA 167,96 BEL 
45 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 165,22 DEU 
46 Banco BPM SpA 161,21 ITA 
47 Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale 158,35 DEU 
48 Zürcher Kantonalbank 140,04 CHE 
49 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 139,15 ITA 
50 OP Financial Group 137,24 FIN 
Coloured cells signal the banks that have been included in the sample of the empirical 
analysis of chapter 4.
 
 
Detail of the corporate governance variables observed – Annual Reports. 
 
 
2008 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 21 0,0408% 66,6667% 28,5714% 14,2857% 98,5195% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 15 0,0475% 100,0000% 0,0000% 20,0000% 69,9187% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 18 0,0893% 0,0000% 0,0000% 44,4444% 83,6710% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 19 3,6912% 47,3684% 31,5789% 10,5263% 91,4706% 
Barclays BARC 1 16 0,0603% 68,7500% 31,2500% 12,5000% 74,4606% 
Unicredit UCG 0 23 0,0000% 69,5652% 4,3478% 0,0000% 110,7480% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 9 0,0071% 55,5556% 33,3333% 0,0000% 41,5805% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,0000% 84,2105% 0,0000% 5,2632% 93,7303% 
UBS UBS 1 12 0,2009% 91,6667% 0,0000% 16,6667% 57,0773% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 13 0,1778% 100,0000% 0,0000% 7,6923% 63,4737% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 14 0,0610% 78,5714% 21,4286% 7,1429% 69,6103% 
Nordea NDA 1 15 0,0220% 80,0000% 0,0000% 26,6667% 75,0868% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 13 0,0280% 69,2308% 30,7692% 15,3846% 66,4754% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 25 0,0000% 12,0000% 12,0000% 4,0000% 126,9775% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 12 0,4302% 75,0000% 8,3333% 33,3333% 62,8192% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 14 0,0872% 64,2857% 7,1429% 28,5714% 72,7142% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 10 0,0160% 70,0000% 0,0000% 60,0000% 52,8341% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 12 0,0092% 58,3333% 16,6667% 8,3333% 65,9259% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 13 0,0942% 92,3077% 0,0000% 30,7692% 67,9880% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 6 0,0394% 100,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 32,8536% 
   2009 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 21 0,0359% 71,4286% 28,5714% 14,2857% 98,9398% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 14 0,0407% 57,1429% 0,0000% 28,5714% 65,2837% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 20 0,0942% 0,0000% 0,0000% 35,0000% 94,6559% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 19 0,0000% 52,6316% 31,5789% 10,5263% 91,2229% 
Barclays BARC 1 13 0,0793% 69,2308% 23,0769% 0,0000% 61,4211% 
 
 
Unicredit UCG 0 23 0,0000% 78,2609% 4,3478% 8,6957% 111,3836% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 12 0,0077% 66,6667% 25,0000% 8,3333% 56,1466% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,0000% 84,2105% 0,0000% 5,2632% 93,8132% 
UBS UBS 1 12 0,1132% 91,6667% 0,0000% 16,6667% 58,1884% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 14 0,2220% 92,8571% 0,0000% 7,1429% 68,7605% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 13 0,0710% 76,9231% 15,3846% 7,6923% 64,6834% 
Nordea NDA 1 14 1,7757% 57,1429% 0,0000% 21,4286% 69,8425% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 16 0,0251% 56,2500% 37,5000% 12,5000% 81,9007% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 22 0,0000% 13,6364% 13,6364% 4,5455% 112,2623% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 12 0,4311% 75,0000% 8,3333% 25,0000% 62,6675% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 14 0,0969% 64,2857% 7,1429% 21,4286% 72,7938% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 10 0,0289% 70,0000% 0,0000% 60,0000% 52,6849% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 13 0,0100% 53,8462% 15,3846% 15,3846% 71,3024% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 19 0,0910% 63,1579% 0,0000% 31,5789% 99,3653% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 7 0,1066% 100,0000% 0,0000% 0,0000% 38,5678% 
 2010 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 17 0,2412% 70,5882% 29,4118% 23,5294% 79,6988% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 15 0,0407% 61,1111% 13,3333% 33,3333% 70,0428% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 22 0,1201% 0,0000% 4,5455% 27,2727% 102,9573% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 20 3,0394% 50,0000% 30,0000% 10,0000% 95,6020% 
Barclays BARC 1 13 0,0907% 76,9231% 15,3846% 15,3846% 61,1032% 
Unicredit UCG 0 23 0,0000% 73,9130% 4,3478% 8,6957% 111,3794% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 11 0,0063% 72,7273% 18,1818% 18,1818% 51,7624% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,0000% 94,7368% 0,0000% 10,5263% 93,5690% 
UBS UBS 1 11 0,1683% 90,9091% 0,0000% 18,1818% 52,9487% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 15 0,3298% 86,6667% 0,0000% 6,6667% 73,0545% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 12 0,0710% 75,0000% 16,6667% 8,3333% 59,6113% 
Nordea NDA 1 14 0,0413% 64,2857% 0,0000% 21,4286% 69,3757% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 16 0,0303% 68,7500% 31,2500% 12,5000% 80,9235% 
 
 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 23 0,0000% 13,0435% 8,6957% 4,3478% 117,4284% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 12 0,4248% 75,0000% 8,3333% 25,0000% 62,1895% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 15 0,0995% 66,6667% 6,6667% 40,0000% 77,6881% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 12 0,0278% 75,0000% 0,0000% 50,0000% 62,9308% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 15 0,0097% 60,0000% 13,3333% 13,3333% 81,5606% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 18 0,0809% 100,0000% 0,0000% 27,7778% 94,0327% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 15 0,0755% 100,0000% 0,0000% 6,6667% 80,2481% 
 2011 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 17 0,0223% 76,4706% 23,5294% 23,5294% 79,4266% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 16 0,0508% 88,8889% 6,2500% 31,2500% 74,7702% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 22 0,1872% 0,0000% 0,0000% 36,3636% 102,3481% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 18 2,2239% 50,0000% 27,7778% 11,1111% 85,9303% 
Barclays BARC 1 12 0,3552% 75,0000% 8,3333% 16,0000% 56,2017% 
Unicredit UCG 0 20 0,0000% 70,0000% 5,0000% 10,0000% 96,9327% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 13 0,0128% 76,9231% 15,3846% 23,0769% 60,9880% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,1438% 94,7368% 0,0000% 5,2632% 93,7061% 
UBS UBS 1 12 0,1868% 91,6667% 0,0000% 8,3333% 57,4765% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 14 0,3107% 85,7143% 0,0000% 7,1429% 68,0353% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 13 0,0690% 76,9231% 15,3846% 7,6923% 64,4093% 
Nordea NDA 1 12 0,0423% 58,3333% 0,0000% 25,0000% 58,9154% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 17 0,0339% 58,8235% 35,2941% 11,7647% 85,2470% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 25 0,0000% 12,0000% 8,0000% 4,0000% 128,4070% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 12 0,4457% 75,0000% 8,3333% 25,0000% 61,7560% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 15 0,1142% 66,6667% 6,6667% 33,3333% 77,3443% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 12 0,0212% 75,0000% 0,0000% 41,6667% 62,6488% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 15 0,0090% 60,0000% 13,3333% 13,3333% 81,4109% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 19 0,0813% 94,7368% 0,0000% 26,3158% 99,1512% 







 2012 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 16 0,0188% 81,2500% 18,7500% 25,0000% 74,6388% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 16 0,0482% 62,5000% 6,2500% 31,2500% 74,8752% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 20 0,1096% 80,0000% 0,0000% 40,0000% 93,3595% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 16 1,9216% 50,0000% 31,2500% 18,7500% 76,3286% 
Barclays BARC 1 12 0,1573% 76,9231% 16,6667% 8,3333% 56,2606% 
Unicredit UCG 0 13 0,0000% 92,3077% 7,6923% 30,7692% 62,9623% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 12 0,0159% 75,0000% 16,6667% 25,0000% 56,5946% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,1397% 89,4737% 0,0000% 5,2632% 93,4666% 
UBS UBS 1 12 0,2434% 91,6667% 0,0000% 25,0000% 57,7886% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 15 0,2251% 93,3333% 0,0000% 13,3333% 73,3294% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 14 0,0720% 78,5714% 14,2857% 14,2857% 69,1462% 
Nordea NDA 1 13 0,0179% 69,2308% 0,0000% 23,0769% 63,9762% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 21 0,0423% 66,6667% 28,5714% 14,2857% 105,0737% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 20 0,1936% 15,0000% 10,0000% 10,0000% 103,2828% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 12 0,4296% 75,0000% 8,3333% 25,0000% 61,7180% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 15 0,1223% 66,6667% 6,6667% 40,0000% 77,0337% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 12 0,0214% 75,0000% 0,0000% 41,6667% 62,5391% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 15 0,0053% 53,3333% 20,0000% 13,3333% 79,3638% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 18 0,0784% 100,0000% 0,0000% 27,7778% 93,8445% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 18 0,1254% 100,0000% 0,0000% 11,1111% 96,1075% 
 2013 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 17 0,0176% 76,4706% 23,5294% 29,4118% 79,4847% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 16 0,0449% 62,5000% 6,2500% 25,0000% 75,0579% 
 
 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 20 0,1183% 80,0000% 0,0000% 35,0000% 94,3380% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 16 1,6665% 56,2500% 31,2500% 18,7500% 76,8020% 
Barclays BARC 1 15 0,1039% 73,3333% 13,3333% 20,0000% 70,7390% 
Unicredit UCG 0 19 0,0000% 63,1579% 5,2632% 21,0526% 92,5384% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 11 0,0325% 72,7273% 18,1818% 27,2727% 52,5390% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,1516% 84,2105% 0,0000% 26,3158% 93,8181% 
UBS UBS 1 12 0,2338% 91,6667% 0,0000% 25,0000% 58,4458% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 13 0,2255% 92,3077% 0,0000% 15,3846% 63,7801% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 13 0,0800% 76,9231% 23,0769% 15,3846% 64,4101% 
Nordea NDA 1 13 0,0179% 69,2308% 0,0000% 30,7692% 64,1598% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 18 0,0429% 66,6667% 27,7778% 11,1111% 89,9495% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 20 0,1934% 5,0000% 15,0000% 15,0000% 103,6771% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 11 0,4759% 45,4545% 9,0909% 27,2727% 56,5456% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 16 0,1093% 68,7500% 6,2500% 43,7500% 82,2480% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 12 0,0257% 75,0000% 0,0000% 41,6667% 62,6820% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 14 0,0014% 64,2857% 21,4286% 14,2857% 74,0253% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 15 0,0645% 100,0000% 0,0000% 26,6667% 78,4761% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 16 0,1697% 100,0000% 0,0000% 6,2500% 85,6166% 
 2014 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 17 0,0198% 76,4706% 23,5294% 35,2941% 79,0644% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 16 0,0465% 62,5000% 6,2500% 31,2500% 74,5762% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 20 0,1158% 80,0000% 0,0000% 35,0000% 94,0778% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 14 1,4151% 64,2857% 35,7143% 28,5714% 66,7959% 
Barclays BARC 1 14 0,0934% 80,0000% 14,2857% 21,4286% 65,7840% 
Unicredit UCG 0 19 0,0000% 63,1579% 5,2632% 21,0526% 92,4398% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 10 0,0221% 70,0000% 20,0000% 30,0000% 47,5611% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,0178% 84,2105% 0,0000% 26,3158% 93,6496% 
UBS UBS 1 11 0,2359% 90,9091% 0,0000% 27,2727% 53,3996% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 13 0,1866% 92,3077% 0,0000% 15,3846% 63,5479% 
 
 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 14 0,0800% 50,0000% 21,4286% 21,4286% 68,9832% 
Nordea NDA 1 12 0,0214% 66,6667% 0,0000% 41,6667% 59,0499% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 17 0,0558% 64,7059% 29,4118% 11,7647% 84,1061% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 18 0,2070% 22,2222% 16,6667% 22,2222% 93,1799% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 10 2,4145% 50,0000% 10,0000% 20,0000% 51,2429% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 15 0,0962% 66,6667% 6,6667% 46,6667% 77,1185% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 11 0,0257% 72,7273% 0,0000% 45,4545% 57,1982% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 14 0,0010% 57,1429% 21,4286% 7,1429% 74,0295% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 17 0,0616% 100,0000% 0,0000% 29,4118% 89,0281% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 17 0,1132% 100,0000% 0,0000% 11,7647% 91,3221% 
 2015 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 18 0,0224% 77,7778% 22,2222% 33,3333% 83,6422% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 14 0,0280% 57,1429% 7,1429% 35,7143% 65,3793% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 22 0,0394% 72,7273% 0,0000% 31,8182% 103,7182% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 15 1,2465% 53,3333% 26,6667% 33,3333% 71,3738% 
Barclays BARC 1 14 0,1116% 71,4286% 14,2857% 28,5714% 66,2191% 
Unicredit UCG 0 17 0,0000% 58,8235% 5,8824% 35,2941% 82,6328% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 11 0,0120% 72,7273% 18,1818% 27,2727% 52,8223% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 0 19 0,0097% 89,4737% 0,0000% 26,3158% 93,4467% 
UBS UBS 1 10 0,2617% 90,0000% 0,0000% 30,0000% 48,5907% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 12 0,0788% 91,6667% 0,0000% 25,0000% 58,7041% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 15 0,0600% 53,3333% 20,0000% 20,0000% 73,4021% 
Nordea NDA 1 13 0,0237% 69,2308% 0,0000% 38,4615% 64,0784% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 14 0,0607% 78,5714% 14,2857% 21,4286% 69,3233% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 16 4,4983% 18,7500% 18,7500% 25,0000% 82,7029% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 9 12,7415% 55,5556% 11,1111% 33,3333% 46,3151% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 15 0,0999% 66,6667% 6,6667% 46,6667% 77,2332% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 11 0,0215% 72,7273% 0,0000% 45,4545% 57,0778% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 15 0,0008% 60,0000% 20,0000% 13,3333% 78,3042% 
 
 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 20 0,0588% 100,0000% 0,0000% 30,0000% 104,6433% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 16 0,0987% 100,0000% 0,0000% 18,7500% 86,2281% 
 2016 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 18 0,0260% 77,7778% 22,2222% 33,3333% 83,5723% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 14 0,0154% 64,2857% 7,1429% 41,6000% 65,2554% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 20 0,0280% 80,0000% 0,0000% 35,0000% 94,3960% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 15 1,1990% 53,3333% 26,6667% 40,0000% 71,3766% 
Barclays BARC 1 13 0,0618% 76,9231% 15,3846% 30,7692% 61,6805% 
Unicredit UCG 0 17 0,0000% 64,7059% 5,8824% 35,2941% 82,6370% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 12 0,0219% 75,0000% 16,6667% 25,0000% 58,0879% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 1 19 0,0062% 73,6842% 5,2632% 36,8421% 93,1289% 
UBS UBS 1 11 0,2546% 90,9091% 0,0000% 27,2727% 53,4275% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 13 0,1214% 92,3077% 0,0000% 23,0769% 63,5480% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 15 0,0600% 53,3333% 20,0000% 20,0000% 73,4894% 
Nordea NDA 1 13 0,0197% 69,2308% 0,0000% 38,4615% 64,2349% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 13 0,0558% 76,9231% 15,3846% 23,0769% 64,2377% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 16 0,1999% 18,7500% 12,5000% 31,2500% 82,3341% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 10 2,6547% 70,0000% 10,0000% 50,0000% 51,4663% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 17 0,1010% 70,5882% 5,8824% 52,9412% 87,5047% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 10 0,0112% 70,0000% 0,0000% 50,0000% 51,9979% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 14 0,0005% 50,0000% 21,4286% 14,2857% 73,0137% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 18 0,0595% 100,0000% 0,0000% 33,3333% 93,9745% 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG RBI AG 0 16 0,0731% 100,0000% 0,0000% 18,7500% 86,3335% 
 2017 bank ots bsize Dir_Own Indep_r Ex_r Gen_Div bsize_adj 
HSBC HSBA 1 17 0,0293% 82,3529% 17,6471% 29,4118% 79,1941% 
BNP Paribas BNP 1 14 0,0155% 64,2857% 7,1429% 41,6000% 65,4481% 
Deutsche Bank DBK 0 20 0,0218% 80,0000% 0,0000% 35,0000% 94,7340% 
Banco Santander SAN 1 14 1,1290% 72,7273% 21,4286% 35,7143% 66,3794% 
Barclays BARC 1 14 0,0782% 78,5714% 14,2857% 21,4286% 66,7704% 
 
 
Unicredit UCG 0 17 0,0000% 70,5882% 5,8824% 35,2941% 82,7449% 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 1 14 0,0280% 78,5714% 14,2857% 35,7143% 68,1645% 
Intesa SanPaolo ISP 1 19 0,0080% 73,6842% 5,2632% 36,8421% 92,7002% 
UBS UBS 1 11 0,3013% 90,9091% 0,0000% 36,3636% 53,7145% 
Credit Suisse CSGN 1 12 0,1024% 100,0000% 0,0000% 16,6667% 58,9984% 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA 1 13 0,0600% 46,1538% 23,0769% 23,0769% 63,8749% 
Nordea NDA 1 14 0,0187% 71,4286% 0,0000% 42,8571% 69,3711% 
Standard Chartered STAN 1 14 0,0358% 71,4286% 14,2857% 28,5714% 69,5443% 
KBC Groep NV KBC 1 16 0,2609% 18,7500% 18,7500% 31,2500% 82,0789% 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SHB A 1 11 2,9076% 63,6364% 9,0909% 45,4545% 56,5416% 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SEB A 1 15 0,0769% 66,6667% 6,6667% 46,6667% 77,4164% 
Swedbank AB SWED 1 11 0,0163% 72,7273% 0,0000% 45,4545% 57,1989% 
Banco de Sabadell SA SAB 1 15 0,0002% 66,6667% 20,0000% 13,3333% 78,0630% 
Erste Group Bank AG EBS 0 19 0,0595% 100,0000% 0,0000% 36,8421% 98,8958% 
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